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This dissertation examines the case of 250-300,000 largely Orthodox Christian refugees 
who fled Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina for the Habsburg Empire during the uprisings 
of 1875-1878. The violence during this period started out as a peasant uprising, but over 
the course of three years cascaded into revolts and violence across the Ottoman Balkans 
and led to a major European diplomatic crisis. The Treaty of Berlin of 1878, which ended 
the violence, reconfigured the political geography of the Balkans, making the former 
Ottoman provinces of Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia independent; giving a sweeping 
autonomy to Bulgaria, and handing over to Austria-Hungary the administration of a 
nominally Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina. Refugees played an under-appreciated role 
in the international and domestic politics of the period, and this dissertation argues that 
forced migration was in fact one of the key considerations of Great Power diplomacy. 
Forced migration offered a means to measure degree of violence, and control over 
population movement offered a way for empires to lay claims to legitimacy. In a similar 
manner, philanthropists and international humanitarians used forced migration to build 
and advocate for their own civic spheres. The dissertation argues that during this period, 
the modern category of “refugee” was defined as states developed processes to manage 
refugees domestically and to create international policies for refugee aid and return.  
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Over the course of the summer and fall of 1875, a series of small skirmishes between 
Orthodox Christian peasants and their Muslims landlords in the southern reaches of 
Ottoman Hercegovina gradually coalesced, strengthened, and expanded into an organized 
insurgency that quickly extended across Hercegovina, and then, by mid-August, spread to 
Bosnia. In the following three years, the insurgency in Bosnia and Hercegovina 
fluctuated in strength and influence, but failed—despite the efforts of numerous activists 
and the interventions of neighboring states and empires—to develop a coherent ideology 
or unified nationalist agenda. What began as a peasant uprising protesting high taxes, 
bureaucratic venality and perceived injustice made worse by a bad harvest never entirely 
lost the disarray of its humble beginnings.1 Various leaders and groups never fully agreed 
on basic questions over the legitimacy of Ottoman rule, the position of the Muslim elite 
and landowners, or the role and influence of neighboring Serbia, Montenegro, or Austria-
Hungary.  
The uprisings also triggered a series of larger, more violent events in the Ottoman 
Balkans: April 1876 saw a Bulgarian nationalist uprising in the Ottoman Danube 
province, followed by the so-called Bulgarian Horrors; in July 1876 war broke out 
                                                
1 Milorad Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878  (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1960). 
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between Serbia, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire; and in April 1877 the Russian 
Empire declared war against the Ottomans. When the final peace was settled in 1878, 
Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro all won true independence, Bulgaria a near-
independent autonomy, and Bosnia and Hercegovina were placed under Austro-
Hungarian administration while the Sultan retained nominal sovereignty.2 The Berlin 
Treaty of 1878 discarded the post-Crimean War commitment to non-intervention in 
Ottoman domestic affairs and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, replacing 
those principles with the recognition of successor states, military occupation, and 
European administration of Ottoman territories. Although the Ottoman flag still flew in 
large parts of the Balkans, after the Berlin Treaty the majority of the Ottoman Balkans—
”Turkey in Europe”—ceased to exist. 
The violence that remapped the peninsula’s political geography also fundamentally 
altered its demographics. Forced population displacement and the death of non-
combatants reached a level unprecedented in modern European history. Forced migration 
began with the early days of the violence in Hercegovina, and over the three years, some 
250,000 mainly Orthodox Christians took flight from Bosnia and Hercegovina—
amounting to about one fifth of the provinces’ total population and nearly one half of the 
Orthodox population. Tens of thousands of these refugees went to Serbia and 
Montenegro; in Montenegro especially refugees from Hercegovina took part in the war 
                                                
2 Montenegro, while part of the Ottoman Empire, had never really been incorporated into it. Romania and 
Serbia had been under Ottoman suzerainty since the 1860s. Serbia paid tribute to the Sultan, but the last 
Ottoman garrison withdrew from the Belgrade fortress of Kalemegdan in early 1867. Leften Stavros 
Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453  (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958). 257. 
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against the Ottoman Empire.3 The vast majority of the refugees from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, however, fled to the Austro-Hungarian provinces of Croatia, Slavonia, and 
Dalmatia, where they were incorporated into a massive, state-run, refugee-aid project. 
Elsewhere in the Balkans, most notably in the Danube and Edirne provinces that would 
become Bulgaria, by 1877 the opposite movement could be seen, but to a much greater 
extreme. During the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, perhaps 1.5 million Muslims 
fled the provinces, going deeper into the Ottoman Empire and often being resettled in 
Anatolia. Another 250-300,000 Muslims from the Eastern Balkans are thought to have 
died.4 Displacement took place across the entire Balkans during these years, just as 
civilian death and forced migration was endemic to the Ottoman/Russian front in the 
eastern Ottoman Empire.  
Nevertheless, the subject of this dissertation is this first group of refugees—the 
Christians of Bosnia and Hercegovina and their flight, mainly to Austria-Hungary. While 
significantly smaller than the mass of Bulgarian refugees, the case of refugees from 
Bosnia and Hercegovina presents a unique set of circumstances that plots a transitional 
moment in the history of the refugee and asylum and, more broadly, the idea of 
“population politics.” By looking at the refugee question of 1875-1878 from the vantage 
of state-run refugee aid, civic activism and humanitarian aid, and the development of 
                                                
3 See, for example, Document 260, von Thoemel to Andrássy, 19 X 1878. Actenstücke aus den 
Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über orientalische 
Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877), (Wien: K.K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1878). 
 
4 Kemal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics, Turkish and 
Ottoman Studies (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). 75. Justin McCarthy is more 
conservative. He estimates about one million Muslims fled. Many of these were Circassians and Tatars who 
had been previously settled in Bulgarian lands. About 500,000 refugees remained in permanent exile. Justin 
McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922  (Princeton: Darwin 
Press, 1995). 81-94. 
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both domestic and international refugee policies, this dissertation argues that refugees 
offered states and civic groups not just challenges, but opportunities. The large number of 
refugees posed a wide range of security, financial, public health, and domestic political 
problems to the Habsburg Empire in particular, and the refugees’ very existence was an 
indictment of the Ottoman Empire’s ability to rule its European provinces. Refugees 
stood as the international face of an insurgency that the Ottoman government insisted was 
domestic. Even though it quickly became clear that insurgents were using Habsburg 
territory to stage their operations, that large sections of the Habsburg public along the 
border actively supported the insurgency, and that weapons and supplies were being 
smuggled to the insurgency across Habsburg territory often with the support of local 
Habsburg officials, refugees came to be understood as a measure of the Ottoman’s failure 
to govern. At the same time that the flight of refugees was direct evidence of the 
weakening of Ottoman domestic legitimacy, the refugees also endangered the Ottoman’s 
diplomatic legitimacy among Europe’s Great Powers by internationalizing a domestic 
disturbance and endangering Ottoman commitments to the equal protection of its subjects 
under the terms of the 1856 Treaty of Paris.5 
                                                
5 The importance of the Treaty of Paris will be discussed below, but the articles of interest are seven and 
nine: 
Article VII: Admission of the Sublime Porte into the European System. Guarantee of Independence of 
Ottoman Empire. Her majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty 
the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His 
Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Majesty the King of Sardinia, declare the Sublime Porte 
admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (Concert) of Europe. Their Majesties 
engage, each on his part, to respect the Independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; 
Guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act 
tending to its violation as a question of general interest. 
Article IX:  Amelioration of Condition of Christian Population of Ottoman Empire. His Imperial Majesty 
the Sultan having, in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman, which, while 
ameliorating their conditions without distinction of Religion or Race, records his generous intentions 
towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give a further proof of his sentiments in that 
respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously 
from his Sovereign Will.  
  5 
In important respects, the circumstances of flight for the Bosnian and 
Hercegovinian refugees of 1875-1878 are similar to those from subsequent forced 
migrations in the late nineteenth and in the twentieth century. These were mass 
movements, for example, and people fled out of fear of violence rather than because of 
political beliefs; confession as a presumed marker of state loyalty (and increasingly as a 
marker of national identity) was also a factor. Yet the scholarly study of refugees has 
largely neglected late nineteenth and even early twentieth century mass refugee 
movements, instead seeing the nineteenth century as an era of political refugees, and the 
phenomenon of mass refugee displacement as a subject properly belonging to the era 
following the Great War.  
This view is to some extent a function of genealogy. The scholarly study of mass 
refugees effectively began at the end of the interwar period, was largely engaged with 
political questions, and was shaped by urgent issues of nationalism, minorities, state-
formation, and sovereignty. In the post-war period, scholarly attention increasingly 
turned to refugee movements in the “third world,” and came from a widening range of 
disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, demography, and political science, not to 
mention from aid workers, policy-makers and other practitioners.6 This is the scholarly 
                                                                                                                                            
Non-interference of Allies in Internal Affairs of Ottoman Empire. The Contracting Powers recognise the 
high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot, in any case, give to the said 
Powers the right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan 
with his subjects, nor in the Internal Administration of his Empire. 
Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes 
Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814, 4 vols., vol. 2 (London,: Butterworths etc., 
1875). 1254-55.  
 
6 The turn to the third world was slow to come. It is often assumed that the European post-war refugee 
crisis was globalized in the 1960s, after it was essentially solved in Europe and, not coincidently, when de-
colonization was in full swing. Pamela Ballinger points out, however, that the refugee question was 
“already global in nature” in the early postwar period, with displacement stretching from “from Europe to 
Palestine to India to eastern Asia and beyond.” Pamela Ballinger, “Entangled or ‘Extruded’ Histories? 
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community that makes up the new, not entirely coherent, field of refugee studies.7 As a 
consequence of the disciplinary breadth, the literature on the refugee and “refugeedom” is 
vast.8 The specifically historical literature of the refugee and refugeedom is limited, 
however, and until recently it has mainly been political scientists who have written that 
history. Nevertheless, there has been a highly productive scholarly discussion, shifting 
from an interwar focus on legal and definitional problems seeking an international legal 
solution to the contemporary crisis to a post-war interrogation of the refugee, the nation-
state, sovereignty, and international institutions.9  
Hannah Arendt’s is likely the most famous of the post-war analyses of the refugee 
problem. Her work ties the selfish agendas of new nation-states and what she saw as a 
bankrupt interwar legal framework to the dependency of individuals’ human rights on the 
whims of the nation-state, and therefore how the condition of rightlessness accompanied 
that of statelessness. Implicitly criticizing much of the interwar and immediate postwar 
writing, she argues that states’ main concern was how to resolve refugees’ legal status so 
that they might be deported. Arendt’s view of refugees as an international pathology has, 
along with the nation-state context, become a central assumption for much of the top-
                                                                                                                                            
Displacement, National Refugees, and Repatriation after the Second World War,” Journal of Refugee 
Studies 25, no. 3 (2012). 
 
7 Malkki sees refugee studies emerging in particular from international relations, international organization, 
and development studies Liisa H. Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: From ‘Refugee Studies’ to the National 
Order of Things,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24(1995). 
 
8 I take the term “refugeedom” from Peter Gatrell’s excellent work on refugees in the Russian Empire. 
Peter Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I  (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2005). 4. 
 
9 Typical of the interwar genre is Louise Holborn, “Legal Status of Political Refugees, 1920-1938,” 
American Journal of International Law 32, no. 4 (1938). There were also many quantitative studies 
designed to help prepare for repatriation, devise aid schemes, etc. See for example Eugene M. Kulischer, 
The Displacement of Population in Europe (Montreal: International Labour Office; P.S. King & Staples, 
Ltd., 1943). 
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down work on the refugee. The not-so-neatly bifurcated approach to the question of the 
refugee takes as its starting point either the question of nation-states and national 
sovereignty, or the functioning of an international “refugee regime.”10 
Historians have largely adopted these positions and are producing a body of work 
that examines the ways in which forced migration—or, especially since the wars of 
Yugoslav succession, what is frequently called “ethnic cleansing”—has been not only the 
result of the disasters and upheavals of war, but also put to political use in the creation of 
nation states.11 At the same time, increasing interest in the history of international 
organizations has yielded work on the League of Nations’ involvement in refugee affairs, 
as well as a growing body of work looking at the role of refugees and the establishment 
                                                
10 Claudena Skran, for example, is less interested in refugees per se than she is in their value in testing the 
efficacy of the League of Nations as an international regime; Aristide Zolberg and others have looked at 
them in the context of nation-state production, and more recently, Emma Haddad has advanced the 
argument by dispensing with the notion of refugeedom as a pathology, and simply a constitutive element of 
state-generation. Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime  (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from 
Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989); Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
 
11 While there is a very large body of national refugee historiography, there has been relatively little in the 
way of comparative or synthetic work. This is slowly beginning. See for example the essays in A. J. Rieber, 
ed. Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1950 (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Philipp Ther 
and Ana Siljak, Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, Harvard Cold 
War Studies Book Series (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Amir Weiner, Landscaping the 
Human Garden: Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework  (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003) and Peter Gatrell and Nick Baron, “Population Displacement, State-
Building, and Social Identity in the Lands of the Former Russian Empire, 1917-1923,” Kritika: 
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 4, no. 1 (2003). Most recent is Jessica Reinisch and 
Elizabeth White, eds., The Disentanglement of Populations: Migration, Expulsion, and Displacement in 
Post-War Europe, 1944-9 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). As an immediate reaction to the wars in 
Yugoslavia, see the essays on the Balkans in Wolfgang Höpken, ed. Zwangsmigrationen in Mittel- und 
Südosteuropa, vol. 6, Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichende 
Gesellschaftsforschung (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 1996). An essential feature is a focus not 
only on the role of expulsion in the formation of the expelling state, but also the role expellees play in state-
formation processes elsewhere.  
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of international organizations during post-war European reconstruction.12 A third 
approach, still in the making, is social-historical. Drawing off of work by anthropologists 
and sociologists, this work tries to analyze the social and cultural effect of displacement 
while getting at the subjective experience of refugees themselves.13  
Almost entirely absent from this work is a discussion of nineteenth century 
refugees; when they are mentioned, factual inaccuracies and a narrow focus on the 
European experience leave little solid ground for traction.14 There are of course some 
good reasons for drawing a line between nineteenth and twentieth century refugees. The 
former are, for example, best known as exiles of conscience rather than victims of their 
own faith or nationality. Yet the post-1848 neo-absolutism in central Europe effectively 
ended the era of the political refugee, and the period thereafter remains under-
examined.15 The readiness to view the modern era of the refugee as starting with the end 
                                                
12 On historians’ renewed interest in the League of Nations, see Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of 
Nations: Review Essay,” American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (2007). Keith Watenpaugh’s article on the 
League’s “Rescue Movement” in eastern Anatolia offers an insightful look at the struggles over 
humanitarianism in action. Keith Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide 
Survivors and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism (1920-1927),” American Historical Review 115, no. 
5 (2010). 
 
13 Peter Gatrell is the best know practitioner and advocate of this work. From the social sciences, the 
anthropologist Liisa Malkki has been most influential. 
 
14 For Nevzat Soguk, “refugees remained unimportant or were of little or no concern to the host countries, 
for they did not represent any drastic disruptions for the host countries. This was to last until the first 
quarter of the twentieth century [...].” Claudena Skran dismisses the importance of earlier movements 
because it was only in the twentieth century that refugee movements “attracted the attention of political 
leaders and became international issues.” Nevzat Soguk, States and Strangers: Refugees and 
Displacements of Statecraft, Borderlines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 63.; Skran, 
Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime: 13. This view oversimplifies the status, nature 
and type of European refugees in the nineteenth century. It also completely disregards the mass movements 
of Muslims from the expanding Russian Empire to the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century. 
Whether these people were refugees or subjects of a “population transfer” as Mark Pinson states would be 
an arguable question, but it is never raised. Mark Pinson, “Demographic Warfare: An Aspect of Ottoman 
and Russian Policy, 1854-1866” (Dissertation, Harvard, 1970). 
 
15 One of the few good studies of nineteenth century continental refugee policies is Herbert Reiter, 
Politisches Asyl im 19. Jahrhundert, Historische Forschungen (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1992). Sylvia 
Hahn’s article, while instructive, relies mainly on Reiter’s findings. Sylvia Hahn, “„... über die Grenze 
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of World War I obscures the story of forced migration in this earlier era, and reinforces 
the idea of the refugee largely as a problem of the nation-state—a problem that policy-
makers sought to solve by establishing international institutions and creating a regime.  
This dissertation suggests, however, that the modernity of the mass refugee should 
not be seen exclusively as a phenomenon of the nation-state, or even as a sign of the 
inevitable end of the imperial system and the fragmentation of empires into new nation 
states. Instead, the refugee was also a tool for imperial legitimacy both internationally 
and domestically.16 Where the interwar refugee question came under the auspices and 
control of new international organizations under the League of Nations, the refugees from 
Bosnia and Hercegovina were inscribed into treaty law and the subject of high 
diplomacy, and their simple existence posed a threat to the international status of the 
Ottoman Empire in the European system. Returning and resettling the refugees in their 
villages would be incontestable evidence for the re-establishment of Ottoman central 
government legitimacy in provinces that had a long tradition of rebelling against central 
government rule. By the same token, at the end of the three-year uprising, the question of 
refugee return was also strong evidence in the Habsburg case for occupying and 
                                                                                                                                            
getrieben” Politische Emigration und Exil im 19. Jahrhundert,” in Ausweisung - Abschiebung - Vertreibung 
in Europa 16.-20. Jahrhundert, ed. Sylvia Hahn, Andrea Komlosy, and Ilse Reiter (Vienna: StudienVerlag, 
2006). 
 
16 Seymour Martin Lipset points out that a “crisis of legitimacy is a crisis of change,” and while he 
discusses it in the context of democratic societies, his very useful Weberian take on legitimacy is germane 
to the Ottoman (and subsequently Habsburg) situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Legitimacy, argues 
Lipset, involves “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.”Seymour Martin Lipset, “Social Conflict, 
Legitimacy, and Democracy,” in Legitimacy and the State, ed. William Connolly (New York: New York 
University Press, 1984). Clark points out that domestic legitimacy has always contained an international 
aspect and vice-versa; he sees as an essential aspect of international legitimacy what Dunne calls “rules for 
identifying who gets to count as a member” and “what conduct is appropriate.” See Ian Clark, Legitimacy 
in International Society  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Also Tim Dunne, “Sociological 
Investigations: Instrumental, Legitimist, and Coerceive Interpretations of International Society,” 
Millennium 30, no. 1 (2001). Cited in Clark. 
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administering the Ottoman provinces. Furthermore, woven into these claims for refugee 
control as an index of legitimate rule was another thread—that of civic activism. The 
refugee cause created a series of unique opportunities in Habsburg civic life that 
expanded the activities of local philanthropists, activists, and nation-builders, while also 
providing unprecedented access to the world of international humanitarianism. For local 
activists, humanitarianism provided a powerful new language with which to argue a case 
that questioned the legitimacy of imperial government altogether. 
Despite the continuities that can be seen between the later nineteenth-century mass 
refugees and those of the interwar, fundamental differences in both the larger contexts 
and immediate circumstances of flight must be noted. Large-scale refugee movements 
stretched back well before the uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina, of course. Europe had 
not infrequently seen civilian populations abandon their lives and fortunes to flee armed 
violence, and empires had a long tradition of forcing mass population movements.17 Even 
the Habsburg military border (Militärgrenze) in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia was 
peopled with Orthodox Christian refugees whom the Habsburg state had settled along the 
border to defend against Ottoman military attacks and, as required, to turn their military 
defenses against pestilence and disease by maintaining a 1,000km cordon sanitaire.18 Yet 
                                                
17 Recent contemporary examples included a total of around 130,000 refugees during the Franco-Prussian 
war, along with the death of some 20,000, arrest of an additional 35,000 and the flight of another 45,000 
Parisian communards in 1871. See Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns: 56. 
Also Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century  (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 24. 
 
18 On the military border, see the classic English-language study Gunther Erich Rothenberg, The Military 
Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1966). Much greater detail, especially on the earlier development of the border and its economic and social 
aspects is in Karl Kaser, Freier Bauer und Soldat: die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft and der 
kroatisch-slowanischen Militärgrenze (1535-1881), Zur Kunde Südosteuropas (Wien: Böhlau, 1997). The 
essays in Dragutin Pavličević, ed. Vojna Krajina: Povijesni Pregled-Historiografija-Rasprave (Zagreb: 
1984) are also useful. The role of the military border as a cordon sanitaire is of no small importance to the 
development of the infrastructure of border control, and the Habsburg ability to police its border with the 
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Fikret Adanır’s observation that even though the Ottoman Empire “pursued an active 
population politics that did not exclude the forced displacement of entire population 
groups [...], ethnically or religiously homogeneous structures could hardly form the goal 
of imperial population politics,” largely holds true for other empires in the nineteenth 
century.19 Indeed, despite the religious confession of the great majority of the refugees 
from Bosnia and Hercegovina, they cannot easily be categorized as what the refugee 
scholar Aristide Zolberg calls the “classic type”—refugees who fled either as a result of 
political activity or because they belonged to a group the state singled out for 
persecution.20 Instead, they most closely resemble a third category Zolberg describes: the 
“refugee as mere victim [...] displaced by societal or international violence that is not 
necessarily directed at them as individuals but makes life in their own country 
impossible.”21 Zolberg’s are the categories of international regimes and political science. 
The reality of refugee identity was, and remains, more complicated—even if the idea of 
the refugee as a political dissident has receded (although not entirely vanished) since the 
                                                                                                                                            
Ottoman Empire during the uprising. The watch houses were no longer maintained for military purposes, 
but for the possible need to shut down cross-border commerce, and the quarantine stations for livestock 
remained in use throughout the uprising—even for the animals refugees brought with them. See Erna 
Lesky, “Die österreichische Pestfront an der k.k. Militärgrenze,” Saeculum 8 (1957) and Gunther Erich 
Rothenberg, “The Austrian Sanitary Cordon and the Control of the Bubonic Plague,” Journal of the History 
of Medicine and Allied Sciences 28, no. 1 (1973). Also Georg Sticker, Abhandlung aus der 
Seuchengeschichte und Seuchenlehre  (Giessen 1910). 312-43. Anton Mollinary, the commanding general 
of the Military Border during the uprising, argued the cordon, by restricting trade along the border, had 
“metamorphosed from a blessing into a plague” Anton Freiherr v. Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im 
österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Zürich: Art. Institut Orell Füssli, 1905). 207. 
 
19 Fikret Adanır, “Bevölkerungsverschiegungen, Siedlungspolitik und Ethnisch-Kulturelle 
Homogenisierung: Nationsbildung auf dem Balkan und in Kleinasien, 1878-1923,” in Ausweisung-
Abschiebung-Vertreibung in Europa 16.-20. Jahrhundert, ed. Andrea Komlosy Sylvia Hahn, Ilse Reiter 
(Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2006). 
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end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, whatever the reasons for flight, the common thread in 
the general understanding of the refugee is as a “mere victim.”  
Victimhood as the primary or even exclusive characteristic of the refugee is new. 
Goethe described a “sorry train of exiles [...] in the hot dust of mid-day” in the opening 
lines of Hermann and Dorothea, but his Conversations of German Refugees, hosted by 
the elegant Baroness von C., is more Decameron than it is conversations among 
Displaced Persons in United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration camps 
after World War II.22 The dominant ideal type of refugee-as-victim took hold, I argue, 
during the period 1875-1878 in a process that involved both the concrete application of 
policies, the wranglings of diplomacy, a struggle to define and control the rhetoric of 
displacement, and the meaning of and legitimate responses to victimhood. Ironically for a 
set of conflicts in which Christian European intervention was in part predicated on the 
idea of Balkan Christians suffering under the “Ottoman Yoke,” the refining of the refugee 
experience into the pure crystal of victimhood began with the Christians of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, but was perfected by the mass flight of Bulgarian Muslims ahead of the 
Russian army and from Bulgarian chetas in 1877. Small but active with the start of the 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugee movements, foreign voluntary aid groups multiplied 
in size and activity in response to the Bulgarian events.23 With the permission of their 
                                                
22 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Hermann und Dorothea  (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1996). Also 
Goethe, Unterhaltungen deutscher Ausgewanderten  (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1991). 
 
23 Groups such as the “Bosnian and Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphan Relief Fund” started not long after 
the outbreak of violence; later British organizations more closely resembled the old London Greek 
Committee. The publication of Gladstone’s pamphlet on the “Bulgarian Horrors” mobilized large sections 
of British society in particular; the killings also helped to mobilize the Russian population, which raised 
money to aid Balkan Christians, and eventually sent large numbers of volunteers—including a decorated 
war hero—to fight Ottoman forces in Serbia. B. H.  Sumner, Russia and the Balkans  (London: Archon 
Books, 1962). 156-59, 94. 
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home governments, members of Istanbul’s foreign diplomatic corps became deeply 
involved in the management of volunteers and distribution of aid.24  
Images published in the foreign press illustrate the before and after.25 Figure A, 
originally published in the Graphic magazine, is “Herzegovinian Refugees at Ragusa.”26 
Figure B, originally published in Zimmerman’s Geschichte des orientalischen Krieges 
von 1876-1878, tells an intimate story of suffering—women and a baby, the weak of the 
world, set among cold mountains and predatory nature.27 Figure C completes the triptych: 
the quantity, not quality, of trainloads of refugees gives the image force. 
  
                                                
24 For a Habsburg example, see Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv/HHStA (Vienna). PA XII box 126, Zichy to 
Andrássy 23 I 1878. 
 
25 The role of the press and especially imagery in the creation of the humanitarian sentiment has been long-
discussed and figures into the discussion of many specific instances; broader discussions can be found in 
Thomas Laqueur, “Bodies, Details, and the Humanitarian Narrative,” in The New Cultural History, ed. 
Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). See also Susan Sontag, On Photography  
(New York: Picador, 2001) as well as her subsequent revision in Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others  
(New York: Picador, 2004).  
 
26 The image was reprinted in Arthur Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegóvina on Foot During the 
Insurrection, August and September 1875, The Eastern Europe Collection (New York: Arno Press, 1971). 
428. 
 
27 Dorothy Anderson, Miss Irby and Her Friends  (London: Hutchinson, 1966). 
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None of the above argument is to deny real suffering, to deny that for centuries before the 
uprising the suffering of displacement had gone unrecognized, or to claim that from the 
very start of the uprising refugeedom didn’t also involve victimhood. Austro-Hungarian 
authorities periodically interviewed the Bosnians and Hercegovinians as they crossed 
over to Habsburg territory, and the refugees’ narratives are dotted with persecution 
misery. This dissertation works directly with some transcripts of these interviews from 
1876; Ilija Kecmanović has published transcripts (translated from German into Bosnian) 
of Habsburg interviews of refugees in fall 1875.28 The interviews themselves were highly 
programmatic, and judging from the repeated use of set phrases and stock descriptions, 
the transcripts reflect the interpretations of the interviewer and stenographer as much as 
the descriptions of the individual refugee. Nevertheless, within weeks after it started, the 
violence had escalated to such a point it is clear that fear for life and property was very 
real. Not clear from the transcripts—though quite clear by 1876—is the extent to which 
refugees were fleeing violence directed at them by the insurgents themselves.29  
The refugee movements of 1875-1878 came with a rapidity and were of a size for 
which there was no precedent in modern Europe (as will be discussed below, this was not 
the case in the Ottoman Empire). Consequently, there was no institutional infrastructure 
for managing the refugees and containing the political fallout from such a mass 
migration. There were however standards of management based on custom at the border 
and international law. Borderland practice kept largely to the framework of the 
                                                
28 Ilija Kecmanović, Izjave bosanskih izbjeglica o razlozima njihovog bjegstva iz Bosne u avgustu i 
septembru 1875. godine: (građa iz državnog arhiva u Zagrebu), Naučno društvo SR Bosne i Hercegovine 
(Sarajevo: S.n., 1964). Copies of the originals exist in both the Vienna Kriegsarchiv/KA and the Hrvatski 
Državni Arhiv/HDA. 
 
29 See the discussion in Chapter Three. 
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expectations of international law, but focused on local specifics: how border-crossers 
were to be treated on arrival, escorted away from the border, and the extent to which they 
would receive help from the state.30 At the same time, since at least the Congress of 
Vienna both Habsburg and Ottoman central governments had been attempting to devolve 
to local officials responsibility for managing border crossings and defusing potential 
conflicts before they escalated to larger political problems. With a few exceptions, these 
efforts had been largely unsuccessful.31  
 
Naming a category, creating policy 
Flüchtling, Flüchtende, Emigrant, Fugitiv, Malcontent; Mülteci, Muhacir, Firarî; 
Izbeglica, Begunac; Réfugié, Émigré, Fugitif; Refugee, Emigrant, Fugitive. The names 
were not yet fixed and the palette of meanings had many subtle shades, whether 
emphasizing the stasis of the Flüchtling or the urgent movement of the Flüchtende or 
distinguishing between Mülteci and the Muhacir, which imperfectly mapped the 
difference between non-Muslims and Muslims.32 Imbricated with these and not mutually 
                                                
30 By 1875, these standards had been most clearly articulated in an imperial rescript from 1854, a copy of 
which can be found in KA 51-4/12, 1875. 
 
31 On the resurrection of earlier efforts to devolve power to border officials during the uprising, see 
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Istanbul)/BOA Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım Evrakı/HR.SYS box 239, 
folder 2. Also see Lothar Maier, “Die Grenze zwischen dem Habsburgerreich und Bosnien um 1830. Von 
einem Versuch, eine friedlose Region zu befrieden,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 51, no. 3 
(2003). George Gavrilis, who has studied border control along the Ottoman/Greek border after Greek 
independence, argues convincingly for the greater efficacy of decentralized border control over 
standardized systems developed by central government. See George Gavrilis, “Border Guards and High 
States: Toward a Theory of Boundary Regimes” (Dissertation, Columbia, 2004). 
 
32 The difference between Mülteci and Muhacir is not explicitly discussed in any of the material I have 
found from this period. By the early twentieth century, however, Ottoman bureaucracy acknowledged and 
defined the differences. The 1913 İskan-i Muhacirin Nizamnamesi (Regulation on the Settlement of 
Refugees) split muhacir into two groups, the first having obtained permission to renounce their nationality, 
and the second, who arrived as mülteci and had subsequently successfully petitioned for the status of 
muhacir. presumably in order to obtain financial support and other perquisites. By 1918, Hamdi Bey, the 
general director of the Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi (General Directorate for Tribes and 
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exclusive were the names of violent men: Insurgent, ̒Asi, Ustanik (and sometimes 
Ustaša); Rebelle; Insurgent. At any given moment characteristics of groups of people 
were either clear or thought possible to determine, but in non-Ottoman Europe during the 
1870s, discrete new categories began to be distilled out of the fluid meanings and 
connotations of these many old words. The nature of the mass refugee, and of 
refugeedom, was becoming fixed.   
What is a refugee? It is a central question in much of the scholarly literature, 
especially the literature of refugee studies that has developed in the past decades. It is 
also an important element in refugee historiography, especially work that focuses on the 
history of the refugee since the Second World War. This holds true even for some of the 
most recent work on post-war refugee history.33 To be sure, the familiar  “melange of 
bleak images” helps to make “determining conceptually (if not politically) who is, or is 
not, a refugee [appear] to be a relatively simple matter.”34 But the transformation from an 
interwar approach to refugees based on group identity to a postwar individualization of 
refugee identity not coincidently reflects the broader shift from minority rights and 
protection to the post-war rise of human rights. This transformation brought with it a 
proliferation of definitions from the international community and regional organizations 
                                                                                                                                            
Refugees) made a clearer distinction, saying “We call mülteci all people without regard to religion who 
have fled into the interior, that is across the border, from land that the enemy has invaded in the war. 
However, those who have left the territory of another state because of an agreement we call muhacir.” 
Quoted in Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları iskân politikası, 1913-1918, 1. bask. ed., 
Araştırma-inceleme dizisi (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2001). 227-28. 
 
33 See, for example, Pamela Ballinger’s study of “national refugees” and their in/exclusion from post-war 
practice and scholarship. Ballinger writes, “the key tension that plagues [...] discussions of refugees [is] 
how to distinguish so-called forced from voluntary migration or ‘political’ from ‘economic’ migrants” 
Ballinger, “Entangled or ‘Extruded’ Histories? Displacement, National Refugees, and Repatriation after the 
Second World War.”  
 
34 Andrew E Shacknove, “Who is a Refugee?,” Ethics 95, no. January (1985). 
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such as the Organization of African Unity.35 James Hathaway has argued that since 
World War One, the definition of the refugee has undergone three fundamental changes. 
In this schematic, refugees were first seen in juridical terms (1920-1935) as people who 
had lost their freedom of international movement because their own governments no 
longer protect them. Second, refugees came to be viewed in social terms (1935-1939), 
including in the definition of refugee “victims of broad-based social and political 
upheaval, whether or not there were problems of international legal status.”36 The focus 
of the juridical period was reversed, from the legal consequence to the social cause of 
flight.37 Finally, in the period 1938-1950 (although it largely holds true for the period 
thereafter), the refugee came to be defined in individualist terms—that is, based not on 
the situation of a group’s status, but based on the individual’s relationship with the 
state.38 The key post-war definition of the refugee is from the 1951 United Nations 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which considered as a 
refugee someone who “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing 
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
                                                
35 Aristide R Zolberg, “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process,” Annals, AAPSS 
467, no. May (1983). 
 
36 James C.  Hathaway, “The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law (1920-1950),” International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 33(1984): 361. 
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nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.”39 
The above definitions mattered. Refugee status had an ethical and moral dimension 
in part because “the attribution of refugee status is designed to provide grounds for a 
claim to some entitlement—relief, admission, and the like....”40 Refugee status 
incorporated people whose very existence defied the rationale of the territorialized and 
sovereign nation-state into the broader international system. The idea of the refugee was 
also highly contingent. While the 1951 convention explicitly included in its definition all 
those who had achieved interwar refugee status, the convention’s minimum definition 
included as legitimate causes for flight only events in Europe.41 
These definitions are modified codifications of reality, which is, of course, one 
reason the definitions change and are fought over. In their focus on policy, the words 
reflect state intent, “political choice, and ethical judgment”; most of all, though, they 
reflect states’ desire to limit immigration.42 A contention of my work, however, is that the 
modern idea of the refugee emerged as much through the domestic practice of refugee aid 
and population management as it did through international policy. Through her studies of 
identity formation among refugees from Rwanda, Liisa Malkki’s work demonstrates how 
different types of refugee aid practice can help to create different types of refugee 
                                                
39 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees,”  http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html. 
 
40 Zolberg, “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process,” 25. 
 
41 Signatory states could choose whether they would consider “events occurring before 1 January 1951” to 
mean “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951” or “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere 
before 1 January 1951.” 
 
42 Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing 
World: 3-4. 
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subjectivities.43 At the same time, the practices of refugee aid and population 
management helped to create and define the “objective” category of the refugee: how 
states managed refugees in part determined how they saw refugees.  
In the case of the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, two different threads of 
refugee management must be considered. The first of these is the domestic management 
of refugee populations, both as part of central-government policy-making decisions as 
well as local variations and implementation. The second strand is diplomacy and foreign 
policy, where one of the most basic characteristics of the refugee—the crossing of an 
international border—becomes a central question. These two threads can hardly be 
disentangled, and are entwined with yet a third: the role of non-state actors, who are 
engaged at the local, imperial, and international level, yet stand outside of the state, 
sometimes competing with and sometimes complementing state activities. 
With regard to the domestic or internal management of refugee populations, it was 
Habsburg policy-making that played the central role. Ottoman policies within Bosnia and 
Hercegovina as well as insurgent paramilitary activities certainly contributed to creating 
refugees, but there does not appear to have been an overarching Ottoman policy towards 
the refugees themselves. By contemporary standards, the definition of a refugee from 
Bosnia and Hercegovina that Austria-Hungary outlined through practice was relatively 
simple. In addition to having crossed an imperial border, refugees were people who 
became manageable. They were people who had been disarmed at the border and 
received by the appropriate imperial and local officials. Their livestock, if they brought 
                                                
43 Liisa H. Malkki, “Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization,” Cultural 
Anthropology 11, no. 3 (1996). 
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any, had first been quarantined and then later released to them.44 Importantly, they were 
also people whose presence and location were recorded and who had been incorporated 
into an elaborate bureaucratic system that discouraged them from migrating within the 
Habsburg Empire. This system revolved around dispensing refugee aid, and placing 
refugees in the houses of local residents.45 The decision to distribute or withhold aid from 
individuals created its own set of categories. Regardless of what officials decided, one 
outcome remained the same: officials recorded the refugees, where they came from, 
where they lived while on Habsburg territory, their gender and age, and in the case of 
men, whether or not they were able to work. State knowledge of the refugee was 
extensive and intensive, and the process of acquiring that knowledge forced refugees into 
a specific and dependent relation with the state. Habsburg officials maintained this 
relationship through a combination of surveillance and bribery. Officials in towns and 
counties maintained head-counts, and the distribution of aid itself required refugees 
regularly to appear, in person, at assemblies where aid was distributed. 
The financial burden to the empire of maintaining refugees was a recurrent theme 
throughout the period of the uprising. By the start of the winter in 1875, Anton von 
Mollinary, the Zagreb-based general in charge of the military border, was in open conflict 
                                                
44 Throughout the period, livestock remained an urgent question of public health and marketplace distortion 
because of oversupply. The first 22,000 refugees to cross onto Habsburg territory brought with them 30,000 
animals Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2: 291. Livestock 
was also a marker of relative wealth among refugees and therefore determined whether or not the refugees 
qualified for aid. They also remained an ongoing subject of debate over customs and trade tariffs that 
carried through until well after the occupation; refugees were expected to pay an import duty on their 
livestock, for example, although local authorities claimed it was only levied when the animal was 
slaughtered. Finanz Archiv/FA (Vienna) 4.1 PR 192, 06 XII 1876. By the time of the occupation, imperial 
officials worried the Hungarian government might levy export duties on returning families, as well. HHStA 
PA XL, box 208, folder “Sitzungs Protokolle der Comission für die angelegenheiten in Bosnien und der 
Herzegowina,” 9 X 1879. 
 
45 The nature and extent of the aid, as well as the Habsburg state management of refugees, will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter One. 
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with officials in Vienna over the cost of refugee aid.46 With a perspective modified by the 
intimacy of abject need in the borderlands under his control, he argued with limited 
success for the expansion of aid during the winter months. By the same token, the 
nominal cost to the state budget became a political tool for members of parliament and 
the press, as well as for the government, while provincial leaders complained about food-
price inflation in areas with large numbers of refugees and demanded increased central 
government spending and better sanitary conditions.47 Refugee aid was expensive. 
Mollinary made his first request for additional money to support refugees within the first 
month after the start of the refugee flows, and by the end of 1875, the Habsburg 
government had spent 475,000fl on refugee aid, and would spend over 10,000,000fl by 
the start of the occupation—and these figures do not include extra costs to the 
bureaucracy.48 By comparison, in the first seven years of Habsburg administration the 
annual effective revenues of the two provinces remained under 10,000,000fl.49  
                                                
46 Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2: 281-308. 
 
47 See the interpellation of Lorenz Monti from Dalmatia, 13 XII 1876 Reichsrat Austria, 
Abgeordnetenhaus, “Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des 
österreichischen Reichsrathes. VIII Session.,” (Vienna: Kaiserlich-königliche Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 
1878), 7476-77. Also Michael Klaić, 6 XI 1877, ibid., IX: 9980. These interpellations are also discussed in 
Gustav Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich, 8 vols., vol. 2 (Wein und Leipzig: C. Fromme, 
1902). 425-26. 
 
48 Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2: 292. 
 
49 Peter F. Sugar, Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1878-1918  (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1963). 231. Bosnian and Hercegovinian tax revenue was low during the period of the uprising and 
for a while thereafter, thanks in part to the devastation of agricultural land during the uprising. Ferdo 
Hauptmann, Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Herrschaft in Bosnien und der Hercegovina 1878-1918: 
Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Zur Kunde Südosteuropas (Graz: Institut für Geschichte der 
Universität Graz, 1983). Nevertheless, low revenues were not merely part of the long-term effect of a 
shrunken wartime economy. As Michael Palairet has pointed out, the re-orientation of the Balkan 
economies away from the Ottoman Empire led to medium term contraction due to the loss of Ottoman 
urban markets. M. R. Palairet, The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914: Evolution Without Development  (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). This was particularly true for Bosnia’s main resources, which 
under Ottoman rule were largely agricultural products and forestry. See Vilayet-i Bosna (Salname),   
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The Habsburg government had many reasons to limit the mobility of refugees once 
they arrived.50 Preventing refugees from returning to the Ottoman provinces to fight in 
the insurgency and thereby endangering Austria-Hungary’s formal claims of neutrality 
was an important consideration, as were concerns over criminality and the spread of 
infectious disease.51 Nevertheless, limiting refugee movement was to a large extent 
intended to limit costs to the state. By restricting movement from community to 
community, Habsburg officials hoped to prevent refugees from collecting more than their 
allotted share of aid, which remained a problem throughout the three-year period, as well 
as minimizing the rampant corruption among officials who distributed the aid.52 At the 
same time, the financial concerns along with the complicated structure of Habsburg 
                                                                                                                                            
(1293/1876). 137-68. Notable is the relative unimportance of mining, a sector Habsburg officials saw as 
vital to the provinces’ economic development.  
 
50 Many recent works examine state efforts to limit population movement internationally, often considering 
the development of controls such as passports, as John Torpey puts it, “a central feature of [states’] 
development as states.” John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 3. For the growth of international controls, see also John 
Torpey and Jane Caplan, eds., Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the 
Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Frank Caestecker, Alien Policy in Belgium, 
1840-1940: The Creation of Guest Workers, Refugees and Illegal Aliens  (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2000); Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders  (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008). The best study of internal control over movement in the Habsburg 
Empire is Waltraud Heindl et al., Grenze und Staat: Passwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und 
Fremdengesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750-1867  (Wien: Böhlau, 2000). See also the 
essays in Sylvia Hahn, Andrea Komlosy, and Ilse Reiter, eds., Ausweisung-Abschiebung-Vertreibung in 
Europa 16.-20. Jahrhundert (Insbruck: StudienVerlag, 2006). There is very little on movement control 
within the Ottoman Empire, but a new collection of essays offers a promising start: Malte Fuhrmann Ulrike 
Freitag, Nora Lafi, City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the Making of Urban Modernity  (Florence, 
KY: Routledge, 2010). In particular, see Christoph Herzog’s chapter on internal controls and the tezkere, 
especially with regard to the “prevention of uncontrolled migration of the rural population to Istanbul” 
(119). 
 
51 The issue of refugees returning in order to fight is an old, and ongoing, concern. See for example Howard 
Adelman, “Why Refugee Warriors are Threats,” Journal of Conflict Studies 18, no. 1 (1998). 
 
52 On corruption, see for example, Evans’ observations in Arthur Evans, Illyrian letters: A Revised 
Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, 
Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester Guardian During the Year 1877  
(Longmans, Green, & Co., 1878). Collecting more aid than deserved was also a problem among the 
displaced Hercegovinian Muslims from Nikšić; see Chapter Four. 
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borderland government provided a further reason for restrictions on movement. Within 
this framework, the geographical distribution of refugees from the perspective of high 
government mattered. Movement from one area to another redistributed burden in ways 
that, if the movement was large enough, could require complicated re-allocations of aid 
money from military to civil administrative bodies. Refugees submitted numerous 
requests to relocate, sometimes based on the desire to be closer to other family members 
who had fled as well, and sometimes because of rumors that conditions, work 
opportunities, or the level of state aid were better in another area.53 Such requests, it 
seems, were rarely honored. 
 
Refugees and the Ottoman State 
Just as domestic policies of population management and categorization for the purposes 
of state aid and control helped to give shape and meaning to the modern mass refugee, 
the necessary condition of refugeedom was international exile. The refugee was (and 
remains) at heart the product not simply of violence, but of the international system—of 
interstate relations. With regard to the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, it was the 
Ottoman and Habsburg Empires that shaped the relevant diplomatic landscape. The other 
Great Powers, along with Serbia and Montenegro, were interested parties. While for 
Britain the Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugee question was important insofar as refugee 
politics shaped Habsburg-Ottoman diplomacy, Russia was in fact engaged in the 
international politics of the refugee. Its consuls in Belgrade, Cetinje, and Dubrovnik 
actively provided support to the insurgency, distributed aid to the refugees and helped to 
                                                
53 In some cases, rumors also encouraged fixity. See Chapter Three. 
 
  25 
arrange the establishment of Red Cross ambulances in Montenegro. The extent to which 
these activities should be seen as part of an over-arching government policy is, however, 
unclear. It was the Habsburg-Ottoman relationship that shaped the foreign policy and 
international presence of the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina.  
The refugee as a category further draws the Ottoman Empire into the nineteenth-
century international system, both as an interested party whose actions helped to affirm or 
undermine international expectations, and also as a diplomatic partner. To be sure, the 
technologies of refugee aid and population management in the Habsburg Empire drew off 
its own tradition, and the nature of civic humanitarianism in the Habsburg lands was 
shaped by the experience of Christian Europe. But in the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire was 
intimately involved not simply in the production of mass refugee movements, but in 
defining mass refugeedom and in creating international expectations regarding refugees. 
At the international level, it was the Ottoman interaction with the other Great Powers—
and the Habsburg Empire in particular—that became definitive. Ottoman and Habsburg 
diplomacy created an international policy for refugees, and the gradual emergence of 
norms and expectations cannot be understood without the Ottoman Empire. That this was 
the case should come as little surprise, especially given the central importance of the 
Muslim flight in 1877-1878. But the fact that the refugees from the Bulgarian provinces 
also included Circassians, Tatars and others who had been settled there over the previous 
three decades attests to an easy-to-overlook fact: out of all Europe’s Great Powers in the 
late nineteenth century, it was the Ottoman Empire that had by far the most experience in 
managing large-scale population movements, aid efforts, and settlement programs.  
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Migration—especially in the form of nomadism—was central to the Ottoman 
historical experience, and even in the late nineteenth century was still a contemporary 
question. According to one mid-century government report, the majority of the central 
Anatolian population was living a nomadic life.54 Migration had played a large part in 
Ottoman expansionism especially into the Balkans, where Yörüks—Muslim nomadic 
tribes whose presence pre-dated the Ottomans—were moved and settled “at times under 
the initiative of the central government [...] for security reasons or in order to expand the 
revenue base by reclaiming new lands for agriculture.”55  
The state’s relation to nomadism was uneasy, however, and included periodic 
rounds of forced sedentarization, which became an increasingly important element of 
nineteenth-century Ottoman population politics. The reasons for the sedentarization 
policies of the nineteenth century were multiple. Long-standing interests such as 
improving tax-collection remained, but were also overshadowed by more recent and 
urgent concerns over imperial reform. In the early nineteenth century nomadism had 
begun to expand again, with tribes growing in size and political strength. Just as the 
Ottoman government began its major push for centralization, tribal strength in some areas 
was steadily increasing, with some tribes acting as if “they had all but seceded from the 
empire.”56 The Ottomans had pinned their hopes for economic growth to the agricultural 
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sector, and where nomads had once been seen as vital intermediaries in agriculture, they 
were now considered to be a hindrance to expanded agricultural output. In this light, 
nomadism appeared to be a fundamental obstacle to the modernization Ottoman officials 
saw as necessary for the survival of the empire.  
Reşat Kasaba cautions that even in the late Ottoman Empire, nomadism and 
sedentarism were not mutually exclusive categories but instead reflect what he calls 
“mobility-in-stasis”: the persistence of some migratory patterns even as various forms of 
temporary—usually seasonal—sedentarism took hold.57 Perhaps to the chagrin of 
Istanbul officials, nomadism continued to be part of Ottoman modernity, even playing a 
role in modernization itself.58 The Ottoman center viewed “the elimination of the state of 
savagery and ignorance of the nomads” as necessary to modernization, and the nomads 
themselves as a primitive people in need of a colonial “civilizing mission.”59 The irony 
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was that because of institutional weakness, the state came to depend on nomadic or semi-
nomadic (largely Kurdish) tribes to ensure another aspect of state modernization, namely 
the maintenance of the eastern Anatolian borders. The Ottomans co-opted and selectively 
supported some tribes and tribal leaders, offering educational opportunities and, through 
the formation of a militia in the 1890s, the imprimatur of state power.60 These steps went 
well beyond securing the border, though, and were also intended to re-integrate the 
seemingly ungovernable eastern Anatolian regions into the empire. By allowing tribes to 
seize land from the distrusted Armenian peasantry, suggests Janet Klein, the state was not 
only “weakening the ‘internal enemies’ in the threatened borderland,” but providing 
“material incentives for the Kurdish tribes to settle and remain loyal to the sultan and the 
empire.”61 The civilizing mission and its corollary of sedentarization were the essence of 
this particular aspect of Ottoman modernization. Control over population mobility 
became a central feature of late Ottoman claims on legitimacy.62  
The Ottoman’s ongoing efforts at nomadic sedentarization had created a strong 
intellectual and technological infrastructure for the management of mobility. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, the state began using these tools to manage 
refugees who were arriving from Russia and the Caucuses. In many ways, the tactics and 
the goals differed little from those associated with nomadic sedentarization, and indeed 
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the Ottoman experience with refugees may have informed some of the state’s approaches 
to nomads.63 Muslim refugees represented for the Ottomans both a burden and an 
opportunity. There is little evidence of a sustained or comprehensive central government 
approach to managing refugees prior to the Crimean War, but already with the earliest 
efforts at such a policy we can see the shape of later refugee-settlement plans—not just of 
those implemented on behalf of the Bulgarian refugees from 1877-1878, but also of the 
plans developed for returning and resettling the Christian refugees from Bosnia and 
Hercegovina.64 The earliest articulation of such a refugee policy is instructions sent to the 
governor of Silistre on 3 May 1856 on how to manage the growing number of Crimean 
Tatars arriving in the vilayet by land and sea. The Porte sent two thousand kise of akçe to 
Silistre to pay for a series of aid projects. In addition to receiving an agricultural tax 
holiday for ten years, the refugees would be exempt from military service for twenty-five 
years. They were to be settled in villages near to each other and close to rivers or lakes 
for access to fresh water, and the government would build houses using locally available 
material and with local labor. Money to help refugees pay for housing and agricultural 
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supplies would also be provided.65 The general outline of these aid programs remained 
constant throughout the period, and also closely adhered to the terms for a refugee 
repatriation program the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires agreed to in 1876.  
As important as the nature of aid—materials for building shelter and starting 
agriculture, as well as temporary exemption from normal obligations to the state—was 
the intent of the aid, and the manner in which refugees fit in with the larger project of 
settlement, sedentarization, and the territorialization of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Ottomans were interested not just in the welfare of the refugees and the local population, 
but also in the possibility of using refugees to strengthen the empire.66 Initially, this 
meant settling Muslim refugees in areas along the Ottoman border with Russia.67 Similar 
to the Habsburg Grenzer, these settlers would provide a first line of defense against 
invasion. But it was also hoped that increasing the specifically Muslim population in the 
border areas would discourage Russia from making territorial claims based on 
confessional demographics.68  
After the Crimean War, however, a number of factors led to reconsideration. Most 
obviously, border areas especially in the Balkans were slowly filling up with people, and 
as they did, tensions between the native population, older settlers, and the newcomers 
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began to rise. The Ottomans tried various techniques to prevent conflict, including 
isolating groups to their own villages (as was the case with the refugees in Silistre), or 
breaking apart refugee groups and settling them among the local population in an effort to 
force assimilation.69 There were already elements of social engineering in this, and the 
title alone of Mark Pinson’s dissertation, “Demographic Warfare,” gives an indication of 
the extent of Ottoman (and Russian) population politics when it came to forced 
migration. By 1860, however, the buckling of regional aid efforts under the ever-growing 
mass of refugees as well as the large number of refugees arriving in Istanbul led the 
central government to establish the Muhacirin Komisyonu, the Refugee Commission. It 
was a high-level commission and attracted experienced officials.70  
The treatment of refugees by the authorities, writes Nora Lafi, offers “many 
indications of the very conception of imperial governance.”71 And while the Refugee 
Commission’s activities, successes and failures have been well studied elsewhere, it is the 
broader issues that are pertinent here.72 Conceptually and institutionally, starting in the 
1860s and early 1870s, the Commission moved refugee management closer to the process 
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of nomadic settlement; by the early twentieth century, the categories were almost entirely 
incorporated. The Muslim refugee became part of the Ottoman government’s 
modernization and civilizing mission in eastern Anatolia, and the central government 
used the opportunity the refugees provided to experiment and find “scientific principles” 
for establishing new towns, increasing agricultural production, breaking down old social 
ties, and bringing nomads and refugees into the “circle of civilization”.73 There were 
knock-on effects, too. Settling refugees meant finding empty land on which to put them; 
this in turn opened up a whole series of questions regarding land claims, usage rights, and 
the very idea of empty land. Terzibaşoğlu convincingly argues that in some cases, the 
process of refugee settlement actually forced peasants into expanding their agricultural 
production in order to maintain claims to land by working it, and also led nomads into 
settling as a pre-emptive way of preventing the state from moving refugees onto land 
nomads claimed for their own use.74 Over time, the two processes became so intertwined 
that the relationship was institutionalized. By 1914, the Refugee Commission and other 
agencies responsible for settling nomads had been subsumed under the Aşair ve 
Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi—the General Directorate for Tribes and Refugees.75  
Nineteenth-century states for the most part did not want to shed their population; 
indeed, as far as international law was concerned in the early nineteenth century, 
“protection against the depopulation of the state, especially through prevention of 
emigration” could be considered a central obligation to the state’s right of self-
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preservation.76 This began to change towards the end of the century, although very 
slowly. Even as some international jurists began referring to the individual right of 
emigration, the English laws against expatriation, for example, were only struck down in 
1870.77 In the Ottoman case, the situation was clearly different. To be sure, Ottoman 
population loss in the nineteenth century was large, however these declines were due not 
to emigration, but to territorial losses. Instead, the empire as a whole was Europe’s 
largest immigrant country and during much of the reform era, it actively encouraged 
immigration as part of its broader agricultural modernization project.78 In this manner, 
immigration, sedentarization, and the settlement of refugees from beyond the imperial 
borders became central considerations in the Ottoman’s tactics for consolidating central 
government power over the empire’s territories, and maintaining its legitimacy not just 
domestically, but internationally.  
 
Refugees in the International Context 
For the Ottomans, the nineteenth century was the century of the refugee, and the century 
had entrenched the idea of refugees not just as a population to be managed, but as a 
population that the modern state actually could manage. In this context, policy towards 
the emigration of refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina fit closely with the schemes the 
state already had developed. With regard to management, repatriating and resettling the 
refugees who had fled Bosnia and Hercegovina differed little from the Muslim refugees 
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who had been fleeing to the Ottoman Empire. The Refugee Commission’s activities had 
been suspended after the death of its director, Muammer Paşa, just months before the 
uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina began.79 Yet in Spring 1876, when the Ottoman 
central government, in conjunction with Austria-Hungary, established commissions to 
return and resettle the refugees who had fled, the structure of the commissions, the co-
operation between central government and local officials, the concern with transportation, 
housing and health—as well as the solutions for dealing with these questions—all 
demonstrate continuity with earlier practice. At least from the standpoint of managing the 
return of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees, then, the decades of Ottoman 
experience with refugees shaped the way in which international policies of refugee 
management were arranged. 
In this way, Ottoman-Habsburg bilateralism developed an international refugee 
policy—effectively a standard for the management and control of refugees and an 
expectation that refugees would be returned and resettled. Safety would be guaranteed, 
and through it, the multi-confessional status quo ante of the imperial provinces would be 
restored. Moreover, an expectation of management and control of refugees on the one 
hand, and their return, resettlement, and the restoration of the imperial demographic 
structure on the other hand, was built into multilateral international agreements. Austria-
Hungary in particular made refugee return a cornerstone of multiple diplomatic 
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proposals.80 The refugee question was not simply an issue for the Habsburg and Ottoman 
Empires, but had become a broader concern of Great Power diplomacy; refugees were to 
be one of the yardsticks with which to measure not just the violence on the ground, but 
the stability of the European system.  
Although it had not been institutionalized in the way it would be during the interwar 
period, the nineteenth century did develop an international “refugee regime.” The 
scholarly focus on the institutionalization of international refugee management during the 
interwar period has obscured the sophistication and internationalism of nineteenth-
century refugee policies. In the process, the focus on the early twentieth century has 
arrogated the development of a refugee regime to the European powers during the 
interwar—it was, after all, the failure to deal with Europe’s interwar refugees that led to 
the still Eurocentric 1951 Convention and to the creation first of the International 
Refugee Organization, and then of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
In fact, the example of the late nineteenth century reveals the extent to which the 
Ottoman Empire figured into the development of international refugee policy. Indeed, the 
middle of the nineteenth century was marked by a well-developed body of international 
law regarding a “right of asylum.”81 While this right was a European invention, the 
Ottoman Empire laid claim to it and used the right of asylum as one of many tools for 
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international policy. By the time of the uprisings, the Ottoman experience with refugees 
contributed greatly to the shape of Great Power refugee diplomacy.  
For nineteenth-century legal scholars, the “right of asylum” was a question that 
balanced an international system of criminal punishment with questions of sovereignty 
and the dangers of foreign criminal law not serving the interests of justice. The concept of 
this right had developed largely in response to a perceived need to differentiate between 
common and “political” criminals. The right of asylum, in this case, was not an 
individual right to asylum, but a sovereign right to grant or to withhold the extradition of 
an individual accused of a crime.82 For much of the nineteenth century, there had been a 
wide range—although leaning towards liberal—of asylum policies across Europe.83 
Conservative reaction to the revolutions of 1848 began to change that, and by 1853, the 
German jurist Robert Mohl was able to describe a much more conservative division of 
European states, separated into three camps according to their asylum policies. Britain 
(and the United States) saw granting asylum to fugitives as a duty. Most European 
states—among them France, Belgium, Switzerland and Russia—were more restrictive, 
and would surrender individuals charged with common crimes, but would surrender those 
accused of political crimes only in extreme circumstances or by treaty. The last group of 
states Mohl identified comprised Austria, Prussia, German confederate states, and 
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Naples. These were willing to surrender individuals accused of crimes both common and 
political.84 Prussian policy called for automatic extradition. 
What is important here for our purposes is less the specifics of states’ policies, but 
rather the broader point: the asylum question was one of sovereign preference and comity 
among nations.85 That is, it existed as a tacit international system to control and manage 
cross-border population movements without endangering European stability. To be sure, 
this was non-binding and states routinely made decisions based on short- or long-term 
policy interests.86 Yet the sovereign right was taken seriously, and it was the Ottoman 
Empire that demonstrated the system’s resilience when it accepted Polish and Hungarian 
refugees after 1848. Russia and Austria both demanded the extradition of their subjects to 
stand trial, and the demands were framed within the terms of treaty law. Russia referred 
to the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, by the terms of which neither power was to shelter 
anyone accused of treason or capital offences on the other power’s territory. For their 
part, the Habsburgs appealed based on the treaties of Passarowitz and Belgrade, which 
banned the powers from sheltering fugitives.  
In both cases, the Ottoman Sultan refused to surrender the refugees, and received 
the strong support of Britain and France in this decision—in fact, the two powers were 
willing to back the Sultan’s decision with their navies. In a note quoted by admiring 
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nineteenth-century jurists, Lord Palmerston argued that based on the laws of hospitality, 
humanity and the general feelings of mankind that bound “all independent states,” any 
state that surrendered political refugees would “be deservedly and universally stigmatised 
as degraded and dishonored.”87 The German jurist Franz von Holtzendorff saw the 
willingness of the “Islamic government” to protect Christians against despotic Christian 
states as a source of European sympathy for the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean 
War.88 Hyperbolic, perhaps, but a telling point. Holtzendorff drew a broader lesson about 
civilization from the Ottoman refusal to extradite. Not only were there “civilized despots” 
in Europe, but countries that “typically count as uncivilized” can nevertheless display 
“political honor.”89  
For Ottoman statesmen, control over nomads and refugees was central to the 
process of state-building and the consolidation of domestic rule. At the same time, 
however, Ottoman asylum policies and international practice with regard to refugees both 
affirmed the empire’s presence on the world stage, and helped to shape and develop the 
nature of international efforts and expectations. Ottoman insistence on its sovereign right 
to protect Hungarian and Polish refugees was verging on anachronistic in a Europe where 
asylum policies had already begun turning more conservative. Nevertheless, in the very 
act of assertion, the Ottoman Empire was demanding—and received—an informal, de 
facto recognition of its place within the European system and its prerogatives under 
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international law.90 Circumstances had changed by 1875-1878, however. The refugees 
from Bosnia and Hercegovina were different not just because they were leaving the 
Ottoman Empire rather than entering it, but also because they were almost exclusively 
Orthodox Christians. The Ottoman international position had also changed, and the fact 
that it was Christians who had fled immediately threw into doubt the empire’s ability to 
meet the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which “had been signed by all the powers, 
including the Ottoman Empire as a newly admitted member of the Concert of Europe, 
and [...] gave international sanction to the territorial and integrity and independence of the 
Ottoman Empire.” As Roderic Davison points out, the treaty “had served as the rock 
upon which Ottoman foreign policy was built.”91 The Bosnian and Hercegovinian 
refugees became a focal point for imperial and nation-state international aspirations on 
the one hand, and the ability of the Ottoman Empire to maintain its position in the 
Concert of Europe and to claim the international right to the non-intervention of foreign 
powers that the Concert guaranteed—indeed, to Ottoman’s international legitimacy.  
The actual terms of the Habsburg-Ottoman negotiations over refugees—the 
development of a regime—need to be considered in this light. At one level, it was 
Austria-Hungary that held all the cards and stood at the center of the diplomatic stage 
during much of the crisis. During the first year of the crisis, the Habsburg foreign 
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minister, Count Gyula Andrássy, followed a two-track course, (discussed in greater detail 
below). The big diplomacy—the formulation of Great Power policy memoranda and 
demands, representations at the Sublime Porte, and coordination among the other 
powers—was largely aimed at maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and 
helping the Porte quell the insurgency. A key part of this involved repeated, and largely 
successful, dilutions of Russian proposals intended to establish for the Ottoman Balkan 
provinces an autonomy that would eventually lead to independence. The second track for 
Austria-Hungary was direct discussion with the Ottomans over concrete measures that 
should be taken to end the crisis, and return the refugees. To be sure, much of the big 
diplomacy was at heart negotiations over measures. But it was direct talks with the 
Ottomans that established the realm of possibility, and in spring 1876, it was direct talks 
that established the procedures for managing and returning refugees. Briefly, these 
included Austro-Hungarian guarantees that their border officials maintain Habsburg 
neutrality by preventing the formation of armed bands on its territory; that the Ottomans 
ensure the security of the refugees as they returned, and provide them with the necessary 
tools for resettlement and return. Committees would be established. It remains unclear 
just how the broad shape of the refugee return process was created—the earliest 
description of the basic terms comes from Andrássy, but also reference an earlier 
Ottoman plan that he deemed premature given the violence. Nevertheless, the specifics 
that were finally agreed to were Ottoman, and they very clearly built off the long 
Ottoman experience with refugee resettlement. Drawing on local experience from earlier 
rebellions in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Ottoman central government also issued a 
blanket amnesty to the refugees who had fled. And by demanding that returnees come 
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back unarmed, the Habsburg-Ottoman return process invented a bureaucratic category of 
the refugee as, if not a victim, then at least by definition, politically harmless.  
 
The Uprising: Local Events and International Repercussions 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
resisted numerous attempts by the central government to exert its authority. In the first 
half of the century armed clashes between local power-holders and the Ottoman army 
were common, as the janissaries, local notables and kapetans—local military 
administrators who held a hereditary office—fought to maintain their privileges against 
the encroachments of government centralization. Central government military victories 
were usually short-lived, and it was not until the arrival in August 1850 of Ömer Paşa 
Latas, a Habsburg-born convert to Islam and respected Ottoman military commander, 
that Ottoman authorities were able to make any headway on reform. Latas’ position as 
Bosnia’s new governor was political, but his mission to impose tanzimat reforms on local 
elite landowners and other entrenched interest groups was effectively military in nature. 
The reforms he brought with him were greeted with violence, and over the coming 
months Latas fought and won thirteen battles with local Muslims, killing some 2,500, 
imprisoning many others, and sending 154 of the most prominent to Istanbul for trial.92 
One of the chief outcomes of Latas’ success was the gradual reconfiguration of 
confessional relations within Bosnia and Hercegovina. In particular, the tanzimat and the 
governors who subsequently implemented it (with greater or, often, lesser skill) fostered 
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and encouraged local Christian communities, in part to demonstrate to the Great Powers 
the Ottoman commitment to the welfare of its Christian subjects.93  
As important as the role of Ottoman reform was in improving the position of both 
Orthodox and Catholics in Bosnia and Hercegovina, it was the role of outside groups—
national activists and secret societies from Serbia and Austria-Hungary, but also the 
Serbian and Habsburg governments—that made the Bosnian and Hercegovinian 
Christians of such great importance to Ottoman administrators. For decades prior to the 
1875-1878 uprising intellectuals, politicians, and activists in Serbia, Croatia-Dalmatia 
and to a lesser extent in Montenegro cooperated or worked individually to encourage a 
Bosnian national revolution. For Croatians, including the activist Bishop Strossmayer, 
early concrete steps did not lead far. Instead, Serbia took the leadership role in 
encouraging revolution. By the 1860s the Serbian government was supporting the 
activities of numerous national activists across Bosnia and Hercegovina, but with little to 
show for the undertaking: efforts to encourage rebellion failed miserably, and even when 
the 1875 uprising began, nationalist activists were unable to determine its tone. The 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian uprisings involved the Great Powers for many reasons, but it 
was the threat of a greatly-expanded Serbian state and the potential for greater Russian 
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influence in the region that lay beneath much of Austro-Hungarian politics during the 
period.94  
In 1875, Bosnia and Hercegovina actually saw not one, but two discrete uprisings. 
The first one began in Hercegovina; the second one began not long thereafter in Bosnia. 
Hercegovina had a long history as an independent province under the Ottoman Empire; at 
the time of the uprising however, it had been incorporated as a district of the province of 
Bosnia.95 Yet despite the administrative organization, Bosnia and Hercegovina remained 
in many ways separate from each other, and it wasn’t until the Ottoman forces in Bosnia 
were mobilized to suppress the uprising in Hercegovina that the Bosnians learned of the 
events to their south.96 Exactly when the uprising started is open to interpretation; for the 
Serbian historian Dušan Berić, for example, the uprising began with guerilla action in late 
1874 and early 1875, and developed into a broader rebellion through the spring and early 
summer of 1875.97 In this view the critical month was April, not coincidently the month 
of Habsburg Emperor Franz Josef’s visit to Dalmatia (“Now it [will catch on fire],” 
thought Mollinary when he heard of the Emperor’s intended visit).98 Contemporary 
observers saw, and many subsequent historians have seen the insurgency as starting much 
later. To Gabriel Rodich, a general in the Habsburg army and the governor of Dalmatia, 
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the insurgency seemed to begin at the start of July 1875, when a handful of Christians 
fled the town of Dračevo onto Habsburg soil.99 For August Šenoa, the Croatian poet, the 
uprising began in Gabela, near the border with Dalmatia.100  
Seen from afar, the first sign of trouble in Hercegovina was refugees. Around 120 
Orthodox Christians, claiming persecution by their Muslims landlords and protesting 
taxes being levied against them despite near-starvation conditions in the district, fled 
from the area around Nevesinje—deeper in to Hercegovina than Dračevo or Gabela—
across the border to Montenegro. The Montenegrin Prince, Nikola Petrović-Njegoš, 
asked Austria-Hungary for financial help to support the refugees and to mediate with 
Ottoman authorities for their return.101 Nevesinje was not an altogether unlikely place for 
the uprising to begin, but the circumstances also illustrate the extent to which the uprising 
from the very beginning was embedded in larger regional processes. As Hannes Grandits 
has convincingly argued in a close analysis of the insurrection’s outbreak, it was the 
involvement of hajduks and other brigands who crossed into Hercegovina from 
Montenegro, as well as some nationalist activists in Mostar, who succeeded in leveraging 
local dissatisfaction into full-scale violence.102  
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Indeed, the outbreak of violence arguably testified to the success of local Ottoman 
administration. After several elders from villages near Nevesinje refused to pay taxes in 
early summer of 1875, the Bosnian vali sent a high-level commission to meet with the 
men and discuss a non-violent resolution to their complaints. In May and June the 
meetings with the commissions seemed to be working. The Ottoman authorities 
countered the villagers’ complaints over tax burdens worsened by two years of bad 
harvests with offers of greater local autonomy, lower taxes, and salaried employment in 
the Ottoman border guards. While the villagers were favorably disposed, brigands 
operating from Montenegrin territories had little interest in the stabilization of 
circumstances in Nevesinje. Prince Nikola was offering them tentative support as part of 
his broader campaign to overthrow Ottoman rule; Nikola was also trying to 
instrumentalize the returning refugees. The brigands themselves appear to have thought 
that instability would make their raids easier and more profitable. It was in these 
circumstances that an attack on a caravan that killed five Muslim merchants led first to 
the Ottomans deploying more zaptiyes to Nevesinje, followed by more violence and 
subsequent escalation. Not two weeks after the caravan attack, the violence had escalated 
to the point that Mićo Ljubibratić, a Hercegovinian expatriate, could return to Nevesinje 
and impose the first organizational structure to what became a broader uprising. Nikola 
was ill-equipped to control the course of the uprising, but it did fit into his general goals 
for gaining independence by weakening the Ottoman hold on neighboring territories. The 
uprising also began to attract foreign volunteers and revolutionaries, many of whom 
entered Hercegovina, along with weapons and supplies, via Dubrovnik and other Austro-
Hungarian ports. With sympathies strong in Montenegro, Dalmatia, Serbia and 
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elsewhere, the localized violence in the area around Nevesinje quickly had outsized 
repercussions.103 
 
The Diplomatic Framework 
Much of this dissertation considers events on the ground, at the local level. Nevertheless, 
local events forced international policies, which subsequently framed local events, and 
the diplomacy of the period must be considered. The diplomatic engagement with 
Ottoman affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina began as an effort to prevent the expansion of 
the conflict and quickly revealed the tensions in the European Concert. These only 
worsened as the insurgency wore on and the number and interest level of other European 
states involved increased, leading to new alignments and entrenching existing positions. 
Diplomacy created a negative feedback loop of sorts, in which the efforts of foreign 
offices to win real reforms and re-establish order in the provinces made the reforms’ 
success only more important, and therefore all the more demanding of further diplomacy.  
The literature on the diplomacy of the Eastern Crisis is vast. It typically frames the 
period not truly as an Ottoman question, but as a diplomatic question for the other Great 
Powers: how to manage the end of “Turkey in Europe” without going to war; how to 
create viable nation-states while maintaining or developing alliances and spheres of 
influence in the Balkans and the Middle East. According to this narrative, the Ottoman 
state was acted upon but rarely acted itself; when Ottoman statesmen made decisions they 
did so under the influence of one diplomat or another and in any case their decisions were 
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most likely errant. This image is not altogether unfair to Ottoman history.104 
Nevertheless, it obscures many of the areas in which the Ottoman Empire remained a 
legitimate negotiating partner, and can overlook many of the same faults among the other 
Great Powers.  
This is particularly the case with the diplomacy of late 1875 and the first half of 
1876, which was punctuated by a series of measures—all of them initiated by Russia and 
subsequently softened by Austria-Hungary—designed to end the violence in the 
Ottoman’s Balkan provinces. An ineffective mission of foreign consuls was sent to the 
provinces, followed by the first formal diplomatic representation in the form of the 
“Andrássy Note.” This was followed by the so-called Berlin Memorandum, which fell 
apart thanks to Great Power discord.  
In 1875, the consular mission’s great achievement had been to break long-standing 
European promises of non-intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs while maintaining 
the appearance of not having done so. In mid-August, each of the powers designated a 
consul for the mission and sent them to Bosnia and Hercegovina. The mission was a 
Russian initiative, and was originally intended to give the consuls negotiating powers 
with the insurgents. Andrássy avoided any possible expansion of Russian influence by 
stripping the consuls of any real power. In doing so he was able to claim the mission was 
not a violation of Ottoman sovereign power. The consuls were there to encourage the 
insurgents to lay down their arms, not to mediate between the insurgents and the Ottoman 
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government. They would not even be permitted to hear complaints; for that purpose, the 
Ottomans were to send their own commissioner.105  
Framed in this manner, Andrássy hoped the consular mission would satisfy Russian 
desires for intervention while remaining a palatable diplomatic measure to the Ottoman 
government. It did neither, but with the violence continuing unabated, the Ottoman 
government had little choice other than to assent. On 22 August, the Porte responded to 
the proposals in terms that seemingly put victims, and refugees, in the foreground. Out of 
the “sentiments of humanity,” the Ottoman ambassador to Britain wrote, “and wanting 
above all to avoid bloodshed and maintain peace, the imperial government has accepted 
this proposal as a last attempt at appeasement.”106 The consular mission did not satisfy 
the insurgents, either, and the consuls could do little to dissuade the insurgents from 
fighting. Instead, the “real result of that mission was to encourage the insurgents to 
pursue the struggle, as it gave them proof that the Powers were not indifferent to their 
cause.”107 
The consular mission as Andrássy had revised it was almost meaningless 
diplomatically. Accredited foreign consuls already had the right to move around the 
provinces, and the presence of an Ottoman emissary only undermined their position. The 
follow-up to the mission was the Andrássy Note, which followed a similar period of 
diplomatic wrangling that had preceded the consular mission. Again, the idea of the note 
originated in Russia, and again Andrássy stripped it of any force. The Note was circulated 
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to the Great Powers on 30 December 1875 and after several weeks in the other European 
courts, was presented to the Porte a month later, on 31 January 1876. The note reiterated 
that the consular mission had not been direct intervention in Ottoman affairs in violation 
of the Treaty of Paris, and claimed the same for itself, carefully avoiding all meddling, 
and guarding the “dignity, rights and authority of the [Sultan].”108 The note concerned 
itself exclusively with Ottoman implementation of pre-existing commitments to reform. 
It asked only for the enforcement of Ottoman guarantees for religious liberty, reform of 
the system of tax-farming and land-tenure. The note’s only innovation was to demand a 
monitoring system:  the election of mixed commissions to oversee reforms. Andrássy had 
explicitly framed the note to express the concerns of all the Great Powers over the 
violence in the insurgent provinces. Ottoman acceptance of the note would be taken as a 
moral commitment not simply to the Sultan’s Christian subjects, but to the Great Powers 
themselves. There was no mention of Austria-Hungary’s more narrow concern, the 
refugees. With the exception of the final point, which demanded provincial taxes be used 
exclusively in the provinces, Sultan Abdülaziz approved the note on 13 February 1876.  
The Andrássy Note was ineffective. Neither its terms nor the implicit Great Power 
guarantee of reforms convinced the insurgents to lay down their arms and the refugees to 
go home, or enabled the Ottoman central government to implement reforms. The failure 
of the Note, combined with the killing in early May of the French and German consuls in 
Thessaloniki led to the Berlin Memorandum—proposal put forward exclusively by 
Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary. For the first time, however, the Berlin 
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Memorandum explicitly discussed refugees. In fact, at its most basic level, it framed the 
Eastern Question as a question of refugees.  The memo argued that because the Porte had 
officially communicated its agreement to the terms of the Andrássy Note, the Great 
Powers had acquired the “moral right” to watch over the execution of the note’s terms. 
They had also acquired an obligation—that of “insisting that the Insurgents and Refugees 
should second this work of pacification by terminating the struggle and returning 
home.”109 This was to be accomplished by means of a two-month armistice. During this 
time, the Ottoman state would supply material to rebuild houses and churches, as well as 
food for subsistence. It would also distribute aid via mixed Muslim-Christian 
commissions. This was all to happen under foreign consular supervision.110 It was these 
terms, in part, that prevented Britain from agreeing to the Berlin Memorandum. Benjamin 
Disraeli, the British Prime Minister, believed it “impossible for the Sultan to reconstruct 
the houses and churches of the insurgents, or to find food for the refugees,” and that a 
relief commission as proposed would be a “huge system of indiscriminate almsgiving, 
totally beyond the power of the Porte to effect, and utterly demoralizing to any 
country.”111 The refugee question had become the stuff of high diplomacy, and the 
diplomatic solution to it, Disraeli worried, would break the Ottoman state. 
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Up to the middle of 1876 the diplomacy focused to a great extent on the issue of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina. Austria-Hungary tried to link the growing violence in the 
provinces and the refugee question together as a subject of Great Power negotiations. By 
late spring and early summer however, the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina had 
metastasized, with new violence springing up across the Balkans. The so-called 
Bulgarian Horrors were drawn to Europe’s attention in June and July 1876 through the 
reports of Edwin Pears and Januarius MacGahan, leading to outrage in Europe and a 
growing anti-Ottoman sentiment, especially in relatively turcophile Britain.112 At the start 
of May, Christian mobs in Thessaloniki seized a girl who was converting to Islam; one 
day later, Muslims attacked and killed the German and French consuls, who had been 
offering the girl protection.113 In Istanbul, Abdülaziz replaced Nedim Paşa with Mehmed 
Ruşdi Paşa as Grand Vizier, and Hussein Avni Paşa was sent to the military office.  
On 30 May 1876—the same day the Berlin Memorandum was to be presented to 
the Sultan, a reformist wing within the Ottoman government deposed Abdülaziz and 
installed Murad V. Two weeks later a Circassian  refugee broke into a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers and began to shoot, killing Hussein Avni and Rasid Paşa. On 2 July 
1876, Serbia began military operations against Ottoman forces along its borders. In a 
matter of two months, the troubles in the Balkans had gone from a seemingly containable 
uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina to war in Serbia, an uprising in Bulgaria, and a 
diplomatic rupture that threatened another all-European war. As important as the refugee 
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question in Bosnia and Hercegovina had been in the early days of the uprising, the 
outbreak of war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire forced a re-orientation of Great 
Power diplomacy. Its failure and Ottoman diplomatic assertiveness despite a weakening 
domestic environment eventually brought Russia to war with the Ottoman Empire, and 
the Russian army almost to the gates of Istanbul.  
The Berlin Memorandum spelled out the stabilization of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
based on a ceasefire and refugee return and was the pinnacle of refugee diplomacy during 
the uprising. Although the memorandum set terms that were invoked in later negotiations, 
it was not until the preparatory negotiations for the Berlin Congress that refugees would 
return as a central feature of Great Power negotiations. The failure of the memorandum, 
notes Langer, marked a turning-point in the crisis after which Russia was unable to 
restrain Serbia and Montenegro’s action.114 Great Britain had broken “the European 
Concert, whatever it was worth.”115 Up until the memorandum, diplomacy had centered 
on the re-establishment of the status quo ante in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Henceforth, 
international negotiations sought to end the Serbian-Ottoman war and to prevent Russia 
from entering into war with either Austria-Hungary or the Ottoman Empire. For the time 
being, Disraeli’s rejection of the memorandum seemed to have prevented Istanbul from 
being “‘garrisoned by Russia, and the Turkish fleet [from being] placed under Russian 
protection’”116 The refugee question was big enough to break the Concert of Europe.  
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Russia and Austria-Hungary quickly began mending fences after Serbia went to war 
with the Ottoman Empire. On 8 July 1876, a week after Serbia’s declaration of war, the 
two empires struck a secret, verbal deal over the outcome of the war. According to the 
terms of the Reichstadt agreement, an Ottoman victory would result in no net gain for the 
empire, but also the introduction of reforms based on the Andrássy Note. An Ottoman 
defeat, however would divide the Balkans. Serbian and Montenegrin territorial expansion 
would be limited, thereby assuaging Habsburg concerns over the creation of a large 
south-Slavic state. Russia would occupy Bessarabia and some territorial extension in Asia 
Minor. Minus some territory that would go to Serbia and Montenegro, Austria-Hungary 
would get Bosnia and Hercegovina.117 The terms of Reichstadt were subsequently refined 
in two secret conventions in 1877, as Russia moved ever closer to war with the Ottoman 
Empire. The Habsburgs were to offer Russia a benevolent neutrality, and would be 
allowed to occupy and then annex Bosnia and Hercegovina at a time convenient to them. 
In case of a Russian victory, the eastern Balkan vilayets might become independent states 
but a large Slavic state would not be formed. Istanbul could become a free city.118  
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At Reichstadt, Austria-Hungary had won a guarantee for a step that Andrássy, at 
least, did not yet want to take. Despite the pressure from within the government and from 
Emperor Franz Josef himself, Andrássy’s foreign policy through 1876 and into the early 
months of 1877 still focused on the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. On the surface, 
Reichstadt appears to have been a deal in which, as Mihailo Stojanović writes, “the latent 
antagonistic interests which divided Russia and Austria in Bosnia found satisfaction in 
the break-up of Turkey.”119 Yet the agreement is best seen as a contingency plan that 
guaranteed the Habsburg southern border against the formation of a large Slavic state, 
and the further encroachment of Russian sympathy.  
By the end of 1876, Bosnia and Hercegovina were no longer the primary question 
in the Eastern Crisis. The violence continued and refugees kept fleeing from the 
provinces throughout 1877, but the problems in the provinces had already been defined 
by international agreement if not circumstances on the ground, and so too had the range 
of possible solutions. Failing an Ottoman-led restoration of peace, the Andrássy Note and 
the Berlin Memorandum served as clear guidelines and expectations for the Great 
Powers. Reichstadt, though secret, had to some extent quarantined the Bosnian and 
Hercegovinian question from Habsburg-Russian relations. Serbian military setbacks did, 
however, strain the Reichstadt agreement: growing pan-Slavic pressure on the Russian 
government was pushing for a unilateral Russian intervention that could, depending on its 
outcome, have resulted in a Russian war with Austria-Hungary.120  
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In the event, it did not come to war. Neither Bosnia and Hercegovina nor the 
refugees figured prominently in the big diplomatic events leading up to the Berlin 
Congress. Instead of war, Serbia’s military setbacks led to a Great Power conference in 
Istanbul at the end of 1876 to which the Ottomans agreed only under the threat of Russian 
military action. The so-called Constantinople Conference (Tersane in Turkish, after the 
actual location of the conference) bundled the Bosnian and Hercegovinian question into a 
larger packet of reforms for the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans in particular. Indeed, 
the real questions in Constantinople were about the shape of an autonomous Bulgaria 
(and therefore the extent of Russian influence in the Balkans) and how it would be 
governed.121 For all of the provinces the Great Powers demanded, among other things, the 
introduction of an international commission that would approve the appointment of 
governors for five-year terms and monitor the implementation of reforms, mixed 
representative assemblies.122 Specific to Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Powers wanted 
improvements to the agricultural system and the acquisition of land by the state for 
refugee repatriation. The legwork for these demands had all been conducted before the 
actual conference began, and in the absence of Ottoman delegates. When the conference 
officially started, however, the Ottomans surprised the Great Powers by announcing a 
constitution as well as a representative imperial parliament; they also rejected the terms 
                                                
121 The centrality of the Constantinople Conference to the establishment of Bulgaria is frequently under-
estimated. The big debates over the division of Bulgaria into two provinces, over Russian oversight, and 
governing structures took place in Constantinople, not in Berlin; this would later prove to be an annoyance 
for Austria-Hungary (see Chapter Four). The San Stefano preliminary treaty, in this respect, reflected 
Russia’s aspirations going into the Constantinople Conference; Berlin more closely represented the 
outcome of the Conference. For an overlooked but insightful analysis, see William Gauld, “The Making of 
Bulgaria,” History X (1925). 
 
122 These assemblies already existed and were, contrary to contemporary understanding, not entirely 
dysfunctional. See Grandits, “Violent Social Disintegration: A Nation-Building Strategy in Late-Ottoman 
Herzegovina.” 
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laid before them.123 Ironically, it seems that several months later, it was the parliament 
that became the obstacle to agreeing to much watered-down terms that might have 
prevented war with Russia. The young Abdülhamid, installed in September as the last of 
1876’s three sultans, later claimed it was the Bosnian deputies in particular who 
prevented him from reaching an agreement with the Great Powers: the Bosnians refused 
any territorial concessions to Montenegro.124 
Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 24 April 1877, claiming that it did 
so only in order to carry out the Great Power decisions the Ottomans had repeatedly 
rejected. The Ottoman army was able to stall the Russian advance at the fortress in 
Plevna, which held out against the Russian siege from July to December; after Plevna fell 
the Russian forces advanced quickly. They reached Edirne by the end of January, when 
an armistice was signed; but the army continued its advance, stopping just short of 
Istanbul on 23 February 1878 in the village of San Stefano, now Yeşilköy. The terms of 
the preliminary peace of San Stefano were harsh. In addition to independence for 
Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia, territorial revisions would further encroach on 
Ottoman lands. Russia claimed territorial indemnities for itself including parts of 
Dobrudja it planned to trade with Romania for parts of Bessarabia. Ottoman fortresses on 
the Danube were to be destroyed. Russia imposed its maximalist vision for a greater 
Bulgaria as an autonomous tributary principality with a Christian government. Bosnia 
and Hercegovina were to be administered according to the terms set forth at the 
                                                
123 The best study of the introduction of the Ottoman constitution remains Robert Devereux, The First 
Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament  (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1963). 
 
124 Feroz Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid and the Great Powers 1878-1888  (Istanbul: Isis 
Press, 1996). 17. 
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Constantinople Conference, with any modifications being agreed to by the Porte, Russia 
and Austria-Hungary. Until 1 March 1880, the Bosnian and Hercegovinian tax revenues 
would be “exclusively applied to indemnify the families of refugees and inhabitants, 
victims of recent events, without distinction of race or creed...”125 Refugees were back on 
the agenda, but the “Ottoman Empire in Europe was practically annihilated.”126 
The other Great Powers very quickly demanded revisions to Russia’s proposed 
settlement, and it was for this purpose a congress was called in Berlin in May and June of 
1878. The terms of the Berlin Treaty and the negotiations leading up to it are discussed in 
detail in Chapter Four of this thesis, with a particular focus on how refugees fit into the 
tactics and the larger strategic goals of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Much 
of the scholarly literature on the Berlin Treaty is both good and dated; recent work has 
tended to view the Berlin Treaty as a turning point: one that established the world of 
nation-states and, therefore, ethnic cleansing or, viewed from the other direction, one that 
institutionalized the idea of minority protection—with all of its weaknesses.127 There is a 
lot of truth to this assessment, and the failures of the post-Berlin order are evident. Yet 
there is also an oversimplification that accompanies some of this analysis. Most basically, 
there is a tendency to overlook the fact that, however narrow the purpose, the Berlin 
Treaty succeeded in its main mission. The terms of the treaty prevented a major European 
                                                
125 Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the Various Political and Territorial Changes 
Which Have Taken Place Since the General Peace of 1814, vol. 4. 2672-2696. 
 
126 J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question; an Historical Study in European Diplomacy. 336. 
 
127 See, for example, the essays in M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett, War and Diplomacy: The Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin, Utah Series in Middle East Studies (Salt Lake City: 
University of Utah Press, 2011). Also Carole Fink, Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the 
Jews, and International Minority Rights Protection, 1878-1938  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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war for thirty-six years—making it much more durable than either of the Paris Treaties 
that flanked it, and nearly as long lasting as the decision at the Congress of Vienna.  
Continuing in this vein, it is easy to overlook the very conservative aspect of the 
Berlin Treaty. Yes, it did create new nation-states, and it was devastating to the Ottoman 
Empire. The Balkans had been some of the Empire’s richest territories, and their loss 
shifted the economic and geographical center of the empire east. The demographic 
changes—in particular the concentration of the Muslim population—had wide-ranging 
effects on the empire’s political and social development. Yet the goal in Berlin was not to 
dismantle the imperial order, but to preserve it. One way of doing this was through the 
use of “autonomy.” In the scholarly literature on Berlin autonomy is often equated with 
independence, but it most clearly was not. From the Constantinople Conference forward, 
the nature and dimensions of autonomy—cultural, administrative, or political—were 
constantly debated. Similarly, the territorial and boundary revisions in the Balkans under 
the treaty of Berlin were to a great extent not based on a “national principle”—and were 
at the time understood in this manner. The extent to which territorial revision at Berlin 
appeared to be much more like traditional post-conflict horse-trading than the creation of 
national boundaries infuriated the Russians, who had argued in Constantinople and again 
in San Stefano for a “national” Bulgaria: 
 
 
Count Schouvaloff adds that Lord Salisbury’s desire to see religious liberty extended as 
much as possible in [European and Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire] appears to 
him quite justifiable. His Excellency would wish that mention should be made in the 
Protocol of his adhesion to the wish of the British Plenipotentiary, and remarks that the 
Congress, having sought to efface ethnographical frontiers, and to replace them by 
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commercial and strategic frontiers, the Plenipotentiaries of Russia are all the more 
anxious that these frontiers should not become religious barriers.128 
 
It is in this light that the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina should be 
seen, and that the repatriation and return of the provinces’ refugees should be understood. 
The occupation of the provinces while they remained under Ottoman sovereignty was 
cynical, and the Habsburgs wasted no time in making themselves feel at home. At the 
same time, however, the occupation was deeply conservative: there was, for example, no 
major revision to the provinces’ boundaries, and the repatriation of the refugees was an 
expectation after the occupation just as it had been before the occupation. If Berlin was 
an attempt to modify an imperial system in order to preserve it, refugee return was part of 
an attempt to preserve a demographic order.  
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is arranged chronologically and thematically, thanks in part to the fact 
that the central themes under consideration arose at different points during the course of 
the uprising. As a result, there are occasional and necessary overlaps in the contents of 
the individual chapters.  
Chapter One examines Austria-Hungary’s establishment of a state-run refugee aid 
regime. It looks at the historical precedents of the refugee aid program by examining the 
state system from several different angles. Arguing that the program was constrained by 
costs, domestic politics, and international considerations, the chapter explores how state 
refugee aid developed from earlier schemes that, while aimed at helping people crossing 
                                                
128 “Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin with the Protocols of the Congress,” House of 
Commons Command Papers (London, 1878), 93. 
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to Austro-Hungarian soil from Bosnia and Hercegovina, had only been applied in much 
smaller refugee events. The refugee aid system worked much like poor aid and brought 
with it a similar set of expectations including fixity of the recipient and the expectation 
that the “able-bodied” must work. The chapter also suggests the political dimension of 
refugee aid played an important role in domestic expectations and diplomatic 
undertakings.  
Chapter Two takes up the question of civic refugee aid on the Habsburg side of the 
border and its relationship both to the state and to the broader “international community.” 
The chapter examines the activities of local philanthropists and refugee aid committees, 
many of which were active in supporting the insurgency along with aiding the refugees. 
Secular philanthropic organizations were only beginning to emerge in Croatia at the time 
of the uprising, and non-state refugee aid became closely intertwined with this process. 
Yet it is the links between philanthropic societies, the insurgency itself, and foreign 
humanitarians that form the core part of this chapter. By examining the ways in which 
local and foreign humanitarians worked together to determine the nature of humanitarian 
aid and the extent of what civic activism could provide, the chapter argues that local 
circumstances helped to define the very nature of “humanitarianism,” and the extent to 
which it should limit itself to caritative initiatives for “innocent victims,” or should be 
viewed as a proper part of violent paramilitary resistance.  
Chapter Three is a case study in refugee management, and examines the joint 
Habsburg-Ottoman effort to return and resettle refugees back in Bosnia and Hercegovina 
in the first half of 1876. It is particularly concerned with the interaction between the 
international commitments and bilateral diplomatic processes between the Habsburg and 
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the Ottoman Empires on the one hand, and the reality of efforts by the central 
governments to manage the various populations along their shared borders and 
successfully to carry out the repatriation. The chapter sees both governments’ inability to 
control events and even the activities of their own officials along the border as a key 
obstacle to the success of the repatriation undertaking, along with fundamental lack of 
understanding of the extreme nature of the situation. The Habsburg and Ottoman hope 
that diplomatic agreements and Great Power guarantees of security would encourage the 
refugees to return home were misplaced. Nevertheless, the plans that were put in place to 
enable the return and resettlement of the refugees helped not only to define the nature of 
the refugee problem, but also to create bureaucratic expectations and definitions for the 
“refugee” as a category. 
The period between the outbreak of war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire to 
the closing days of the Russian-Ottoman War saw little change in the situation for the 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees on Habsburg territory. Their relative importance on 
the international stage was minor in comparison with the events taking place in the 
eastern Balkans. Chapter Four skips forward to late 1877 to pick up the narrative in the 
closing days of the Russian-Ottoman War, when the mass flow of Muslim refugees from 
Bulgaria had all but obscured the visibility and the international importance of the 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees. This chapter argues, however, that the refugee 
question became a central point in Habsburg arguments for the legitimacy and necessity 
of its occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina as would be framed in the Berlin Treaty. 
Refugees were a language of convenience and conviction that, it was hoped, would 
overcome domestic opposition to an occupation, while also strong-arming the Ottoman 
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leadership into “inviting” a Habsburg occupation. With the claim for an effective refugee 
return as a cornerstone of Habsburg legitimacy in the provinces, carrying out that return 
became an earlier and vital goal of the new Habsburg authorities. The chapter considers 
the circumstances, difficulties, and ultimate success of the final repatriation.  
 





State-sponsored Refugee Aid: 




On 2 July 1875, the district commissioner of the Dalmatian border-town of Metković sent 
an urgent cable about disturbances in the neighboring Ottoman-held Hercegovina to 
Gabriel Rodich, the Governor-General of Dalmatia. The night before, two Muslims had 
reportedly attacked the Hercegovinian town of Dračevo, and although the attack was 
repelled, they had promised to come back another night “with a large number of Turks to 
[kill] all of the Christians.” After the attack, two of Dračevo’s young men had fled to join 
the insurgency, which at the time was just days old and still loosely organized. Before 
they left, the villagers also charged these men with escorting the women and children of 
the town across the border to safety. The commissioner in Metković had asked Rodich for 
instructions on what to do should Christians “flee to our territory.”1 
In his report to the Foreign Minister Andrássy, Rodich interpreted the event 
primarily as a security matter: “In expectation of further orders, I am telegraphing that 
Christians, after putting down their weapons, should not be denied passage [across the 
                                                
1 HHStA.PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder “Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-
1876,” 02 VII 1875, Statthalterei Dalmatiens/SHD Zara to Ministerium des Äusseren/MdÄ. 
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border], but in case of threatening news, I nevertheless believe that the military should be 
deployed to Metković in order to maintain our neutrality.”2 The foreign ministry 
approved the terms of refuge, as well as the planned deployment. Two days later, Rodich 
sent two companies of soldiers from Dubrovnik to Metković.3 Neither the flight nor the 
dispatch of troops to the border was out of the ordinary. Cross-border flight was not 
uncommon and there had been similar unrest before, most recently in 1873, but also in 
1862, 1858, 1842 and earlier.4 The news from Metković brought no indication of the 
large-scale flight of refugees to Austro-Hungarian territory not just from Hercegovina, 
but also Bosnia. There was no indication that within a matter of months, General Anton 
von Mollinary, the commander of Croatia’s Military Border with Bosnia, would have 
cause to report that the “gravest event [of the uprising would] indisputably be the massive 
entry of Bosnian refugees onto Austrian-Hungarian soil, in a way it has not yet happened 
in this century.”5 
As more refugees arrived, regional officials began to make available regular cash 
payments to refugees for the purchase of food and other necessities. Although the central 
government responded quickly to the initial need by sending money, the initial response 
was haphazard. The response relied on precedents set during earlier small-scale crossings 
of refugees to the Habsburg side, and it was based on the assumption that the current 
                                                
2 HHStA PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder “Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-
1876” 02 VII 1875, SHD Zara to MdÄ. 
 
3 HHStA PA XII 1875-1876, box 234, folder “Korr. mit FZM Rodich u. d. Statthalterei in Zara, 1875-
1876” 05 VII 1875, SHD Zara to MdÄ. 
 
4 Theodor von Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns seit 1866, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Stuttgart and 
Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913). 95-126. 
 
5 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, General 
Kommando/GK Agram to Hofburg. 
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refugees would soon return home. At first, the central government did not develop an 
over-arching policy towards aid, nor did it put in place a centralized infrastructure for its 
distribution. Instead, it exercised control mainly with its purse strings, and allowed local 
officials leeway regarding who was given aid and how money was spent. Over the three 
years from the start of the uprising in 1875 to the Austro-Hungarian military occupation 
of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878, the government spent over ten million gulden on 
aid.6  
Yet despite the public aid effort and the work of private charities, the suffering was 
great. Payments, especially in winter, were seldom sufficient to stave off hunger; 
epidemic diseases thrived in over-populated borderlands, and ravaged the starving, the 
shelterless, and the weak. When government officials began to produce detailed statistics 
in 1876, the data showed mortality rates among the refugees of 7-10%, although it is 
unclear how reliable these data are. 7 In his memoir, Mollinary refers to a mortality rate—
at least early on—of 22%.8 Others estimated the rate to be even greater. Paulina Irby, a 
British do-gooder who worked with refugees and established schools for their children, 
                                                
6 This figure is from Mollinary’s memoir; Finance Ministry Archives are not complete but can confirm: 
1875   475, 810fl 09.0kr 
1876              2,122,097fl 00.5kr 
    519,727fl 52.0kr 
1877              3,200,000fl 00.0kr 
1878 (1st quarter)   900,000fl 00.0kr 
See: Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2. Also FA 4.1 PR ad 
138, 16 IV 1878, MdÄ and Finanz Ministerium/RFM to Delegations. 
 
7 FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al. Some of these figures were also made public. The Zagreb-
based newspaper Obzor published tables showing refugee population and death rates by county, based on 
data Mollinary provided. Obzor 152, 6 VII 1876. Quoted in Dragutin Pavličević, “Odbori za pomaganje i 
bosanski prebjezi u sjevernoj Hrvatskoj tijekom Bosansko-Hercegovačkog ustanka 1875-1878,” Radovi 
(Sveučilište u Zagrebu—Institut za Hrvatsku Povijest) 7(1975): 242-43. Pavličević points out that the data 
came from only those counties in military Croatia with the largest number of refugees. 
 
8 Mollinary, Sechsundvierzig Jahre im österreich-ungarischen Heere, 1833-1879, 2: 292. 
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put the mortality rate as high as 50%.9 Contextualizing such numbers is difficult. 10 
Interior Minister Josef Lasser response to the Imperial Finance Minister Leopold von 
Hofmann’s concerns over increasing costs as winter approached was telling: “The answer 
to the question, how much and what kind of subventions should be made available, and to 
what level suffering can be brought,” wrote Lasser, “is first of all a matter of foreign 
policy [...].”11 From the perspective of the government, absolute numbers mattered little. 
The need for government aid was not to be judged according to any direct measure such 
as the success or failure of keeping people alive, but rather by the indirect measure of just 
how much suffering the international political situation would allow.  
This tension between foreign policy and domestic affairs would be the defining 
characteristic of the Austro-Hungarian refugee aid project throughout the period under 
consideration. For Andrássy’s diplomacy, co-operating with the Ottomans to pacify the 
insurgent provinces and return the refugees was the primary concern. But the necessity of 
responding to the growing number of refugees who were actually present on Habsburg 
soil, were in need of help, and were unwilling to return to Ottoman territory was an 
                                                
9 Evans, Illyrian letters: A Revised Selection of Correspondence from the Illyrian Provinces of Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, Addressed to the Manchester 
Guardian During the Year 1877. This last number seems suspiciously high. Irby was in the business or 
raising money for her efforts, and high numbers could only have helped her cause. Moreover, she was 
assisted in her efforts by Florence Nightingale, the Grand Dame of Britain’s humanitarian export industry. 
Nightingale at one point crossed out a bit of copy from one of Irby’s reports that she found to be 
unsatisfactorily harrowing, writing below it “How many lies I have told.” See Anderson, Miss Irby and Her 
Friends. 
 
10 Prisoners of war—another large and temporary population requiring care—offer one possibility for 
comparison. The range is great: French POWs in Bavaria during the Franco-Prussian war had a mortality 
rate of 3.8%; In the Great War, the rate ranged from about 3% for German POWs in Britain to some 20% 
for Austro-Hungarians in Russia. For the Franco-Prussian case, see Katja Mitze, “Seit der babylonischen 
Gefangenschaft hat die Welt Nichts derart erlebt,” in In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von 
der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Rüdiger Overmans (Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 247. For POWs in the 
Great War, see Rüdiger Overmans, “In der Hand des Feindes: Geschichtschreibung zur 
Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike biz zum Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in In der Hand des Feindes: 
Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg, 9.  
 
11 FA 4.1 PR 159, 28 XI 1876, Ministerium des Inneres/MI to RFM. 
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inseparable aspect of this foreign policy. As this chapter demonstrates, Andrássy saw aid 
itself as a potential tool of foreign policy. Used properly, the alleviation of suffering 
could encourage the gratitude of the refugees toward the Habsburg Empire. This in turn 
would strengthen Austria-Hungary’s strategic position in the Balkans not only with 
regard to the Ottoman Empire, but also with regard to the growing Serbian irredentism 
and Russia’s efforts to broaden its sphere of influence.   
At the same time, the international nature of the refugee flight circumscribed the 
domestic response to the refugees. Many Ottoman subjects—even those in need—who 
crossed to the Habsburg border saw the category of “refugee” as a useful expedient while 
they organized paramilitary actions and sorties back into Bosnia and Hercegovina. When 
regional officials began distributing aid to the needy, it became apparent that in the new 
circumstances of mass flight and disorganized cross-border violence, the international 
characteristics of the refugee had not yet been determined. The question of definition 
was, however, vital and played directly into Habsburg foreign policy making and 
international responsibilities. The problem was how to distinguish between refugee and 
rebel. The first response, taken as a matter of course, was to collapse any distinction 
between the two by making further participation in the rebellion impossible. All who 
crossed over onto Austro-Hungarian territory were to be disarmed and removed from the 
immediate border zone. The policy did not end cross-border traffic, and officials in 
Vienna were aware that implementation had been a failure. Nevertheless, the foreign 
ministry needed to maintain Habsburg neutrality with regard to the insurgency, and the 
policy did express a commitment, at least in form, to international laws of neutrality.  
  68 
Neutrality became a key consideration in Habsburg refugee policy. Just one year 
before the uprising started, an international conference in Brussels had produced a 
“Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,” an 
unratified document that nevertheless reflected a new sentiment on the part of European 
states towards a multi-lateral regulation of such matters as occupation, weaponry, the 
obligations and rights of neutral parties, and the treatment of prisoners of war.12 The new 
international consciousness of neutral powers’ obligations re-invigorated long-standing 
general practice, including a “growth in importance of the principle that neutral 
sovereigns must take scrupulous care to prevent their territories from being used by one 
belligerent as a base of hostile operations against the other.”13 The inability to control 
exactly this sort of activity dogged Austria-Hungary throughout the uprising, and 
weakened its diplomatic position. Andrássy and other central government officials may 
have framed their concern over the failure to enforce border controls in the language of 
international obligations, but these very obligations would also help to fix patterns of 
refugee aid and population management that would persist throughout the uprising. 
International expectations may have demanded a refugee management based on 
border control, but domestic policy also placed limitations on refugee management. 
Andrássy’s expectation that the refugees would not long remain in Austria-Hungary 
thwarted any long-term planning for their care. The devastating effects of this were 
evident in the death rate of the refugees, but more pertinently for leaders in Vienna, in the 
                                                
12 Geoffrey Best writes of the prisoners’ section of the Brussels Code that “although it never became 
‘official’ in the sense of a signed and ratified convention, in fact [it] was accepted by armies as an agreed 
statement of the law.” Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). 
157. 
 
13 Stephen C. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History, Melland Schill Studies in 
International Law (New York: Manchester University Press, 2000). 105. 
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ledgers of the finance ministry. The 1873 stock-market crash and European economic 
downturn had further undermined the already weak financial stability of the Empire. The 
foreign ministry had some discretionary funds available to help pay for refugee aid, but 
the complicated politics of the dual monarchy’s parliamentary system made securing 
large sums over the long term difficult. In these circumstances, finances were a central 
consideration in refugee aid policy and the limiting factor in its development. The hard 
truth was that as far as domestic policy was concerned, the main way the central 
government viewed refugees was as a budgetary issue. This concern over expenditures on 
refugee aid was myopic to the point of being self-defeating, and the unwillingness or 
political inability of the government to make plans even for the medium term ultimately 
incurred further costs, for the care of refugees, for the care of the local population, and for 
ancillaries such as public health measures. 
The regional officials were the most familiar with the sentiment of the local and 
fleeing populations, and with their material needs. It was General Mollinary who had first 
grasped that the rapid population increase in the Croatian and Dalmatian borderlands 
would, without government intervention, undermine social stability and endanger public 
health and safety. Andrássy acknowledged the danger, but gave it little priority as he 
worked towards a diplomatic solution, which failed in part because he had turned a blind 
eye to the warnings from regional officials that the refugees would not return under the 
terms they had been offered. The failure did, however, force the government to pay 
greater attention to the actual situation on the ground. In late 1876, it sent an inspector to 
the borderlands to obtain both an independent assessment of the condition of the 
refugees, and an evaluation of the systemic problems in the provision of aid. For the 
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central authorities this was an attempt to make the refugee population and the emergency 
aid project more legible, in the hopes that efficiencies might be found and costs reduced. 
The results of the inspection were surprising, and ultimately resulted in even higher costs 
to the state budget. But the inspection also marked a sort of turning point, where the 
government began to come to terms with the nature of its obligations for aid, as well as 
the nature of a new and thoroughly modern phenomenon: the mass exodus of refugees “in 
a way it has not yet happened in this century”, and even more, in a way that struck at the 




In his history of the Bosnian uprising, Milorad Ekmečić dates the actual start of the 
uprising not to July or August 1875 with the outbreak of a broader insurgency, but to 
April of that year, “when the first noticeable indication of [this] process was the flight of 
several peasant families  [...] to the Austro-Hungarian side.”14 The first evidence of an 
uprising was not an outbreak of violence, but the flight of refugees.  
From early on, Austro-Hungarian officials kept reasonably detailed records of the 
number of people who crossed over the border onto Habsburg territory, and the shift in 
the magnitude of the problem is neatly illustrated not just in the numbers themselves, but 
also in the way the bureaucracy kept track of them. Initially, Rodich and Mollinary 
reported to the foreign and war ministries in Vienna the number of refugees who crossed 
over during any given event, but as these grew in frequency and size, this was changed to 
                                                
14 Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878: 24. 
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reporting the numbers on a regular basis. Officials standardized the system of reporting to 
the point that mechanically-reproduced blank tables and forms were distributed 
throughout the provinces for local officials to fill in. The data on arriving refugees were 
detailed, including the location and time of their entry onto Habsburg territory, their point 
of departure, the number of people broken down into families, women, children, and 
men. Later on, record-keepers further broke down the male population by their ability to 
work or not. Some tables also recorded the number of livestock the refugees brought with 
them. 
By late September the Military Border alone had 23,000 refugees under Mollinary’s 
charge, and there was no sign of a slowdown ahead. As a result, public spending on the 
refugees grew rapidly, and the sheer number of people crowding the borderlands 
threatened to undermine the security and health of the local population. There was a clear 
and urgent need for some sort of long-term, aggressive solution to the problem. What 
such a solution would look like, however, was another matter.  
Austro-Hungarian management of the refugee crisis was multivalent, and all levels 
of the bureaucracy were involved, from village administrators who counted heads and 
helped distribute cash through Mollinary and Rodich, the senior officers on the ground, 
up to Andrássy and Hofmann in the ministries in Vienna. Yet despite this bureaucratic 
vertical integration, there were strong differences between Vienna on the one side and 
Zagreb and Zadar on the other when it came to the goals of refugee policy-making, to the 
sorts of pressures and priorities that formed these, and even to the simple understanding 
of the nature of the situation. This gulf, however understandable or even necessary, 
became one of the most important characteristics of the debate over what the best course 
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of action in aiding the refugees would be. For Vienna, the refugees were part of a greater 
problem of Ottoman weakness and a looming Balkan power vacuum. Although the 
Habsburg government took it for granted that it would offer the refugees some sort of 
support, the types of long-term solutions it sought were based on diplomacy and 
negotiated settlement. For the officials stationed in the border regions, the refugees were 
a problem much greater than had been expected, representing everything from an 
economic drain to a public health and security threat. While they too could hope for a 
negotiated solution, they were confronted by the limited means and the urgency of need 
far more than by the mechanics of Great Power diplomacy. The concern expressed in the 
solution from the region was to make aid sustainable by making refugees more self-
sufficient. These modes of understanding were delimited early, and the solutions that 
were proposed reflect not only two competing sets of priorities among the actors 
involved, but also two competing sets of knowledge about the problem and the range of 
possibilities for a solution.  
Mollinary was the first to put together a cogent and forward-thinking program for 
the management of the crisis. It came as early as September 1875, embedded in a 
situation report drafted at the request of the Emperor. Although much of the report was 
devoted to a sort of rough-and-ready assessment of refugee numbers, their origin, and the 
policy measures taken so far, Mollinary also provided a detailed analysis of the dangers 
inherent to the situation, and how the not-too-distant future was likely to unfold if the 
government did not take more aggressive measures. The essence of the argument was that 
the successes of the previous month in aiding and caring for refugees were not the result 
of a successful refugee aid program. Instead, these minor victories had been contingent 
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on a variety of external factors, and these, the report argued, would soon change for the 
worse. In the early stages of the crisis, the local population had warmly received the 
refugees, which Mollinary attributed to the locals’ compassion for their suffering 
Christian brothers. Surpluses of food were made available, as were places to sleep, and 
with an unusually abundant harvest of plums and maize in Slavonia, there was also 
seasonal agricultural work available for those able to accept it. The refugees, in turn, were 
grateful and respectful; the authorities received few complaints about crimes that refugees 
might have committed. What had been created, it seemed, was a sort of virtuous circle of 
generosity eliciting gratitude. Between the state aid and money sent to the refugees from 
private support committees, both in the region and abroad, efforts so far had been 
“successful at protecting even the poorest among them from adversity and want.”15 
The medium-term outlook, however, was grim. As the weather turned raw and the 
surplus food started to run out, Mollinary expected the locals would become stingier and 
the refugees more belligerent. Already, he had been forced to raise the base daily aliment 
from 7 kreuzer (kr) to 10kr, because the concentrations of people and aid money had 
started to feed through into localized inflation that would soon, he expected, adversely 
affect the local population’s buying power. The aid program as it had so far taken shape, 
he argued, would soon be unsustainable. As he explained to Andrássy, “irrespective of 
the material sacrifice that both the state and the population has made [...], this refugee 
invasion, as unexpected as it is massive, has suddenly created situations and relationships 
                                                
15 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to 
Hofburg. 
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which in the interests of the border region demand a rapid and satisfactory solution or 
regulation.”16 
There were any number of foreseeable problems. The housing stock was fine for 
warm weather, for example, but in winter, the local tradition had it that everybody would 
“retreat to a communal living- and sleeping-room. As a general rule, this is the only room 
that is heated and livable in winter.” There was no reason to expect local families would 
invite refugees to move into these crowded rooms, even if space were available. The 
refugees had brought with them many head of livestock, and these were believed to have 
been the vector for an outbreak of epizootic disease in three small villages in the Gradiška 
district. The epidemic had shut down livestock exports from the border region to much of 
the rest of the empire, and although local trade in animals remained lively, worries about 
disease were further depressing prices that were already low due to oversupply. Adverse 
market conditions, in turn, cast even larger doubt over the refugees’ ability to sustain 
themselves in the future. Mollinary also expected a drop in private donations as the 
numbers and length of stay grew would soon add further strains. The result of all this, he 
argued, would be twofold. First, crime would escalate as “numerous thieves and robber-
bands are recruited from among the refugees.” And second, the state would have to pay 
higher alimentations, “which for the time being are only paid out to relatively few 
refugees, but presumably will need to be increased as soon as the refugees have eaten up 
their own provisions, and as soon as what the locals give them from their surpluses is 
depleted.” 17 
                                                
16 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 26 IX 1875, GK Agram to MdÄ. 
 
17 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to 
Hofburg. 
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Mollinary based his report on direct observation and interviews that he and his 
agents had conducted with over 200 refugees.18 These interviews had convinced him that 
if the situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina had been dire enough for thousands of people 
to pull up stakes and head north to an uncertain future, then “at least in regard to the 
majority of the refugees, a timely return to their homes is not to be expected.”19 From this 
insight, and based on his expectation that circumstances would soon worsen, Mollinary 
proposed to the emperor that the government allow the refugees to settle on Habsburg 
territory. He suggested three possibilities: the establishment of independent colonies in 
sparsely populated areas; the attachment of semi-independent colonies to pre-existing 
villages; and finally the settlement of refugees in the existing population. The first two 
would lead to refugee self–sufficiency; with the third, refugees would “earn their support 
[from the state] by contracting as day laborers and etc.” He argued for the proposals 
based on historical precedent, and cited over a dozen examples of such colonization in the 
area, spanning from 1535 up to 1791.20 
Andrássy strenuously objected to any sort of colonization, and by the middle of 
October, he had denounced the plan to the emperor, and sent a critical analysis to 
Mollinary. Although he rejected the colonization plans out of hand, Andrássy never 
actually disputed the main thrust of the Mollinary report. He understood the implications 
                                                                                                                                            
 
18 These reports have been collected and published by Ilija Kecmanović. The line of questioning in the 
interviews is formalized, and for the most part focuses on what the refugees experienced in Bosnia. Many 
interviews were used to gain military intelligence. See Kecmanović, Izjave bosanskih izbjeglica o razlozima 
njihovog bjegstva iz Bosne u avgustu i septembru 1875. godine: (građa iz državnog arhiva u Zagrebu). 
 
19 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to 
Hofburg. 
 
20 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 IX 1875, GK Agram to 
Hofburg. 
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and dangers to public health and domestic social stability that Mollinary was predicting, 
and he even went so far as to compliment Mollinary for his detailed knowledge of 
refugee affairs. The cost of maintaining the refugees was an urgent and very real concern, 
taken up by the finance ministry and the parliamentary delegations, and financial matters 
figure prominently in the archival record. By November, even Minister-President Adolf 
Auersperg had accepted that Austria-Hungary’s parlous finances demanded an 
acceleration of the refugee return process, and he found himself “increasingly in 
agreement with the view of [Andrássy] and the finance minister, that in the interests of 
the finances, measures in this direction can only be very desirable.”21 Although Andrássy 
repeatedly used the empire’s financial difficulties to justify repatriation, the potential 
financial burden of colonization was conspicuously absent from the list of reasons for 
rejecting Mollinary’s plan. Cost, it seems, was not a viable argument against 
colonization, and a year later it would be claimed that maintenance was cheaper than 
coercion: an inspector sent to the border regions would report that “closing the border 
against further crossings would be practically impossible and would require much greater 
outlays than do the subventions [...]”22 
Instead of money, the real objection to the colonization plan was one of both 
domestic and international politics, and Andrássy wrote to Mollinary that “as your 
Excellency is no doubt aware, in situations similar to those today, the colonization 
question was a repeated subject of multiple and sober discussion, and [...] even the most 
                                                
21 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “k.k. Minister-Praesident fuerst Auersperg,” 6 XI 1875, Auersperg 
to MdÄ. 
 
22 FA 4.1 PR 95, 08 I 1877, Krauss to MdÄ, et al. 
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benevolent intentions of the government in this direction constantly failed when it came 
to the practical execution.”23  
One potential problem was the moral hazard of providing permanent refuge, and the 
possibility that a generous refugee aid program might actually attract people who 
otherwise would not have left their homes. The Emperor mentioned the possibility of 
such a pull factor with regard to the care of soldiers who were expected to cross over after 
the outbreak of the Serbian-Ottoman war in 1876, but it seems here that Franz Josef, ever 
the soldier himself, was less worried about straining the budget than he was about 
tempting otherwise honorable soldiers into “effeminate” actions such as desertion and 
flight.24 Andrássy, in a similar context, was a bit more explicit about the danger with 
regard to civilians, and wrote, “we would only run the danger of encouraging the refugees 
to cross over, if we should not decisively and consequently reject any claims [to aid] 
greater than the marginal necessity.”25 The concern was limited; the refugees’ general 
privation on Habsburg territory may already have been considered deterrent enough.  
Push factors loomed larger. Andrássy perceived in the colonization plan a potential 
opportunity that he was certain the Ottomans would try to exploit. He wrote to Mollinary:  
 
Now, it is hard to doubt that the Porte would exploit an action of ours such as the one you 
have endorsed [colonization], simply as a newly available opportunity to dispose of, as 
far as possible, the Christian population of their insurgent provinces, and through that to 
secure a numeric majority in favor of the Muslim element. A politics of the Porte that 
corresponds to that of Russia after its subjugation of the Caucasus and forces the 
Christians to emigrate would in no way be in our interests.26 
                                                
23 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133. folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to GK Agram. 
 
24 For Franz Josef’s fear of luring soldiers into effeminacy, see Best, Humanity in Wafare, 157. 
 
25 Kriegsarchiv (Vienna)/KA Praes. Reihe 1748b/Dep II, 17 VII 1876, MdÄ to kön. ung. Min Präs. 
 
26 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to GK Agram. 
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In the draft for a note sent to Auersperg on the same day, he went so far as to suggest a 
possible Ottoman “resettlement of the provinces” with Muslims, although this was 
crossed out of the final version.27 As Andrássy made clear in his note to Mollinary, this 
was not a humanitarian concern, but a strategic matter.  
 
With [a population transfer], the only thing we would gain is that these people would be 
driven from places of residence where they can be and are of use to us, to residences 
where they could be only of questionable value to us. I must therefore emphasize that the 
refugees who are currently on Austro-Hungarian territory are to return to their home as 
soon as possible.28 
 
To Minister-President Auersperg, he described the population in Bosnia as “useful,” and 
able to “forward our interests”—as long as it remained at home and did not flee to 
Austria-Hungary.29 
From early on, Andrássy perceived not just the strategic importance of population 
movement, but also the propaganda power of aid. This understanding of the refugee 
population and, more generally, of the population of the insurgent provinces would 
become a definitive and abiding one. It was not an exclusionary definition; that is, seeing 
these populations in these terms did not on its own eliminate the possibility of seeing 
them as victims in humanitarian need. But the differences in approach encapsulated in the 
colonization versus repatriation debate illustrate an essential discrepancy: where officials 
near the border sought to address the forms of need, officials in Vienna were preoccupied 
                                                
27 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “k.k. Minister-Praesident fuerst Auersperg,” 23 X 1875 MdÄ to 
Auersperg. 
 
28 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to GK Agram. 
 
29 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder, “k.k. Minister-Praesident fuerst Auersperg,” 23 X 1875, MdÄ to 
Auersperg. Unlike the previous passage from this document, these words are not crossed out. 
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with the function of the needy. From the earliest days of the crisis, function was a 
deciding factor in much of Andrássy’s thinking. This became particularly clear in early 
September 1875, when Rodich relayed to Andrássy a request from Prince Nikola of 
Montenegro for help in caring for the refugees then fleeing to what was, at the time, still 
an Ottoman principality. Andrássy rejected Rodich’s suggestion that in the interests of 
maintaining neutrality, Austria-Hungary would be best off secretly to “grant cash 
subsidies and leave it to the prince to distribute.”30 Nikola’s record of abusing Austro-
Hungarian cash aid31 was surely a factor in this, but Andrássy’s decision was mainly 
motivated by his concern with keeping up appearances, and not only with the Porte. 
Andrássy thought it best to send food, not money, to Montenegro, and as he wrote to 
Rodich, “keeping this a secret is not necessary with regard to Turkey, and with regard to 
the Christians it is downright undesirable.”32 A day later, as they were clearing up the 
details of the shipment, he reiterated that “this support in any case has to be in natura and 
the shipment should not be dispatched in secret, but publicly, moreover very publicly.”33 
The strategy was designed to prevent Nikola from using the aid to boost his own 
popularity among fugitive Hercegovinians, and Andrássy reported to the Emperor “it is 
not our business to advance this agenda. We can [provide aid], however only with the 
                                                
30 HHStA PA XII, box 237, Varia Turquie V, 10 IX 1875, SHD Zara to MdÄ. 
 
31 Wertheimer writes that Nikola had in the past secretly used Austro-Hungarian money to curry favor with 
Albanians. Eduard Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, sein Leben und seine Zeit nach ungedruckten 
Quellen, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Deutsche verlags-anstalt, 1910). 266. 
 
32 HHStA PA XII, box 237, Varia Turquie V, 10 IX 1875, MdÄ to SHD Zara. 
 
33 HHStA PA XII, box 237, Varia Turquie V, 10 IX 1875, MdÄ to SHD Zara. 
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proviso that those affected by it know that the prince of Montenegro can help them only 
as long as Your Majesty helps them.”34 
The central flaw in Mollinary’s colonization plan was neither the financial cost, nor 
the threat of domestic instability, nor even the supposed past failures of similar attempts. 
It was that the international circumstances made it impossible. Andrássy’s early worries 
that the Ottomans would use the emigration to consolidate their hold on the provinces 
were unfounded. It was quickly apparent the real danger to the international system lay 
instead in the weakening or loss of Ottoman loss of control over the provinces. 
Colonization would destroy any hope of returning to the status quo ante. The only real 
proof of effective Ottoman rule was repatriation, which had the added advantage of 
further extending Austria-Hungary’s sphere of influence by sending the refugees home 
praising “Austria’s great Emperor for the blessings he had given them.”35 Or at least that 
was what was intended. In a remarkable failure to take account of Habsburg subjects’ 
moral and material support for the insurgency, of the often willful violation of border 
control protocol by local Habsburg officials, of the refugees resistance to return, and of 
their mistrust of the Ottoman capability to reform, Andrássy’s repatriation effort 
collapsed by mid-1876, not only underscoring the government’s inability to control the 
refugee population, but leaving it saddled with a fragmented and inefficient aid program 
of dubious value.  
For officials in Vienna, the failure of the repatriation attempt marked a turning 
point. Although the ministers never seem to have given up hope that they might force a 
                                                
34 From an unprinted presentation, quoted in Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrássy, sein Leben und seine Zeit 
nach ungedruckten Quellen, 2: 266. 
 
35 Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year: 347. 
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repatriation, and each subsequent spring saw renewed efforts, the failures of 1876 point to 
the limits imposed by types of knowledge. Despite Mollinary’s warnings, the central 
government did not come to terms with the reality that the refugees mistrusted Ottoman 
reform promises and were resistant to going home. The failure of repatriation also 
emphasized the need for a long-term approach to the care of refugees, and a greater 
involvement of the central government in these activities. In the autumn of 1875, 
Andrássy had rejected Mollinary’s proposals for the establishment of refugee colonies, 
and in so doing had effectively rejected any medium- or long-term planning that focused 
on the care and maintenance of the refugees. In the absence of such planning, however, a 
variety of locally-specific systems for aid had developed, fed by constant payments from 
the central government budget. The repatriation failure underlined the importance of this 
aid, and forced the central government to re-consider its policies towards maintaining the 
refugee population already on its soil.  
 
The central government’s decision to outsource emergency relief to regional authorities 
while it directed its efforts at repatriation offered the immediate and concrete advantage 
of flexibility in the provision of aid. Just as Mollinary and Rodich were in a better 
position to assess the likely success of terms of repatriation than were officials in Vienna, 
they were also clearly better positioned to manage the rapidly changing demands of 
refugee populations for emergency relief. Decentralization had a number of unintended 
consequences, however, including sharp regional variations in aid levels and services, 
and burgeoning costs that central government officials suspected were the result of 
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corruption and faulty distribution procedures as much as they were simply a 
manifestation of a growing refugee population.  
The government had been providing emergency aid for the refugees from the 
earliest days of the crisis. Aid money initially came from the budget of the foreign 
ministry, and was transferred to regional officials—Mollinary and Rodich—for 
subsequent distribution to the refugees. Most aid was in fact provided to the refugees in 
the form of cash payments, and although the foreign aid to Prince Nikola of Montenegro 
clearly demonstrates that other forms of aid, such as food, were at least conceivable at the 
time, paying out cash seems to have been the current and accepted best practice. This was 
true of the cash aid payments made to earlier waves of Bosnian refugees in the Military 
Border and which would ultimately serve as a model for the system that developed there 
in 1875-1878; other contemporary examples of cash aid being used in other locations and 
contexts also exist. In Galicia, for example, the government was providing exclusively 
cash subsidies to villagers in the wake of a particularly bad harvest.36  
For the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina, the central government did have 
some policy-related restrictions in place, and Andrássy’s concerns over the establishment 
of colonies or settlements may help to explain why the government provided very little in 
the way of housing for the refugees. But for the most part, Vienna’s control over 
Mollinary and Rodich was effected through financial measures, and there are numerous 
examples of either Mollinary or Rodich complaining of the need for funding over and 
above the budget that Vienna had already approved. There were also examples of 
                                                
36 See, for example, a discussion of raising the aid package from 200,000fl to as much as 700,000fl in: 
Reichsrat Austria, Abgeordnetenhaus, Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der 
Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrathes. VIII Session.  (Vienna: Kaiserlich-königliche Hof und 
Staatsdruckerei, 1876). 194 Sitzung der 8 Session, 29 II 1876.  
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autonomous, even defiant action. In November 1875, Mollinary had asked permission to 
transfer supplies of wool and fabric in the form of “unusable or barely usable blankets” 
from the local military warehouses to the refugees, who could “patch [the rags] into 
clothing that, after all, can still serve for the winter.” He also planned to use surplus wool 
to make a traditional moccasin called the opanka, which could be sold at a discount to 
refugees, or given to them in exchange for a corresponding deduction from their 
subsidies.37 Yet despite his hope that he could get a volume discount, the Minister of War 
was unwilling to let go of the used rags at anything but the market price—a slap in the 
face that was accompanied by Finance Minister Hofmann’s caution that approval for the 
plan would only come under the condition that “this cause [...] will not increase the 
foreign ministry’s expenditures.”38 For his part, Mollinary seems to have interpreted the 
warning liberally, and after buying the rags, he used foreign ministry aid money to buy an 
additional 1,600 useable blankets—at 85kr each—for distribution among the refugees as 
well. “...In the event that in the region under the command of this office the available 
supplies of expendable wool blankets is insufficient for the intended purpose, I will allow 
myself [...] to turn to other [military] bedding warehouses” and then, he wrote, he would 
present Vienna with the paperwork.39 
                                                
37 Mollinary planned to turn the border jails into opanka factories, although it is unclear whether he ever 
managed to do this. He intended then to sell the opanka at 95kr per pair, instead of the going rate of 1f 70kr 
per pair. The wool rags he proposed to buy from armories under his command at or below the surplus price 
of 23f 50kr per Zentner. KA Praes. Reihe 1875 90-1/6, 22 XI 1875, GK Agram to 
Kriegsministerium/RKM. 
 
38 KA Praes. Reihe, 1875 90-1/6, 22 XI 1875, GK Agram to RKM; 27 XI 1875, RKM to GK Agram;  KA 
Praes. Reihe, 1875 90-1/7, 01 XII 1875, MdÄ to RKM. 
 
39 KA Praes. Reihe, 1875 90-1/6, 09 XII 1875, GK Agram to RKM. 
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Aid was a burden to the central government, and the costs of it played a role in 
policy-making at all levels. Although the shape of emergency relief was, in the broadest 
sense, outlined by the central government, the development of specific policy was for the 
most part determined at the regional level. There was a great variety in the methods of aid 
distribution, the levels of aid provided, and the efficacy of the aid. The death rate, that 
crude but essential metric for efficacy, varied considerably across the region. The fact 
was, the central government had little control over what was going on in the regions other 
than through finances. When the repatriation effort of 1876 collapsed, the government 
found itself faced with keeping the refugees on Austro-Hungarian aid for another winter, 
almost certainly sending the budget spiraling out of control, too. In an effort to limit the 
autonomy of action in the regions and to minimize the costs of refugee aid for another 
winter, Andrássy and Finance Minister Hofmann sent an inspector to tour the border 
regions. Baron Karl Krauss would function as an intermediary of sorts, a representative of 
the central government among regional officials. He became, in effect, Andrássy’s eyes 
in the region.  
 
Although those first dispatches from Metković point to the beginnings of refugee aid for 
Hercegovinians arriving to Dalmatia, it is unclear just when officials in the military 
border began distributing aid to refugees arriving from Bosnia. By 22 August 1875, 
however, Mollinary referred to the existence of “norms [of care] for Christian refugees,” 
which apparently included a daily aliment of 7kr per person.40 Mollinary was drawing on 
earlier experiences with Bosnian refugees as a basis for his aid efforts, and requested 
                                                
40 HHStA PA XL 1875, box 133, folder “Agramer Generalcommando,” 22 VIII 1875, GK Agram to MdÄ. 
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from the ministry of war in Vienna a copy of a rescript that laid down a rough set of 
regulations for dealing with refugees. This document had originally been sent to Military 
Border officials in 1854, following the “hard actions” of a certain Major Zezić against 
refugees—or potential refugees; it is unclear whether the people mentioned in the 
document ever made it to Habsburg territory. The instructions explicitly stated that 
Bosnian refugees were to be allowed over the border; “the selfsame shall not be forced to 
return to Turkey—just as they will not be hindered, if they voluntarily choose to go back 
to the other side.” Moreover, the document also points to a pre-existing tradition of 
handing out aid money: “The daily aliment of 4kr and respectively 2kr for children can, 
as always, be paid to the completely destitute arrivals.”41 
Officials distributed aid money according to families’ actual and anticipated need. It 
was expected that able-bodied refugees would work and earn their keep, while the state 
took care of those who were not expected to do so—the infirm, the elderly, women and 
children. Furthermore, aid was not provided to refugees who were capable of supporting 
themselves from the material goods they brought with them. This category was not fixed, 
and after exhausting their resources, refugees would then qualify for aid. Officials took 
into consideration any items that could be eaten or sold, but the most typical means of 
                                                
41 A copy of the rescript is included in the folder KA 51-4/12, 1875. The 7kr (which would later be raised to 
10kr) that Mollinary was paying in 1875 would have been the figure for adult refugees. Although the 50% 
discount for children remained standard between 1854 and the entire period under study, the sums are not 
directly comparable. The 4kr/2kr figure from 1854 is based on so-called Convention Currency; while the 
7kr is based on the Gulden after it was revalued in 1857 against the North German Thaler. 4kr (CC) would 
have been worth 4.2kr (AC). Josef Reautschnig, Geld, Gestern und Heute. Eine Dokumentation über das 
Geldwesen und die Währung in Österreich, [1. Aufl.] ed. (Graz, Wien, München,: Universal Verlags- und 
Vertriebsgesellschaft, 1966). 31. 
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support was probably animals. Between 16 August and 19 September, 22,734 refugees 
crossed into Croatia and Slavonia; they brought with them 27,264 head of livestock.42 
Different methods for payment to refugees developed in the various regions, 
indicating little central control over the means of distribution. Although these differences 
seem to have been present from the start, as pressure for fiscal responsibility and cost 
cutting built, they became an increasing concern: “As far as the monitoring, the payment 
modalities, and the allocation of the assistance are concerned, it is to be noted that in 
Croatia and the Military Border all of the necessary precautions are being observed, in 
order to [...] prevent double participation and to get [the refugees] their assistance 
undiminished.”43 According to the established procedure in these two areas, officials gave 
the head of each refugee family a certificate on which every change of residence or aid 
status was to be recorded. Payments were made every ten days, although this was 
subsequently switched to fortnightly in order to ease the strain on over-worked local 
officials.44 The payment commissions were composed of the municipal board, two town 
elders, as well as two members of the local refugee community. In order to receive their 
aliment, refugees would present their certificate to the commission, which was not only 
subject to unannounced visits from higher military or political authorities, but also “took 
responsibility for the identity and the actual presence of the family members and for the 
payment through their signature.”45 Starting in the summer of 1876, the government also 
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introduced the payment of Schlafkreuzer, or “bed-pence” which were seen as a means of 
transferring money to locals who housed refugees, as well as propping up the actual aid 
income of the refugees themselves. There was a special payment list for Schlafkreuzer, 
which were paid out on a monthly basis according to the status of refugees and only with 
confirmation from a landlord or other local provider of housing.46 
A different method developed in Dalmatia, where it was claimed that a system 
“involving a lot of paperwork would encounter local difficulties.”47 In the localities of 
Benkovac, Kotor and Knin, officials paid out the subsidies to the heads of refugee 
families at designated locations as a lump sum, rather than basing payments on 
headcount. In the area around Dubrovnik, the inaccessibility of the villages where the 
refugees lived made such a system impossible. Instead, the municipal chief, typically 
with the assistance of a member of the Gendarmerie, would take care of subsidy 
payments in individual districts. In the municipality of Dubrovnik, local authorities took 
care of the aid distribution directly. Frequently, it was noted, the subsidies in Dalmatia 
were “paid out by one person”—and therefore without any oversight.48 
In addition to differences among the method of payments, the amounts paid out also 
varied. While data lack for 1875, by 1876 there was a broad range to aid levels. In Civil 
Croatia, all refugees, regardless of status, received the full amount of 10kr per head per 
day. In Military Croatia, only those refugees unable to work—including women and 
children—received aid. The able-bodied, regardless of their actual employment status, 
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did not qualify. Finally, despite the harsh circumstances that awaited refugees in 
Dalmatia—or perhaps partly as a root cause of them—fugitive Hercegovinians typically 
received during the summer months anything from 3.5kr to 5kr. For that amount, 
refugees were unable to purchase sufficient maize to live on. Moreover, at least according 
to Arthur Evans, the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, a number of refugees in 
Dalmatia were simply left out of the system: Austrian authorities “refused to register 
many [refugees] who live too near the Bosnian frontier” he wrote, and as a result, they 
“receive nothing at all.” And even for those who did receive aid, their “pittance is cut 
down by the villany and corruption of the official underlings who distribute it.” 49 
Housing was a perennial problem, and particularly so in Dalmatia, where refugees 
lived out in the open, in tents, magazines, and even caves in the hills.50 Approaches to 
housing the refugees varied among the regions. In civil and military Croatia, for example, 
refugees were for the most part expected to make their own arrangements. The 
government essentially relied on the generosity of the local population to make space 
available in its own homes; Schlafkreuzer encouraged this. The situation in Dalmatia was 
somewhat different. There, the local population was either less willing or less able to 
lodge refugees than was its Croatian counterpart. As a result, refugees often ended up 
living in camps or other communal situations. In Dubrovnik, for example, some refugees 
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were housed in the military hospital, which had previously served as a quarantine station. 
In winter, one of the market halls was also converted into a residence hotel.51 Other 
refugees were put into dormitories, known by the Turkish word han, while refugees also 
established large tent-camps outside of the city walls. Among the tent camps, there was 
one on the Ploča, just outside the southern gate to the city, and another one north of the 
city. This encampment was visible to passengers arriving in Dubrovnik by sea, and even 
managed to become something of a tourist attraction, “counting for many as a truly 
interesting excursion, which never lacked for nerve-wracking circumstances.”52 Further 
out—and especially in the mountains—refugees lived in mean huts of stone or maize 
stalks they built for themselves.53  
The government’s unwillingness directly to provide housing for the refugees was a 
source of ongoing privation. The decision was based both on finances as well as the 
concern that such housing might offer a disincentive to return to Bosnia or Hercegovina. 
In the event, it was the local solutions and decisions that counted. Some of these, for 
example the use of the military hospital in Dubrovnik, were decisions taken by municipal 
officials responding to the needs of residents as much as the newcomers. The Military 
Border town of Petrinja, for example, took it upon itself to erect barracks capable of 
housing up to 640 people.54 The structure and possibilities of the Habsburg aid program 
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also created new opportunities. In Dalmatia, for instance, there were examples of 
refugees building their own huts in order to house themselves, but also in order to raise 
their alimentation by accepting Schlafkreuzer from other refugees.55  
 
When the pacification and repatriation effort crumbled in 1876, Austro-Hungarian 
officials were confronted with the unwelcome prospect that the refugees would remain on 
Habsburg territory for another winter. This possibility raised a whole new set of 
questions, many of which were prompted by the troubles that the emergency relief 
program had encountered in the previous winter: from the start there had been concerns 
with fraud and the possible diversion of funds for purposes more warlike than feeding 
and clothing refugees. Disease also appears to have been rampant, and by early January 
1876, some 700 people had died of various illnesses in the Lika district of Dalmatia 
alone.56 It was this period about which Mollinary later wrote that the death rate exceeded 
22%, or one in every five.57  
In Vienna, however, Foreign Minister Andrássy had already promised the budget 
committee of the Austrian and Hungarian parliamentary delegations a steady decrease 
and rapid end to the subsidies.58 That had been while he was still convinced that he could 
force a repatriation. But after the collapse of the return efforts, we can see two distinct 
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shifts taking place in the dynamics of aid. In autumn, Mollinary and Rodich started to 
focus on the expectation that the refugees would remain on Austro-Hungarian soil 
through the winter, and that in order to maintain any sort of well-being, the aid effort 
would need to expand. Vienna’s goals were clearly at odds with this. Andrássy had 
already gone one round with the delegations, and he clearly did not relish the thought of 
trying to squeeze more money from them. There were also growing concerns about how 
the aid money was being spent, and he and Finance Minister Hofmann set about doing 
what they could to limit expenditures by exercising greater control and oversight over the 
entire aid process. 
In September 1876, the central government initiated what would prove to be the 
most fundamental change, reflecting as it did both a general philosophy and a pragmatic 
goal. Mollinary had been receiving monthly payments of 100,000fl for the refugees, paid 
at the start of the month. But on 20 September, he reported that the most recent payment 
was depleted, and that he would need an additional 200,000fl. The number of refugees 
had reached 50,513; there was no reason to think they would return and every reason to 
think they would stay the winter; and come winter, aid would need to go to all refugees, 
regardless of their ability to earn, in order to head off disease and threats to public 
safety.59 As plausible as these reasons seemed, Andrássy wrote to Hofmann that he was 
considering rejecting them. “In no way am I inclined to accept the pronounced necessity 
[Mollinary claims] for the distribution of aid to all refugees regardless of their ability to 
earn, because the title of Bosnian refugee alone still does not carry with it a right to 10kr 
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per head, and it is the duty of able-bodied men to seek employment.”60 He proposed 
instead tightening requirements, and perhaps even sending an inspectorate to the region to 
investigate the situation. And he rejected the additional 200,000fl payment, asking what 
Hofmann thought about a 100,000fl payment instead. 
Up to this point the practice had been to encourage the able-bodied to seek work. 
Aid was given to those who could not work, and at least in the winter, to those who were 
physically capable of working, but had found no work to do. Yet until September 1876, 
this particular means of subdividing the refugee population had not actually been codified 
as an official policy measure. Rather, local officials maintained a certain degree of 
control over the process and were able to exercise some freedom in determining what sort 
of aid it was necessary to give and to whom. Hofmann’s response to Andrássy’s note 
closes that gap. “In my [...] view,” he wrote, “all refugees should be officially consigned 
to one of two groups, namely the Erwerbsfähig [those capable of earning] and the 
Erwerbsunfähig [those incapable of it].” Once that had been accomplished,  
 
the alimentation would be distributed unconditionally to the Erwerbsunfähigen, while it 
would be paid to the Erwerbsfähigen only conditionally, and only until they found 
employment or were assigned it. The political organs in conjunction with the municipal 
representatives would hold responsibility for assigning work, and refugees who declined 
work that had been allotted to them would immediately lose their subvention.61  
 
Hofmann agreed with the idea of sending an official down to Croatia and Dalmatia. But 
“with regard to the unexpected additional payment [...] there is in my opinion no urgent 
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need to release it immediately. Rather, its release should be dependent on the report that 
the planned commissioner should prepare as soon as possible.”62 
 
Even as Vienna tried to contain costs, Mollinary and Rodich were coming under 
increasing pressure to expand the aid programs. The pressure came from local officials 
who dealt directly with refugees, and it came primarily as a result of a rapidly worsening 
situation. Indeed, in early October 1876, Mollinary had sought to justify his requests for 
more money by warning of a threatening “calamity as a result of insufficient food” for the 
refugees, and argued that it was necessary to extend the alimentation payments to 
Erwerbsfähigen as well. By the end of the month, he reported that in “the administrative 
districts Unter Lapac, Udbina and Gračac [there had been] an alarming outbreak of 
various epidemic diseases, such as typhus fever, smallpox, dysentery and etc.”63  
Rodich, facing similar problems in Dalmatia, had suggested at the start of October 
that should it be necessary for the refugees to winter in Dalmatia, the government should 
build barracks for them in addition to providing firewood and clothing, as well as 
doubling the maximum alimentation to 20kr. In a note to Interior Minister Lasser, 
Hofmann suggested rejecting the request, in part because “it is not entirely appropriate to 
equip the refugees in such a manner that they feel positively settled in.” Nevertheless, his 
response was not simply an automatic reaction against expanding refugee access to aid. It 
was a reaction against expanding above-the-line, on-budget aid programs, and in an effort 
to increase subsidies without upsetting the aid budget that had been approved, Hofmann 
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went so far as to ask Lasser if there might not be another possibility, by having the 
interior ministry, for example, pay for public works projects that would provide job 
opportunities for erwerbsfähig refugees—a suggestion that Lasser said was not 
possible.64 
It was the reports filed back by the central government’s own inspector, however, 
that undermined Vienna’s ability to cut spending. Krauss, the investigative commissioner 
proposed back in September 1876, left on his tour in early November and in a series of 
reports presented a broad and frank picture of the situation in Dalmatia, Croatia and the 
Military Border. It was these reports, prepared by an envoy of the central government, 
and not the regular updates provided by the regional administrators, that would compel 
the government to expand the aid program. The investigation resulted in several extra-
budgetary deals to relieve general suffering, as well as an overall recommendation of 
additional spending on aid of 39,900fl per month.  
The effectiveness of these reports in loosening purse strings was the result of 
several factors. Foremost among these was the collocation of witnessed suffering and 
governmental power. Krauss arrived in the region with not only an assignment to report, 
but also with some power to make and execute policy decisions. Moreover, he was in 
direct contact not just with the government, but with the Emperor, who, for example, 
authorized an agreement between Krauss, acting for the central government, and the city 
of Dubrovnik, by which the city would shoulder some of the responsibilities of aid 
distribution during the winter months. Krauss’s final report also differed from the sort of 
regular updates that Andrássy and Hofmann would have seen coming from the region up 
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to this point. It was significantly longer than earlier reports, running to 27 handwritten 
pages, and was a litany of concrete details of what has been done, what has worked, and 
what remains to be done. The situation had indeed worsened considerably, and as 
Mollinary would complain, Krauss showed up after more than two months had gone by 
without the central government providing any additional aid.  
Krauss did not restrict his investigation to the situation of the refugees. The problem 
was of course central to his consideration, but he contextualized it further with the 
existing and potential knock-on effects of having such a large and sudden population 
growth with little physical or social infrastructure to support them. The crux of Krauss’s 
arguments relied as much on the danger to Habsburg subjects as it did on the misery of 
the refugees. Much of Krauss’s reporting focused on the sorts of description of aid 
payment methods and housing opportunities that have been discussed above. But he also 
went well beyond simple description of the situation and what had been done, and 
explored the possible reasons why “with such a large expenditure for the refugees, there 
is nevertheless constant complaining about the insufficiency of the subventions, and in 
reality the suffering of the refugees can grow to the point of an outbreak of epidemic 
typhus.”65 One of the key issues, he argued, was the unavailability of work. Because the 
refugee population was divided into groups that either received or did not receive 
subsidies based on their physical ability to work, the local labor market directly effected 
their standard of living. Krauss claimed that many of the refugees were unwilling to 
work; indeed he proposed that refugee families in Dalmatia who build their own huts 
should continue to draw Schlafkreuzer in the hope that “indolent refugees are animated to 
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useful work that will bring them advantages.” The primary problem, he argued, was that 
the work available tended to be agricultural and therefore seasonal. Yet even during the 
summer months, employment was not guaranteed—especially in Military Croatia, where 
there was already a large excess of workers. The situation there had been particularly bad 
until Hofmann’s September decision; not only was there little work, but able-bodied 
refugees unable to find work still did not qualify for aid. That left them dependent on 
those family members who did qualify, which meant “in fact, nobody there receives the 
maximum subvention, but rather a significantly reduced payment.”66 
Malnutrition was the most immediate result of this, which in turn caused or 
aggravated the problems with disease. In Knin, in Dalmatia, the smallpox outbreak had 
reached epidemic proportions, and Rodich had obtained permission from Andrássy to 
dispatch a doctor with medicine, as well as to set the subvention at 10kr per person 
regardless of their situation. In Unter Lapac, Udbina and Gračac, where Mollinary had 
warned of typhus, doctors were also distributing medicine and the subventions had been 
raised. But in a short time, of 12,200 refugees, typhus had killed 413. The overall 
mortality rate in the Military Border was running at 8.83%. That was significantly lower 
than the 22% that Mollinary had talked about in the early days of the crisis, but it was still 
high, and the winter was just beginning. There were no data for Dalmatia, but Krauss 
wrote that he “found no family that had not mourned several deaths, and not one hut in 
which there was not at least one sick child.”67 He estimated mortality at a minimum of 
10%. 
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Also worrisome was that the typhus epidemic had killed a further 469 Habsburg 
subjects, out of a total population of 19,000. In the early phases of the crisis, the threat to 
the domestic population from the refugee crisis had been primarily conceived of in 
political terms: the refugees, it had been feared, would be a destabilizing element in 
Austria-Hungary, just as Austro-Hungarian citizens were contributing to the 
destabilization of Bosnia and Hercegovina. As early as October 1875, Mollinary’s memo 
to the Emperor had already proposed an alternative economic and public health 
framework for understanding the threat that the refugee population posed. Krauss’s 
report—coming a year after the initial forecasts—confirmed the outline of Mollinary’s 
predictions. 
The sheer fact of a rapidly increased population density played havoc with the 
existing physical and economic infrastructure. In Civil Croatia, the 25,810 refugees 
meant an 18.5% increase to the existing population of 180,516; in Military Croatia, 
53,474 refugees increased the population of 263,177 by 21%; and in the four districts of 
Dalmatia, there were 31,634 refugees among 126,500 locals, meaning that the population 
had grown by 24%. For Krauss, it was not the overall data that were particularly 
worrisome, but the local concentrations of refugees that these data did not reflect. 
Because of an Austro-Hungarian policy that forbid foreign clergy from practicing on 
Habsburg territory, refugees frequently ended up clustering in villages where they could 
find local clergy to tend to their spiritual needs.68 Other factors, such as geography or the 
overall hospitality of the local population certainly also played a role in determining local 
settlement patterns. Regardless of the reason, in some areas, the concentrations were 
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extremely high. In typhus-afflicted Udbina, the population density increased by almost 
50%. In Stermica-Golubac in Dalmatia, there were 552 houses with 3,029 locals and 
another 7,829 refugees packed in; the Dalmatian village of Trnova, with 187 residents in 
29 houses, was also housing 858 refugees. 
With the cash-based aid regime firmly anchoring its recipients in the local 
economy, Krauss did not fail to see the deleterious effects of inflation about which 
Mollinary had warned over a year before. Inflation, Krauss pointed out, was affecting not 
just the refugees, but everybody, just as the increase in the number of livestock and the 
scarcity of good pasture was hurting all the animals. In some parts of Dalmatia there was 
not enough well-water to meet the new demand. He also pointed to serious, and 
fundamental changes in the micro-economies of villages in the border regions. “All along 
the border,” he reported, “there are stretches of land where the population lived in great 
harmony with the Turks on the other side, and had a robust trade, or held leases over 
property. The insurrection and its results have destroyed all of these relationships.” Only 
a handful of suppliers, most of them shipping goods to the insurgency, were still doing 
well. “Originally a victim of circumstance, the refugees are now a burden to all.”69 
Andrássy had rejected colonization for strategic reasons, but in the absence of an 
alternative, the Croatian and Dalmatian borderlands were nevertheless faced with a 
refugee settlement that had become an unmanageable burden on the budget. Krauss’s 
mission in the region was to bring a certain degree of order and standardization into the 
refugee aid regime, with the apparent expectation that in the long run this would allow for 
a reduction of the budgetary outlays. The results were, in fact, the opposite. Although his 
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reports pointed to a number of areas where better controls would likely reduce the 
outlays, the overall effect was to increase the costs of refugee aid. This was justified by 
paying attention not merely to the monetary costs of the refugees, but also to the social 
costs of hosting them. By recasting the refugee crisis as one that was also a threat to the 
domestic population—as Mollinary had warned it would be—his reports provided the 
supporting evidence needed to justify the increase in payments, and to place the care of 
the refugee population at the center of government concern. 
 
The Krauss report marked a turning point in the care and treatment of the Bosnian and 
Hercegovinian refugees. It was a formal conclusion to a process that began with 
Andrássy’s failed attempt at orchestrating the mass return of refugees the previous spring; 
an admission by the central government that refugee repatriation was neither simple nor 
imminent, and that the problems refugees posed would require a commitment to 
management as well. The Krauss report points to a sort of normalization of refugee aid. It 
is the moment where the central government expanded its monitoring of regional aid 
efforts to a level that it found acceptable. The compromise was financial and political, 
motivated on the one hand by pressure from the delegations to introduce cost-cutting 
measures, and on the other by the political circumstances of aid and the complex 
calculations of the tolerable limits of privation. The degree to which the refugees 
burdened imperial finances and the physical and political stability of the domestic 
population warrants a modification to Interior Minister Lasser’s observation: the answer 
to the question of what levels of suffering can be tolerated is that it is a matter of both 
foreign and domestic policy.  
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The de facto settlement of refugees took place despite Andrássy’s objections. The 
debate over resettlement or repatriation had not been simply a debate over two very 
different policy options; it had also been the central discussion in the search for what is 
now called a “durable solution”—a solution to the refugee problem that addresses the 
long-term needs of both the refugees and the societies hosting them. A durable solution 
differs from emergency relief in that it seeks over the medium term to end refugees’ 
reliance on charity, and over the long term to re-establish them in the state system.70 If 
successful, either Mollinary’s or Andrássy’s proposal would have created exactly these 
medium and long-term conditions. In the event, however, the circumstances of the aid-
funded settlement after the repatriation failure lacked any shred of durability.  
Andrássy’s fixation on repatriation was rooted in his diplomacy, where the re-
establishment of Ottoman state power in Bosnia and Hercegovina had been the first 
priority. Diplomatic concerns doubtless colored Andrássy’s understanding of the refugee 
crisis, just as the refugees’ nearness colored Mollinary’s understanding of the situation. 
For both men, the aid program was a means to an end; whether that end was the 
sustainability of emergency relief or the conservation of diplomatic options and 
entrenchment of power in a rapidly changing political environment depended on point of 
view—on ways of seeing. In this context, James Scott’s concept of legibility becomes 
most intriguing, in part because it speaks to the types of knowledge available to particular 
actors.71 Not only was Austro-Hungarian refugee aid policy characterized in the 
beginning by a lack of efforts to make the refugee population legible, but some of its 
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most spectacular failures—the repatriation plan for example—were built in part on 
flawed understandings of the population. This misapprehension of reality resulted from 
Andrássy’s unwillingness—or inability—to engage with and believe specific aspects of 
the reports coming from Zagreb and Zadar. There were any number of reasons for this. 
Rodich was considered to be an activist Slav-sympathizer; the central government was 
unwilling to meet the financial demands of the regional heads; it has also been suggested 
that Andrássy neither liked nor trusted Mollinary.72 Whether out of unwillingness or 
inability, the result was that what was manifestly clear in the regions was essentially 
unknowable in Vienna.  
These factors put Krauss and his reports in a particularly interesting and vital 
position, effectively bridging the knowledge gap. As a high-ranking commissioner sent 
by Vienna, not only was he in contact with the emperor, but he had the authority to make 
decisions, including those that would increase the cost of refugee relief. His mission was 
an explicit attempt to “see.” Like people, states concentrate on the issues that are most 
pressing, and as Scott points out, the processes of simplification necessary to measuring 
and quantifying a population—to making them legible—deal for the most part with 
utilitarian facts.73 Krauss was highly selective in what he looked at—his reports were 
utilitarian in nature—and when quantifying the refugees’ impact on Austria-Hungary, he 
did so in terms of cost: the cost to the budget and the cost to society. He was aided in his 
effort by the growing availability of data, as the increased attention paid to the refugee 
populations led regional officials to start describing the refugees in statistical terms that 
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also focused on cost. The regions broke down the populations in different ways, but to the 
same effect. In Dalmatia, the question was how many received subventions, while in the 
Military border, the question was how many were erwerbsfähig and how many 
erwerbsunfähig.74 Either way, the real issue was how much had been or needed to be paid 
out. Ability to earn stood as a proxy for ineligibility for state support.  
This chapter has concentrated on how refugees were treated in Austria-Hungary—
the mechanisms of emergency relief in the first half of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian 
uprising, examining the types of aid, the means of distribution and the administrative and 
political limitations on these efforts. Yet in the context of this aid effort, there is another 
discrete question: what were refugees treated as? This differs slightly from “how were 
they treated?” in that it asks what the historical precedents were for the care of the 
unprecedented. Where did these ideas of refugee relief come from, and what did they 
mean? Furthermore, it speaks to the origins of this category refugee and the methods by 
which it was “made up”—what Ian Hacking calls the “vector of labeling from above.”75  
One of the most important links is the nexus between the sort of emergency relief 
provided by regional officials and traditions of poor aid. Until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the trend across continental Europe had been towards a strong state 
role in welfare and poor aid, a role that was both required and affirmed by the importance 
of institutionalization. By the middle of the century, this had started to change. Peter 
Mandler argued that by the nineteenth century, charity was typically seen to have mostly 
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a symbolic value. After an expansion of charity during economic transition of the 
eighteenth century, provisions for the poor “were now scaled back or repealed altogether. 
Even if municipal authorities had wanted to pursue the eighteenth century fashion for 
institutionalization, relieving the poor ‘indoors’ in return for productive labor, they would 
not have been able to cope with the numbers now involved.”76  
One of the key factors in this change was a switch from “indoor” relief—that is, 
institutionalization—to “outdoor” relief, where recipients were not confined. This switch 
did not, by necessity, eliminate the role of the state in poor aid. In Austria-Hungary, for 
example, small organizations for helping the poor flourished, although many of them also 
drew on government funds to do their work.77 But the switch did favor smaller 
organizations. Stuart Woolf argues that with the switch to outdoor aid, the question 
always remained whether recipients might not be cheating donors. The efficacy of the aid 
depended on the reliability of local knowledge of need.78 Concomitant with this came 
worries over the corruptive or demoralizing potential of aid: the concern that providing it 
might increase the number of poor; the concern that if it provided anything more than the 
bare minimum, it would make laze-abouts of all.79 
The premise of poor aid was not a necessary condition for the ultimate shape of the 
Austro-Hungarian state refugee aid project. We don’t need the traditions of charity to 
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explain the state’s concern with the monitoring of need at a very local level, nor do we 
need these traditions to explain the fear of being cheated, or the minimal (at times 
insufficient) levels of aid provided. Nevertheless, the patterns of government aid 
distribution fit nicely within the framework, and the division of refugees into 
erwerbsfähig and erwerbsunfähig corresponds well with the dominant notions in the late 
nineteenth century of the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor.80 But most 
importantly, it also seems that from the start, refugee aid had in fact been seen as a sort of 
“poor aid” to refugees: the rescript of 1854, after all, offered aid to “destitute” arrivals, 
while the general policy in 1875-1878 of letting refugees first exhaust their own resources 
before receiving refugee aid makes it clear poverty, and not simply being a refugee, was 
the necessary, although insufficient, condition of aid.  
If poor aid can help explain the patterns and priorities of emergency relief at the 
regional level, the changing standards for neutral powers and new obligations towards 
prisoners of war discussed in the introduction help to contextualize Vienna’s response to 
the situation, and the circumstances that helped delineate how it would perceive the 
refugees. The persistent question of identity—the gray indeterminacy between refugee 
and rebel—were an important factor. Habsburg foreign policy situated the moment of 
state control at the border. Regulations, however poorly enforced, called for officials to 
disarm refugees when they entered Habsburg territory, and prohibit their armed return to 
the Ottoman Empire. By controlling the mobility of Ottoman subjects on Habsburg 
                                                
80 Mandler writes that the assumption was often that “the able-bodied male should be able to support his 
family and that relief would be extended only to a narrow category of “deserving” poor. In many places, 
orphans , widows, and the aged and infirm were judged to be deserving prima facie and thus eligible for 
limited doles [...].”Mandler, “Poverty and Charity in the Nineteenth-Century Metropolis: An Introduction,” 
13. 
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territory, the state effectively tried to create a single identity for all who crossed—the 
refugee. The refugee aid program itself recapitulated this; the sole bureaucratic 
distinction to be made was between the erwerbsfähig and erwerbsunfähig. 
By the middle of 1876 it was becoming apparent that the obligations of a neutral 
Austria-Hungary were set to grow more complex. War in Serbia promised to force a 
variety of people across the border, including civilian refugees, non-military and military 
combatants. If they were civilians, the military would escort them to one of several 
locations, where they would be handed over to civilian authorities.81 These refugees were 
to receive a daily aliment of 10kr for adults and 5kr for children, a level of aid equal to 
the standards that the government applied for refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina. In 
keeping with the policy of neutrality, combatants were to be dealt with as a special case. 
Austria-Hungary lacked a set policy for this matter, and as a result applied the military’s 
policy towards prisoners of war—treatment equivalent to that which a soldier would 
receive. The transport of combatants away from the border was “to take place according 
to the principles of other troop transports.”82 Payments would start at the level of the 
salary (plus the “bread fee”) of an infantryman and move all the way up to that of a 
General, who would be entitled to four gulden daily.83 
                                                
81 Andrássy mentions Taranebes, Lugos, Temesvar and Beckerek. KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 1748b/Dep II, 17 
VII 1876. 
 
82 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/4, 19. VII. 1876. Combatants crossing into Hungary were to be taken to 
Arad; those entering Croatia and Slavonia to Peterwardein (Petrovaradin), Esseg (Osijek) and Karlstadt 
(Karlovac); those into Dalmatia were to be sent to Klagenfurt. 
 
83 KA Praes. Reihe, 1748b/Dep II, 17 VII 1876. MdÄ to K. Hung. Min Pres. This list is described in the 
note as being subject to the “highest empowerment of His Majesty”. There is no explicit mention later that 
these were indeed adopted; however, as they are in accordance with the billeting rules that the government 
ultimately applied to this category of foreigner, it can be assumed that the figures held. 
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Andrássy and Artur Bylandt-Rheidt, the minister of war, agreed on a definition of 
combatants that would overcome some of the problems that had dogged the Germans in 
France in 1870-1871 by simply not distinguishing among “Serbian troops or franctireurs 
enlisted under military discipline.”84 The latter, Bylandt-Rheidt would later write, 
compose “an integrated part of the Serbian army. Therefore these, when forced onto [our] 
territory, are to be treated as combatants (military personal).”85 In contrast, “even when 
organized militarily, Bosnian, Bulgarian or Hercegovinian insurgent detachments must 
be strictly distinguished [from the Serbs]”86 While Bylandt-Rheidt was mainly concerned 
with those involved in the Serbian struggle, the implications of these distinctions appear 
to have reached well beyond the Serbian theater. A more encompassing note from the 
foreign ministry, for example, drew the distinction in strict legal terms: the Bosnian and 
Hercegovinian insurgents “stand outside of a legal connection to a recognized military 
power, have under international law an indefinable character, and are considered to be 
insurgents by the authorities of the state on whose territory they are currently active.”87  
Under the latest standards of neutrality, the insurgents would need to be returned to 
the hands of the Ottoman government. Yet the reality, as we have seen, was rather 
different. One of the outcomes of this round of correspondence in the run-up to the 
Serbian-Turkish war was that insurgent leaders were to be treated in the same manner as 
were soldiers who crossed over. The result was that a rebel leader such as Mićo 
Ljubibratić, apprehended by Austro-Hungarian authorities an Habsburg territory, ended 
                                                
84 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/4, 19. VII. 1876.  
 
85 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/13, 05 VIII 1876. RKM to Regional commanders. 
 
86 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/13, 05 VIII 1876. RKM to Regional commanders. Emphasis original. 
 
87 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876, 26 VII 1876.  MdÄ to RKM. 
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up spending the remainder of the uprising interned “on his honor” in Graz, neither 
extradited nor returned to Ottoman hands. At the same time, he and a handful of other 
insurgent leaders were “to be placed in the category of refugee,” which ultimately 
became the stopgap category for captured members of the insurgency.88 Because of their 
legal situation, Bylandt-Rheidt ordered that “the members of such detachments cannot be 
viewed as combatants, and when they cross over to our territory, are to be treated 
analogously to the civilians who flee here [...] Following successful disarmament, they 
are to be led to the locations designated for the reception of “refugees” and handed over 
to the civilian authorities.”89  
This blurring in care and treatment mirrors the uncertainties of identity. One of the 
greatest differences in the management of the refugees from 1875-1878 and those who 
were covered by the rescript of 1854 is that members of the former group were, 
theoretically, prevented from returning voluntarily. For the central government, one of 
the objectives since the start of the uprising had been to make this population neutral, and 
this lumping together of the two main categories of people crossing over onto Austro-
Hungarian territory was, in the end, a functional necessity that despite the realities of the 
porous border, allowed the Austro-Hungarian government to maintain neutrality by 
administratively conflating the insurgent with the refugee. This blurring of identity 
worked in both directions, however. It also offered, in the shape of prisoners of war, 
functional models for the care and management of large, temporary populations.  
                                                
88 FA 4.1 PR 443, 19 I 1877, MdÄ to RFM. 
 
89 KA Praes. Reihe, 1876 77-1/13, 05 VIII 1876. RKM to Regional commanders. Quotation marks original. 
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These methods of looking at and managing refugees in 1875-1878 put them in sharp 
contrast with previous refugee populations. Although there are examples of large 
population movements in the region earlier—Mollinary called it the greatest refugee 
event of the century, but Dragutin Pavličević writes that it was the largest population 
movement in the region since the sixteenth century—the majority of refugee events up to 
this point had been significantly smaller. 90 For the most part refugees had been people 
looking for political asylum, and migrations had been small enough that states could see 
them as individuals; could deal with their applications for political asylum on a case-by-
case basis.91 The prospects for asylum seekers in Austria-Hungary seemed generally 
good, and until the middle of the nineteenth century, the empire remained quite open to 
immigrants. By the end of the century, neither Austria nor Hungary had special laws on 
extradition, which was instead regulated by treaties, criminal law, and in some cases 
precedent.92  
Yet regardless of the relative laxity of Austro-Hungarian regulations with respect to 
political refugees, the law was nevertheless built on a simple assumption: that the state 
retained not only the right, but the ability to make decisions about whether it would 
permit refugees to remain on its territory. This had, in fact, also held earlier for Bosnian 
                                                
90 Pavličević, “Bosanske izbjeglice u banskoj Hrvatskoj u doba ustanka 1875-1878 godine,” 102. 
 
91 See, for example, the case studies of Peter Augustin Holley or Josephine d’Uponeau in Zdenka  
Stoklásková, “Fremdsein in Böhmen und Mähren,” in Grenze und Staat: Passwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, 
Heimatrecht und Fremdengesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750-1867, ed. Waltraud 
Heindl, et al. (Wien: Böhlau, 2000), 701-11. 
 
92 For more on citizenship, see Birgitta  Bader-Zaar, “Foreigners and the Law in Nineteenth-Century 
Austria: Juridical Concepts and Legal Rights in the Light of the Development of Citizenship,” in Migration 
Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in Europe and the United States from 
the French Revolution to the Inter-war Period, ed. Andreas Fahrmeir, Olivier Faron, and Patrick Weil 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2003). The information on Austro-Hungarian extradition law comes from 
John Bassett Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition, vol. 1 (Boston: Boston Book 
Company, 1891). 701-04. 
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refugees. Indeed, in the absence of bilateral extradition treaties between the Ottoman 
Empire and Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Christians seem to have enjoyed a certain level of 
protection in Austria-Hungary that was unavailable to others. And although the religion 
of the refugees that arrived in the southern borderlands in 1875-1878 was certainly 
important, its meaning to the requirements of refugee management should not be 
overestimated: the government in Vienna explicitly ordered that any Muslims arriving on 
Habsburg territory would be given equal care.93  
Andrássy’s inability to repatriate the refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina set 
them apart from earlier refugees. Unlike the criminals, political exiles and intellectuals 
who tended to make use of the system of political asylum throughout much of the 
nineteenth century, these had hijacked the state’s right to make decisions over asylum or 
extradition; they represented a challenge to the government’s sovereignty.94 The sheer 
number of them dwarfed virtually all prior refugee events, and the circumstances of their 
exile—the armed uprising of civilians, Austria-Hungary’s aspirations in the Balkans, and 
the changes to international standards—created and demanded new responses, while 
effectively placing them in a new, unique category. They had become the “refugee” in the 
modern sense of the word. 
 
                                                
93 FA 4.1 PR 916, 27 IX 1878. RFM to MdÄ. 
 
94 For a good discussion of the extent to which migrants undermine state sovereignty, albeit in a 
contemporary context, see Christian Joppke, ed. Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western 
Europe and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Of particular interest are the 
competing views of Joppke’s introduction and his own essay “Asylum and State Sovereignty: A 
Comparison of the United States, Germany and Britain,” 109-152; and Saskia Sassen’s “The de facto 
Transnationalization of Immigration Policy,” 49-85. 
 




Humanitarian Violence:  






The Ottoman-Habsburg border had long been witness to Ottoman subjects fleeing to Austria-
Hungary and then returning back to Bosnia and Hercegovina. But the flight of twenty-four 
orthodox Christian merchants from Bosanska Gradiška in the Banja Luka district of Bosnia to 
Habsburg territory on June 15 1873 prefigured several key elements of the mass crossings that 
would take place starting in 1875. The Bosanska Gradiška refugees’ complaints and fears were 
confined to specific local circumstances in a way that would not be the case two years later. 
Their largely ineffective attempts to voice their complaints to audiences beyond the Habsburg 
and Ottoman Empires nevertheless demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how to 
internationalize their concerns. Where the Bosanska Gradiška refugees made direct appeals to 
the European Great Powers, this chapter demonstrates that starting in 1875, it was civic 
mobilization at the local level that succeeded in internationalizing the plight of refugees from 
Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina. But it was in the language of humanitarianism, not 
diplomacy, that this internationalization took place. The meaning of humanitarianism was 
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unclear and unstable and local activists and civic groups were able to exploit the fluidity of the 
concept for their own means. What did become clear however was that humanitarianism created 
opportunities outside of diplomacy and international relations. As such it also represented a 
challenge to the international order itself. 
The merchants’ flight from Bosanska Gradiška came after several years of escalating 
Christian-Muslim violent crime in Bosnia and Hercegovina. In 1870, as attacks from brigands 
increased in the countryside and the city, a mixed commission of Muslims, Orthodox, and 
Catholic Christians submitted to the Sublime Porte over 170 petitions complaining about unfair 
taxation, corruption, insecurity and other matters.1 The problem was not the lack of laws on the 
books, but the regional government’s failure to enforce the laws that already existed. The 
commissioners requested the Sultan recall Safvet Paşa, the governor of Bosnia.2 Rumors that the 
Ottoman Empire might lease—or even sell—Bosnia and Hercegovina to Serbia spread, as did 
violence between the Muslim and Christian communities.3 Local officials in Bosanska Gradiška 
denied a request to install a larger bell in the Orthodox church, and a number of fires broke out in 
the Orthodox section of town. 4  
Throughout this, the Orthodox community in Bosanska Gradiška sought help from beyond 
the Ottoman Empire. Orthodox communities in Novi Sad, Belgrade, and even in Russia followed 
the events closely. After the fires, a small committee from the Orthodox community met with the 
                                                
1 There are numerous examples of such petitions in the Ottoman archives. For an example from late 1873 see 
Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi Tercüme Odası, box 457, folder 15.  
 
2 Safvet Paşa was vali from May 19 1869 to April 27 1871. See Salih Sidki Muvekkit Hadžihuseinović, Povijest 
Bosne [Tarih-i Bosna], trans. Abdulah Polimac, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, Gazi Husrev-begova biblioteka, 
1999). 
 
3 Čubrilović, Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878: 35. 
 
4 Ibid., 36. 
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Habsburg vice-consul in Banja Luka. With the murder in early October 1872 of Jovan 
Naumović, the Christian business agent of a Sarajevo purveyor to the Ottoman military, 
Christian merchants in Banja Luka submitted petitions for an investigation to the Sublime Porte. 
They also petitioned the Habsburg vice-consul, asking that Austria-Hungary take extra-territorial 
measures to guaranty their safety in the Ottoman Empire. Tension escalated when an Ottoman 
investigator, sent in response to the troubles, concluded not only were the complaints unfounded, 
but the Habsburg vice-consul was colluding with the petitioners to incite an uprising. In May 
1873, the murder of the younger wife of a certain Hadži Ahmed in the town of Varzar Vakuf, 
also in the Banja Luka district, gave occasion for the local police to imprison a number of the 
town’s Christian merchants. This was quickly followed by the beheading of the supposed 
perpetrator, Ostoja Zuhora.5 When word reached the merchants of Bosanska Gradiška that 
Ottoman officials thought the Habsburg vice-consul incited the entire incident, and that they too 
were implicated because of their previous associations with him, the merchants fled north across 
the Sava river to the safety of Habsburg territory. 6  
The act of crossing the border immediately internationalized the situation in Bosanska 
Gradiška, but the impact of the events was different for each of the involved parties. For the 
Habsburg Empire the Bosanska Gradiška refugees were a problem of international law and 
diplomacy. For the Ottomans they posed both diplomatic difficulties and challenged the 
authority of local Ottoman administration. For the refugees, their flight and the circumstances 
leading up to it offered a podium from which to make sweeping claims for international 
                                                
5 Document 3 Enclosure, “Copie d’une Note adressée par le Comte Ludolf à Son Excellence Rachid Pacha en date 
de Buyukdere, le 28 juin 1873.” Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen 
Ministeriums des Äussern über orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877).  
 
6  Čubrilović, Bosanski Ustanak 1875-1878: 34-38. 
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protection that went beyond the Ottoman and Habsburg Empire and invoked the entire European 
state system. 
By the second half of the nineteenth century the “refugee” as a subject of international law 
was well-defined, even if the term “refugee” usually did not refer to a Balkan merchant, but to an 
asylum-seeking European revolutionary—a political criminal in one country, yet “martyr of 
freedom” in another.7 With the arrival of the Bosanska Gradiška refugees, the Habsburg response 
followed the formal practices and expectations that customarily pertained to this more clearly 
defined category of political refugees.8 Border authorities interviewed the merchants and then, 
“according to the existing directives,” sent them to the town of Požega, some 20 kilometers from 
the border.9 Habsburg Foreign Minister Andrássy argued it was Austria-Hungary’s sole 
obligation to “afford protection to foreigners who cross to our territory in search of the same.”10 
At the same time, the Internierung—internment—of the refugees to Požega would honor another 
expectation of international asylum law, namely that states offering refuge prevent asylees from 
engaging in any cross-border activities that might provoke their home government.11 
                                                
7 Johann Caspar Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staten., 2 ed. (Nordlingen: Beck’schen 
Buchhandlung, 1872). 230. 
 
8 This includes the removal of refugees from the immediate border area; more broadly it includes the state’s right to 
afford protection to individuals and to decide on the appropriate moment for return. These and other standards 
would be codified by the Institut de Droit international in the 1880s. See James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of 
Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: W. 
Blackwood and Sons, 1883). 334-47. 
 
9 Document 1, Mollinary to Andrássy, 16 VI 1873. Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. 
gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877). 
 
10 Document 11, Andrássy to Mollinary, 29 VII 1873. Ibid. 
 
11 Document 11, Andrássy to Mollinary, 29 VII 1873. Ibid. Mustafa Asim Paşa would complain that the refugees 
were not successfully detained in Požega and had returned to Stari Gradiška in Croatia, directly across the Sava river 
from Bosanska Gradiška. See Document 9, Theodorovich to Andrássy 24 VII 1873. Ibid. 
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The similarities between the Bosanska Gradiška merchants and the traditional political 
refugee stopped at formalities of care. Andrássy was unwilling to accord the merchants any 
political character out of fear it might legitimize their plight as an international question rather 
than a local disturbance. Such a possibility existed “if it even appeared that we a priori view their 
complaints as legitimate and take it upon ourselves to intervene formally.”12 It was not the task 
of the Habsburg government, he wrote, to “involve itself in the disputes of individual Turkish 
subjects with their individual local officials, and to dictate to the Porte the terms on which the 
return of the refugees will depend [...].”13 
By the end of June, the Ottoman government initiated an investigation into the 
circumstances of the flight. Mehmed Raşid Paşa, the foreign minister, had received a report from 
Mustafa Asim Paşa, the Bosnian governor, that the merchants were part of a revolutionary 
committee and they had fled after local authorities found them out; more worrisome were 
allegations that the Habsburg vice-consul in Banja Luka was involved in pan-Slavic agitation. 
Raşid Paşa dispatched Mustafa Asim Paşa to Banja Luka to investigate the whole affair further, 
promising the Habsburg envoy in Istanbul that if need be a special commissioner would also be 
sent to ensure impartiality. In view of the accusations of Habsburg consular misbehavior, Raşid 
Paşa also asked that Theodorovich, the Habsburg general consul in Sarajevo, accompany the 
governor on the trip to Banja Luka and submit a separate report.14  
The findings of these two parallel investigations were contradictory, and precipitated a 
diplomatic crisis that overshadowed any imperial concerns about the refugees themselves, 
                                                
12 Document 12, Andrássy to Mollinary, 30 VII 1873. Ibid. 
 
13 Document 11, Andrássy to Mollinary, 29 VII 1873. Ibid.  
 
14 Document 5, Ludolf to Andrássy, 30 VI 1873. Ibid. 
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resulted in the Habsburg withdrawal of its vice-consul and the Ottoman removal of key 
provincial officials, including the governor. In late September, Mustafa Asim Paşa submitted to 
the Porte his report on the events in the Banja Luka district. The governor exonerated local 
Ottoman officials of any wrong-doing and denied any anti-Christian activities by the local 
Muslim population. Theodorovich, who had been reporting to Vienna during the investigation, 
submitted his final report to the Porte as well. He sharply criticized the Ottoman investigative 
techniques and questioned Mustafa Asim Paşa’s findings, saying that from the very start the 
governor had conducted his investigation to demonstrate his preconception that all of the 
Christian complaints were ungrounded.15 The Porte responded by sending to the Habsburg envoy 
in Istanbul a “fierce denunciation of [Habsburg] consular officers in Bosnia, who are depicted as 
agitators of the disquiet and propagators of the pan-Slavic movement,” and went as far as 
accusing Theodorovich himself of being party to anti-government activities.16 
Andrássy was furious. Writing to his envoy in Istanbul, he described the Porte as wanting 
to imitate the example of the refugees by submitting a sweeping indictment of Habsburg 
behavior. By doing so, the Porte “managed to produce a result that every effort” of the Bosanska 
Gradiška refugees failed to achieve: “to transform into an international issue a question of 
internal administration” in which Austria-Hungary, despite being a neighboring state, should 
have played only an incidental role.17 From the start, Andrássy had suspected the refugees’ 
claims were greatly exaggerated and likely inspired by provocateurs. He had been willing to 
                                                
15 Document 17, Theodorovich to Andrássy, 13 VIII 1873. Ibid. 
 
16 Document 20, Zaluski to Andrássy, 3 X 1873. Ibid. The Habsburg Empire did not have representation in Istanbul 
at the ambassadorial level until the arrival of County Zichy in 1874—an indication to the other Great Powers that 
Andrássy was interested in greater engagement in “Eastern Affairs.” See Henry George Elliot and Gertrude Elliot, 
Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences  (New York: Dutton, 1922). 205. 
 
17 Document 21, Andrássy to Ludolf, 21 X 1873. Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. 
gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877). 
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support the Ottomans’ original attempt at inducing refugee return through a simple guarantee of 
safety. The Ottoman memorandum changed that by imbricating the refugee question with those 
of diplomacy. Informing the Porte that the Habsburg vice-consul had already been recalled to 
Vienna, he demanded the Porte recall Emin Effendi, the sub-governor of Gradiška, and Kamil 
Bey, the head of the Banja Luka district, and insisted on an explicit apology. Should the Porte 
not meet these demands, Andrássy would recall his envoy.18 
The internationalization that Andrássy spoke of was limited, and while it was occasioned 
by the flight of the refugees, it was the result of diplomatic missteps rather than their proximate 
cause. It was not persecution of Bosnia’s Christian population that led the Habsburg government 
to strengthen its demands against the Ottoman government. Well after Theodorovich’s highly 
critical reports on Mustafa Asim Paşa’s investigation of the events in Banja Luka, Andrássy 
remained reluctant to involve Austria-Hungary in Ottoman affairs. His cover note to Count 
Zalusky in Istanbul for the refugee memorandum reflects this reluctance, based largely on 
political considerations. “A certain tendency [on the part of the refugees] to use the undeniable 
crimes and especially the events in Bosanska Gradiška and Banja Luka for political purposes 
cannot be ignored,” he wrote, yet noted only that “administration and judicature in Bosnia do 
appear to be in need of some improvements.”19 Andrássy concluded the note by further 
emphasizing the Habsburg unwillingness to get involved. After recommending the Ottomans 
take necessary measures, he entrusted the problem to the “wisdom and sense of justice of the 
                                                
18 Document 21, Andrássy to Ludolf, 21 X 1873. Ibid. 
 
19 Document 19, Andrássy to Zalusky 30 IX 1873. Ibid. 
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Porte.” With that, the Habsburg government was all the less willing to take further steps, because 
“an ostensible intervention from our side could possibly encourage the agitation.”20 
Habsburg policy was circumspect at all levels. Despite repeated demands and requests from 
the refugees for the assurances of not just a safe return but also an amnesty upon their return, at 
no time were Habsburg authorities willing to pressure the Ottoman government on the point. It 
was not until early January 1874 that Andrássy instructed Theodorovich to have the new vali 
forward the instructions for safe return to officials in Gradiška, as the refugees would not return 
before this happened.21 The amnesty was limited to the act of flight and did not extend to 
common crimes (of which the majority of the refugees were accused).22 Moreover, Austria-
Hungary was more parsimonious with aid to the refugees than the expectations of political 
asylum would indicate. Andrássy worried any generosity in that regard would be rewarded with 
more refugees, and was willing only to provide the Gradiška merchants with enough money to 
pay for their transport back home, and throughout the course of their stay they had been offered 
no help for subsistence—a fact about which they complained, hoping that Andrássy “would not 
permit [them], as protectees of his Majesty the Emperor, to die of hunger on Austrian 
territory.”23 
As treacherous as it was, diplomacy did eventually work. By the end of January 1874, the 
refugees were heading home and the incident could be viewed as “laid to rest.”24 But the essence 
                                                
20 Document 19, Andrássy to Zalusky 30 IX 1873. Ibid. 
 
21 Document 33, Andrássy to Theodorovich. 3 I 1874. Ibid. 
 
22 Document 29, Andrássy to Hungarian Minister President Szlavy, 4 XI 1873. Ibid. 
 
23 Archive of the Nacionalna i univerzitetska biblioteka Bosne i Hercegovine/NUB BiH, box 107, 6/21 1873. 
Refugees to Andrássy, 23 I 1874. 
 
24 Document 26, Andrássy to Ludolf, 1 XI 1873. Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. 
gemeinsamen Ministeriums des Äussern über orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877). 
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of the refugees’ complaint—that the Ottoman Empire was incapable of guaranteeing not just the 
equality, but the physical safety of its Christian subjects—went straight to the core of Great 
Power concerns about the Ottoman Empire. The refugees wanted a more thorough diplomatic 
engagement with the Ottoman Empire that they got, and for them it wasn’t their flight across the 
Habsburg-Ottoman border that had created an international incident—it was the fear of 
persecution and the Ottoman state’s inability to control local actors. The refugees argued that the 
Sultan’s failure to guarantee the safety of his Christian subjects was not simply a domestic 
problem, but an international one. The day after Andrássy warned against giving the refugees’ 
claims even an appearance of legitimacy, Vaso Vidović, the elected representative of the 
Bosanska Gradiška refugees, submitted to the Habsburg Emperor the memorandum “On the 
Current Situation and the Suffering of the Christians.”25 The document, which Vidović also gave 
to the Vienna ambassadors of the other Great Powers, outlined the refugees’ complaints and their 
requests for amelioration. More dramatically, it did so in the name of the Treaty of Paris of 1856: 
their persecution, the refugees argued, was an infraction against the community of states, against 
the concert of Europe and against a humanitarian, Christian West. 
The memo was received coolly. The Habsburg Emperor simply forwarded it to Andrássy, 
who had already seen it; the British ambassador did not take it seriously; and the Italian 
representative suggested Vidović would have better luck if he met with the Russian 
ambassador.26 Nevertheless, the note demonstrates a sort of well-informed naïveté that took 
treaty declarations seriously and viewed the signatories as powers to be petitioned. Based on 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
25 Document 19 Enclosure, “Memorandum. Gerichtet an die europäischen christlichen, die Pariser Verträge 
garantierenden Grossmächte über die gegenwärtige Lage und Leiden der Christen in Bosnien” 14/26 VII 1873. Ibid. 
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treaty drafts written prior to the Ottoman’s pre-emptive promulgation of the Imperial Reform 
Edict of 1856 (Islahat Fermanı), the refugees argued that, counter to Article Nine of the Treaty 
of Paris, which banned foreign intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs, it was “beyond doubt 
that the signatory Christian powers, based on the nature of the matter itself, and also the aim and 
goal of the Paris Treaty, had the complete right to protect” Ottoman Christians.  
 
There can thus be no doubt that the only legitimate way for the Christians in Turkey [...] to be 
rescued is for them to turn to the Christian guaranteeing Great Powers of the Treaty of Paris, 
and no doubt that these moreover have, in the name of all Christendom and Humanity, the moral 
right, yea the moral obligation to offer their protection [...] even if it is not in the form of a 
formal intervention, then at least in an advisory manner—and [this is also] in the best interests 
of Turkey.27 
 
The Bosanska Gradiška refugees saw in the international system a morally responsible 
system, and the claims they made on it were done so in the name of the preservation of the 
system and its constituent parts. The refugees kept their complaints detailed and specific, and in 
conclusion demanded that Istanbul send to Bosnia and Hercegovina an independent commission 
to investigate their claims, their persecutors be brought to trial and punished, Christians be 
allowed to vote for representation in councils, and finally that they be granted an amnesty and 
assured a safe return home. The demands make it clear that the refugees sought nothing more 
than to use the existing international system for the restoration of imperial order within the 
Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the rhetorical appeals to Christianity and humanity were limited, 
and kept strictly within the architecture of international affairs: they expected the Sultan to 
                                                
27 Document 19 Enclosure, “Memorandum.” Actenstücke aus den Correspondenzen des kais. und kön. gemeinsamen 
Ministeriums des Äussern über orientalische Angelegenheiten (vom 16. Mai 1873 bis 31. Mai 1877). 
 
  120 
“extend or widen” the rights of his Christian subjects “in a timely fashion, in the spirit of 
humanity and civilization.”28 
 
1875 
The difference between the Bosanska Gradiška refugees and the mass flight of refugees that 
began in 1875 was not—at least at first—this local understanding of Ottoman domestic 
responsibilities in the context of the international legal framework, but more simply the scale of 
the flight and with it the size and the scope of the response. The Ottomans were unable to stop 
the uprising and Austria-Hungary became increasingly involved in the care of the refugees and 
the maintenance of border integrity. The instability the uprising and the refugees imposed on the 
international order started to matter as friction grew among various state and non-state interests, 
and aggressive foreign engagement seemed increasingly urgent.  
The first foreign intervention in the Bosnian and Hercegovinian crisis was a multi-lateral 
consular mission to investigate the problems and the Ottoman response to them on the ground. 
The Ottomans were understandably reluctant to undergo the injury to their sovereignty that such 
a consular mission entailed. But the matter was made all the more delicate by tensions between 
the Russian goal for some sort of eventual autonomy for Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the 
Austro-Hungarian resistance to any effort to destabilize the Ottoman Empire. Fearing Russian 
influence in a neighboring province, Andrássy carefully circumscribed the mission by preventing 
the consuls from direct involvement in any insurgent-Ottoman negotiations. The restriction 
limited any real influence the mission had in ending the violence, but from a more narrow 
                                                
28 Document 19 Enclosure, “Memorandum.” Ibid. 
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Habsburg view, the restriction also helped to thwart Russia’s efforts to make itself indispensible 
to Ottoman-Christian insurgent negotiations.29  
At the same time the Great Powers began shaping a diplomatic approach to the problem, 
processes of definition began to take place. The scale of the refugee flight and the poverty and 
misery that accompanied it led to a process of defining the refugee as a humanitarian subject. 
Even as Habsburg authorities were using policy and force to stabilize and manage refugees and 
the “refugee crisis”, the refugees themselves—and those they appointed to represent them to the 
Habsburg Empire as their immediate protector and to the international community—were trying 
to define the terms by which they would be understood—the extent and the shape of their 
humanitarian subjectivity. 
Recent work has asked us to lay greater importance on the European periphery in the 
shaping of the global order that emerged after the First World War. One of the key points has 
been a fundamental re-evaluation of the theory, law, practice and meaning of sovereignty in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, and especially how encounters at the periphery shaped or 
caused theoretical and legalistic formulations and revisions.30 Eric Weitz has characterized the 
transition from the “Vienna to the Paris system” as the transformation from “dynastic legitimacy 
                                                
29 Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year: 75. 
 
30 Antony Anghie has argued that the colonial encounter was central to shaping the way Europeans conceived the 
very idea of sovereignty; see Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, 
Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). Balakrishnan Rajagopal is even more forceful, arguing “the architecture of modern international law 
has been ineluctably shaped by popular, grassroots resistance from the Third World,” in Balakrishnan Rajagopal, 
International Law From Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance  (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 45. For Cemil Aydın, the Ottoman Empire was able to use the language of 
international law not only to argue its case, but to force changes in it. Cemil Aydın, “The End of the Ottoman 
Empire and the International History of Decolonization,” in Center for International History (Columbia University 
2010). The relationship worked in reverse, as well. Milena Methodieva’s recent dissertation argues that Bulgaria, for 
example, sought to adhere to international expectations—including for minorities—in an effort to legitimize its 
place on the international stage; in doing so, it valorized the same laws it sought to follow. Milena Bogomilova 
Methodieva, “Reform, Politics and Culture Among the Muslims in Bulgaria, 1878-1908” (Dissertation, Princeton 
University, 2010). 
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and state sovereignty within clearly defined borders [to] populations and an ideal of state 
sovereignty rooted in national homogeneity.”31 This is the history of minority protection, failed 
interwar minority rights regimes and the postwar rise of human rights, which Weitz neatly ties to 
the questions of managing the imperial periphery raised at the “two Berlins”—the Berlin 
Congress of 1878 where the Great Powers tried to manage the challenges of the failing Ottoman 
Empire, and the Berlin Conference of 1884, which divided the African continent among the 
imperial powers.  
Treaties and conferences were an important site of these reconfigurations; the loci at which 
new thinking and the persistence of old thinking came into force. They were also a forum where 
non-Europeans tried to join the game and influence its outcome. As Cemil Aydın has argued, this 
was true for the Ottoman Empire, which came to the Berlin Congress well prepared to argue its 
case in the language of existing treaties and international law.32 As much as the Berlin Congress 
of 1878 was a step towards Weitz’s Paris system of nation-states and minority protection, the 
Ottoman Empire was nevertheless an empire, and its participation at Berlin also invokes 
elements of the dynastic “Vienna System.” By Paris the new architecture of the international 
system—especially the idea of national self-determination—had, as Erez Manela has 
demonstrated, reached well beyond the boundaries of existing states, and provided a new 
language with which subject peoples could articulate claims.33 
Humanitarianism was another available language. In the historiography it is most often 
jumbled into analyses of human rights, a natural and important step that nevertheless occludes 
                                                
31 Eric Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human 
Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” American Historical Review 113, no. 5 (2008): 1314. 
 
32 Aydın, “The End of the Ottoman Empire and the International History of Decolonization.” 
 
33 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial 
Nationalism  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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humanitarianism as specific discourse that could create frameworks for understanding 
state/subject relationships at and beyond the European periphery. Humanitarianism was an 
important interface between the violence at the European periphery and the moral-political 
inertias at the center. Focusing on Germany, Margaret Anderson has pointed to a multiplicity of 
narratives with regard to anti-Armenian violence in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and in particular the question of whether violent people could also deserve 
sympathy.34 The refugees of Bosnia and Hercegovina were similarly suspect and faced similar 
questions. Habsburg border officials disarmed refugees when they crossed over to Austro-
Hungarian territory, but many refugees still participated in the insurgency. Nevertheless, in the 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian case a humanitarian subjectivity was an important representational 
face to the outside world. Local actors used the familiar tropes of brutal oppression, the 
bloodthirsty Turk, a proud, ancient nation under the Ottoman yoke, and slavery as a means to 
seize and to define the narrative of humanitarianism in the Balkans. 
This chapter contends that this process of self-definition of refugees as a “humanitarian 
problem” and refugees’ ability to define and to manipulate this problem to the world beyond the 
immediate border zone was an essential aspect of the European core’s encounter with the 
violence in the Balkans from 1875-1878. On the face of it, this should come as little surprise to 
those familiar with Gladstone and the “Bulgarian Horrors.” Yet whatever the symbolic strength 
and historical impact of that particular moment, the situation this chapter considers represents 
something more subtle: the efforts and ability of the refugees and their supporters to work with 
and manipulate the principal dichotomy embedded in their humanitarian subjectivity, namely the 
tension between displaced victim and insurgent activist.  
                                                
34 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “‘Down in Turkey, Far Away’: Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and 
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In the case of the Bosnian refugees in Croatia, self-definition was closely linked to a broad 
infrastructure for aid to refugees and to the insurgency. The involvement of this deeper, more 
organized level of social activism played an important role in the ability of refugees and activists 
to project their message. The ability to define refugees as an international problem, and the 
ability—or at least effort—to control the content and shape of this definition relied on the 
contingencies of local circumstances. The refugee crisis took place at a moment of rapid social 
and political change in Croatia, where a new political liberalism was taking hold after the 1867 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise reconfigured the Habsburg Empire. The consolidation and 
growing strength of a new bourgeois associational life was vital to the “humanitarianization” of 
the refugee crisis: secular, civic charity was the direct predecessor to the humanitarian project 
along the border, and the individuals, institutions and techniques of civic refugee aid all drew 
directly from charitable societies. At the same time, this process of defining a humanitarian 
subjectivity was shaped by—and helped to exacerbate—the domestic tensions that accompanied 
these new forms of civic activism.  
The development of a civic and associational life in the Habsburg Empire is often seen as a 
marker—as it is in the case of Germany—of the strength of the rising bourgeoisie.35 In the 
Habsburg case, associational life was also a key center for national activism and differentiation.36 
                                                
35 The stakes in the Habsburg debate are different than in the German debate. The main questions for Habsburg 
historians are about the stability of empire, not the rise of Nazism. For the classic discussion of the bourgeoisie in 
Germany, see David Blackbourn’s half of the now-classic critique of the Sonderweg thesis. David Blackbourn and 
Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany  
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
 
36 Debates over the ascendance and stability of political nationalism have driven the study of associational life in the 
Habsburg Empire, and a wide variety of associations can be viewed as playing important roles in this process. The 
historian Jiri Pokorny, for example, includes singing, sport, student and reading associations under the rubric 
“Nationale Bildungsvereine.” See Pokorny, Jiri. “Vereine, Verbände und Parteien in den böhmischen Ländern. A: 
Vereine und Parteien in Böhmen” in Helmut Rumpler and Peter Urbanitsch, Politische Öffentlichkeit und 
Zivilgesellschaft. 1 Teilband. Vereine, Parteien und Interessenverbände als Träger der politischen Partizipation, 
Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918 (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006). 
619-37. 
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Associational life was at once divisive and unifying. On the one hand, clubs and groups 
functioned as the space where local identities fractured into stronger national affiliations; on the 
other hand, once split, they were an axis around which national groups could coalesce, even 
superseding other affiliations, such as class.37  
The Dalmatian čitaonica, or reading rooms, were a good example of this. Reading rooms 
began forming even before 1848, but under neo-absolutism became the backbone of national 
movements, differentiating themselves first between Slavic and Italian groups, and then later into 
Croatian or Serbian. The reading room “Casino” in Kotor was founded in 1844, changed its 
name in 1880 to Slavjanski dom (Slavic House), and in 1884 to Hrvatski dom (Croatian House); 
in 1880 Kotor’s other reading room, Slavanjska čitaonica (Slavic Reading Room), changed its 
name to Srpska čitaonica (Serbian Reading Room).38 The Dubrovnik Narodna štionica (National 
Reading Room), which in 1875 established a committee for aid to the uprising and refugees, 
fractured not long after the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1878. To be sure, 
nationalist political movements and activists for the most part had little interest in destroying the 
empire. 39 Nevertheless, not all Habsburg political nationalism was equal, and its threat could be 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
37 Jeremy King has illustrated this well with the replacement of local identities by stronger national affiliations in 
Bohemia, where conflict over the introduction of bilingual education at previously German language schools led, in 
1861, to the division of the local choir into the German Liedertafel and the Czech Beseda. The division was 
subsequently reflected in the foundation of other specifically German and Czech clubs. These associations were also 
integrative—they were consciously used to build a national identity and a cohesion that, for example in the case of 
the Deutsche Böhmerwaldbund, could extend beyond limited class interests or even gender divisions. Jeremy King, 
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 24, 51-66.  
 
38 See Petar Strčić,  “Vereine, Verbände und Parteien in den Adrialändern. B: Die politischen, kulturellen und 
wirtschaftlichen Vereinigungen in Dalmatien” in Rumpler and Urbanitsch, Politische Öffentlichkeit und 
Zivilgesellschaft. 1 Teilband. Vereine, Parteien und Interessenverbände als Träger der politischen Partizipation: 
587-608. 
 
39 As Gary Cohen has neatly summarized, “put simply, a polity that permitted and in many ways abetted the 
flowering of vigorous nationalist political movements, an abundance of political parties and interest groups, and a 
multifarious and assertive political press could not have been so immobile or paralytic that only war and revolution 
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viewed differently from the perspective of the borderlands. There was, after all, no Czech 
Piedmont. For Austria-Hungary’s south Slavs, however, there was always Serbia.   
Humanitarian organizations did not necessarily fall along national lines, despite—or 
perhaps because—of the charged national environment along the border. Nevertheless, 
associations and organizations could and did form the basis for the humanitarian representation 
of refugees, for the definition of their subjectivity, and for the way this subjectivity was mediated 
with the outside world—creating both dependence on and opposition to civic mobilization. 
Given the unique circumstances of a weakened Habsburg Empire humanitarianism of the sort 
that evolved along the border was necessary, invaluable, and for the Habsburgs, deeply 
worrisome. 
 
The rise of aid committees 
The immediate Habsburg response to the arrival of refugees discussed in Chapter One had been a 
policy reflex driven by international obligations and, in the case of the small sums of money 
distributed to refugees from the Ottoman Empire, concerns over domestic stability. Regardless of 
the empathies of officials along the border, the aid response was demanded by protocol, not 
sentiment. A true humanitarian mobilization happened instead at the provincial level, in the 
Habsburg borderlands. There, after the arcane internal politics of Austria-Hungary thwarted an 
attempt in the provincial parliament to develop an autonomous local aid program, an increasingly 
active bourgeois associational and charitable life enabled the long-term development of private 
committees and societies into the center-points of humanitarian activity. 
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“Official” humanitarianism was limited to the milieu in which it was conceived and to its 
intended subject: the military.40 The only explicit reference to humanitarian motivations in the 
Habsburg archives comes when Andrássy, in “the interest of humanity” permits the transport of 
wounded Ottoman troops across Habsburg soil, even though it could be perceived as a possible 
violation of Habsburg neutrality. This narrow interpretation of humanitarianism is perhaps most 
clearly illustrated by the refusal of the Vienna Red Cross Committee to succor the wounded who 
had crossed to Habsburg territory. In lockstep with the attitude of Artur Bylandt-Rheidt, the 
Habsburg Minister of War, that the insurgents “stand outside of a legal connection to a 
recognized military power, [and] have under international law an indefinable character [...],” the 
Vienna Committee reported to the International Committee in Geneva that its statutes prevented 
it from acting on behalf of refugees and wounded insurgents on Habsburg territory.41 That 
decision irked members of the International Committee in Geneva, who described as a “question 
of principle” the strange situation in which “injured fighters on the territory of a state included in 
the network of the Red Cross” had no neutral body to intervene on their behalf. Nevertheless, the 
role of the Red Cross was clear, and clearly limited to the regular military. Its members could 
find no precedent to invoke on behalf of wounded insurgents.42 
                                                
40 For the bellicose origins of humanitarian law and the limited purview of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross see Best, Humanity in Warfare. 
 
41 On Bylandt-Reidt, see KA Praes. Reihe, 1876, 26 VII 1876. The Vienna Committee not only washed its hands of 
responsibility, but seems to have been willfully ignorant of the situation in Hercegovina and the activities in the 
Habsburg borderlands. In the same letter it also denied knowledge of Gabriel Wesselitzky, a leading activist who 
had already made the rounds of the diplomatic corps in Vienna and had an audience with Andrássy. For the contents 
of the Committee’s letter, see “Séance du 25 octobre 1875” in Jean-François Pitteloud et al., Procès-verbaux des 
séances du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge: 17 février 1863-28 août 1914, Documents pour servir à 
l’histoire de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, (Genève: Société Henry Dunant: Comité international de la 
Croix-Rouge, 1999). 364-66. 
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An international “humanitarian” response developed informally. Even well after the start of 
the uprising, it was not necessarily clear whether refugees would become “humanitarian 
subjects,” or would remain, as had happened in previous refugee movements along these borders, 
the recipients of strictly local charity. Despite some disconcerting reports from the border zone, 
in the early days of the uprising the refugees’ situation did not necessarily seem dire. As late as 
October 1875, The Graphic, a British periodical, ran an article about refugees in Dubrovnik 
written by Arthur Evans, a seasoned Balkan traveler who would remain in Dalmatia throughout 
the uprising.43 In this report, he described a scene of relative well-being. His small portrait of 
Dubrovnik does not evince a town in crisis, but rather the fluidity of the Habsburg borderlands, 
where refugee women sold their jewelry to buy weapons for their husbands at the same time 
“Turks” were buying salt, corn and fodder for the Sultan’s troops—an image entirely at odds 
with the Dubrovnik of the following spring, which “had the appearance of a city at open war 
with Turkey.”44  
Evans wrote that instead of the “half-starved miserable wretches” he had expected to find, 
the refugees were “well fed; they did not seem at all forlorn, and with their light white 
handkerchiefs and chemises they presented a picture of cleanliness which would have put to 
shame the squalor of many an Italian Dalmatian.” The accompanying illustration, in which men 
stand in idle conversation and women sit holding their infants completes the image. Evans’ 
refugees are well supported by an “Austrian government [that] allows each family on an average 
twenty kreutzers a day, and the commune of Ragusa makes up the amount to thirty-six kreutzers 
                                                
43 Evans eventually started reporting for the Manchester Guardian and developed a strong pro-insurgent sentiment. 
44 Koetschet, Aus Bosniens letzter Türkenzeit: 23-24. 
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[which is] sufficient to support life...”45 These refugees are not humanitarian subjects; they are 
the well-off beneficiaries of charity and a civic obligation—the “hospitality of the Ragusans.”46  
This hospitality was actually a good deal more complicated than an additional sixteen 
kreutzers daily paid out from the city coffers.47 Especially in the early days of the crisis, some 
(but not all) communities throughout the Habsburg border zone did indeed use communal funds 
to aid the refugees in a variety of ways. Cash subsidies were not uncommon, and many 
communities supplied refugees with food, or allowed them to gather wood or graze livestock on 
communal lands. The town of Petrinja took it upon itself to erect barracks capable of housing up 
to 640 people—one of the few examples of a mass-housing solution during the period.48  
These examples were exceptions, however, and most communities were unable to offer to 
the refugees help along the lines of traditional communal poor-aid. Instead, non-state refugee aid 
relied directly on another new practice—the charitable association. Embedded within Croatia’s 
developing associational life and bourgeois culture, these civic institutions served as a model for 
popular refugee aid efforts, and in so doing helped to create, if only temporarily, new solidarities 
within Croatian civic life. The urban business and political elite aligned in common cause with 
the rural peasantry, and at a time of growing Croat-Serb tension served as a tenuous node of 
unity in purpose.  
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The specific associational form that became the central institution for the raising, 
consolidating and distributing of all aid that did not come from the Imperial Habsburg 
government in Vienna was the odbor—the committee. Aid committees in most cities and larger 
towns were established and began to operate almost immediately after the start of the uprising, 
and continued their work throughout the period under consideration. As the principal organ of 
private aid, the committees served as the point at which the refugees’ humanitarian subjectivity 
came to be defined. The committees linked local aid efforts with organized regional interests and 
ultimately served as the exclusive points of connection between foreign humanitarian aid and 
local distribution. They were also almost always tied to or the same as another type of 
committee: those offering direct help to the insurgency.49 In this way the committees linked 
Croatia’s business and political elite with the uprising itself and with longer, localized traditions 
of cross-border involvement in Bosnian and Hercegovinian violence. Particularly in Dalmatia, 
the aid committees seem at first to have been formed almost reflexively, drawing on past 
experience of uprisings and population movements along the Habsburg-Ottoman border, before 
quickly becoming entrenched in the associational structures of Croatian society.  
As early as 20 July 1875, community leaders in the Dalmatian capital Zadar announced to 
the governor of Dalmatia, Baron Gabriel Rodich, the formation of a “society for the collection of 
voluntary contributions to support families of the Hercegovinian insurgents who cross over to 
Dalmatia.”50 Not formally announced to Rodich—yet brazenly announced in the main Zadar 
paper, Narodni List—was the establishment of an association specifically dedicated to collecting 
money for the insurgency itself. Within days of the newspaper announcement, associations to 
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help both the fleeing families and the insurgency itself appeared in cities and towns across 
Dalmatia, from Makarska to Dubrovnik.51 With the support of Narodni List, the numerous 
societies across Dalmatia were vertically organized under the Zadar associations. By autumn, a 
single “Central Society” had been formed.52  
Whatever support these associations gave to the insurgents themselves, they also did 
provide help to the refugees. Habsburg authorities, however, found the immediate ligature of aid 
to rebel and to refugee particularly disconcerting. From the first report that Hercegovinians were 
fleeing across the border into Dalmatia, Andrássy had recognized in the refugees—and in the 
insurgency itself—a threat to Habsburg neutrality toward the Ottoman Empire during what 
remained at the time a strictly internal disturbance. Andrássy immediately approved the dispatch 
of a military unit to the border region in response to the flight.53 Two and a half weeks later, with 
the question of border integrity and Habsburg neutrality still at the top of the agenda, Rodich sent 
a circular to district heads that agitation and the formation of societies should be prevented as 
much as possible.54  
In fact, the Austro-Hungarian authorities were in a quandary. With the continuing violence 
in Hercegovina and the expansion of the uprising to Bosnia in August 1875, it became obvious 
that the Ottoman Empire would be unable to suppress the insurgency quickly, that the number of 
refugees on Habsburg soil would continue to grow, and that the modest refugee aid program the 
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state had enacted would quickly be overwhelmed.55 As discussed in Chapter One, the cost of 
long-term refugee aid strained the Empire’s internal politics as much as it did the shaky finances. 
The situation in Civil Croatia, which belonged to the Hungarian half of the Empire, was 
particular problematic. In the face of Hungarian anti-Slavic truculence, the aid societies were a 
political and financial pressure valve for the Foreign Ministry. In September 1875, Andrássy 
instructed the provincial government in Zagreb to offer refugees in Civil Croatia the standard 
state subvention only when “voluntary contributions to their support do not suffice.”56 Budapest 
strengthened the language before forwarding the order on to the provincial government in 
Zagreb, ordering that local officials be “most frugal” with their expenses.57 Ivan Mažuranić, the 
governor of Civil Croatia, came under strong pressure from within his party to aid refugees using 
discretionary provincial money. Mažuranić resisted, surmising—probably correctly—that any 
decision in the Croatian provincial diet to pay the costs of refugee aid could be seen as 
parliamentary overreach and would offer Hungary an opportunity to dissolve the diet and revoke 
the little autonomy Croatia had won in the previous decade.58  
In these circumstances, and despite the potential threat that private, non-state aid 
associations posed to Austro-Hungarian neutrality, the Habsburg Empire entered into an uneasy 
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condominium with civil society over the care of refugees. Since the first law on associations 
came into force during the neo-absolutist years that followed 1848, successive revisions—strictly 
limited to non-political associations—had led to piecemeal liberalization.59 As an example of the 
efficacy and extent of social good that associations could produce, the refugee aid societies that 
appeared throughout Croatia immediately after the start of the uprising represent some of the 
most sophisticated of their kind. As an example of the dangers that nominally a-political 
associations could pose during this period of gradual liberalization, these societies were 
unsurpassed.  
The period of the uprising saw an unprecedented expansion of associational activity. The 
refugee aid associations drew directly from a model the few existing charitable institutions had 
developed over the previous decades. These aid associations were wholly a product of a rising 
Croatian bourgeoisie that had found for the first time, in the figure of Mažuranić, a liberal leader 
with sufficient political and cultural power to launch a serious project of administrative and 
social reform. Despite restrictions, organizations to raise money for needy students or volunteer 
fire departments had existed for several decades, and were slowly proliferating in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. This was especially the case with the growing number of women’s 
societies, which officials tended to view in a favorable light.60 In 1872, the schoolteacher Marija 
Jambrišak founded a so-called ladies’ association to raise money for a girls’ school, and there 
was a similar society, backed by Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the influential Bishop of Djakovo, for 
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the construction of a university in Zagreb.61 Also in 1872, the new caritative association 
Dobrotvor (Philanthropist) was founded “to take care of their city with bourgeois love.”62 The 
biggest caritative society was the Društvo čovjećnosti (Humanitarian Society), founded in 
1841.63 Along with the smaller interest groups, the Humanitarian Society introduced into the 
Croatian public sphere a variety of fund-raising techniques, including charity performances, 
fundraising drives in newspapers, and gala balls.  
These tools for raising money and the consciousness of the urban bourgeoisie point to one 
of the hallmarks of this period: a shift in the nature of charitable associations, in which the 
nobility and the clergy played a less important role. Where previously the character of charitable 
associations had been religious and their aim had been to raise money for the church to retain or 
redistribute as it saw fit, the associations of the late nineteenth century were increasingly secular, 
even if the intentions of their aid remained largely the same. For example, in the relatively 
wealthy Slavonian town of Požega, of nine philanthropic foundations established between 1799 
and 1909, only three were set up by people independent of the church—and the first of these was 
established in 1861.64  
In this sense, the advent of the refugee aid societies can be neatly slotted into the 
development of associational life more generally. With the first flight of Bosnians onto Croatian 
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soil, a “Ladies’ Committee” was formed in Zagreb to collect food and clothing for distribution to 
the “suffering Bosnian” peasantry. 65 To be sure, the president of the committee was Comtessa 
Clotilde Buratti, who lived in the “ivory tower” of wealth and nobility.66 But the 23 other 
members were not nobility. Some of the women were from prominent Zagreb families or, like 
Marija Hatz, entrepreneurs in their own right. 67 Others however, were neither.  
There was precedent for this type of committee. During a smaller uprising in 1862, a 
ladies’ committee had been formed to send aid to “suffering brothers in Montenegro and 
Hercegovina.” The outstanding difference between the 1862 and 1875 committees was not just 
one of size, but of membership. Only one of the 24 members of the 1875 committee, Barbara 
Mrazović, had been involved in the eight-member 1862 committee.68 Some of the difference in 
size and interest may be explained by a possible greater interest in the uprising itself, or the 
larger degree of suffering. But a decade’s worth of associational activity and the rise of the 
liberal bourgeoisie cannot be ignored as an explanation. Moreover, this breadth of interest went 
beyond the insular world of the Zagreb elite. One of the changes that the uprising—and the 
refugee crisis in particular—brought to associational life in Croatia can be deduced from articles 
in the local newspapers. Charitable and refugee aid associations periodically published thank-you 
lists of donors in the newspapers, and in these lists it is not the great size of a few large donations 
that stand out. Rather, it is the large number of the many small donations, often under one forint, 
that are most conspicuous. The crisis did not simply mobilize the bourgeoisie to form 
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associations. It mobilized broad swaths of the larger public and the poor to contribute what spare 
change they had in a way that until 1875 only the church had been able to do. 
With the start of the uprising, the state seems to have granted permission to establish aid 
societies based on members’ promises and their reputation. In mid-August 1875, the deputy head 
of the county assembly in Ruma (in present-day Vojvodina) requested instructions following the 
formation of a society to collect contributions for the Hercegovinians crossing into Dalmatia—at 
the opposite end of Croatia.69 There could not be “any type of obstacle” to the formation of the 
association, the Zagreb authorities responded, “because these refugees are wounded and are a 
great burden to [Dalmatian] society.”70 And while the deputy head would be responsible for 
monitoring the association’s activities, such supervision was based not on any real inspection, 
but rather on the reputation of its members. It was the deputy head’s “task to judge if the 
members of this association are sufficiently reliable people and [to judge] the security of the aid; 
that the collected donations under their management are used for the purpose intended.”71  
Authorities were ill-equipped to police this outburst of activity. In Civil Croatia, the office 
for internal affairs and finance, which was responsible for monitoring the activities and 
operations of associations, was notorious for “unsatisfactory supervision by the political 
authorities.” 72 Although the committees themselves were difficult to monitor, the state 
maintained a telegraphic monopoly that allowed officials in the Military Border to insert 
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themselves into all non-cash financial transfers.73 Wired transfers were guaranteed at both ends 
by the state. While there are some examples of money nominally intended for refugees sent 
directly to individuals who were active and known supporters of the insurgency, for the most part 
transfers went directly into the hands of state officials along the border, and it was these officials 
who carried out the final distribution to the refugees.74 
The state used the leeway afforded to it. In June 1876 Josip Mahalović, the Archbishop of 
Zagreb, sent 350 forints to the civilian government for distribution among the refugees in 
Croatia-Slavonia. The money had been raised by the editors of the Catholic-conservative 
newspaper Čeh in Prague from “friends of the suffering Christian Yugoslavs in the struggle with 
the Turks” and was to be distributed specifically among Catholics. Few of the Bosnian and 
Hercegovinian refugees were Catholic, and the government ignored the instructions. Not only 
did it determine how the money was to be apportioned among eight districts and the city of 
Zagreb, it also broadened the scope: the money was to be distributed not specifically among 
“suffering Catholics,” but rather among “the poorest of the … Bosnian refugees.”75 
 
Ilija Guteša, God and Savior 
The government of Civil Croatia granted permission for the establishment in Zagreb of an 
association “for the collection of voluntary contributions for suffering Hercegovinians” on 1 
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August 1875.76 The following day the Zagreb newspaper Obzor published the Zagreb 
Committee’s first formal call for contributions.77 On 5 August the Croatian Federation of Singers 
published in the German-language newspaper Agramer Zeitung an appeal that all Croatian 
singing clubs hold concerts to benefit the “suffering families of our blood-related Hercegovinian 
relatives who fled to Dalmatia,” and to send the donations to the treasurer of the Zagreb 
Committee.78 Money sent to the Committee, it had already been emphasized, would go 
“exclusively and only to supporting” the refugees.79 Within a week of calling for contributions, 
the Zagreb committee sent its first 1,000 forints to Dalmatia. Within a month the committee had 
collected 11,000 forints.80 
The Zagreb Committee quickly became one of the most important of the Croatian aid 
societies, and was the most intimate institutional connection between the uprising and the elite of 
Croatian politics and business. It received money from well-known industrialists, writers such as 
August Šenoa, the mayor of Zagreb, and even from the commander of the Habsburg military 
border. While Mažuranić may have blocked the effort to distribute provincial discretionary funds 
for refugee support, he was also one of the earliest donors to the Committee, as was Milan 
Makanec, the Sabor member who had first called for an official fund.81 Political opponents 
within the narrow confines of a barely autonomous parliament, yet united in purpose and support 
for an aid society: this was exactly what officials in Vienna—and even more so in Budapest—
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feared from associational life. The Zagreb Committee was also buying and smuggling weapons 
and supplies to the insurgency.82 Although the committee could not advertise this, it was an open 
secret in Zagreb from the very start—and Mažuranić surely knew where some of his money was 
going.  
The committee seems to have carried out its activities relatively undisturbed until March 
1876, when the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires began their joint campaign for pacification 
of the insurgency and an official repatriation of the refugees (See Chapter Three). On 3 March 
1876, Mažuranić sent a long letter to the Zagreb City Council, outlining a five-point agreement 
with the Foreign Ministry in Vienna that would govern the conduct of Habsburg subjects during 
the pacification and repatriation process. The directive is most enlightening not for what it says, 
but for what it repeats. Vienna’s frequently renewed orders to prevent armed bands of insurgents 
from using Habsburg territory as a base of operations in Bosnia and Hercegovina only illustrate 
the large gap between order and execution. For officials in Zagreb, the first and second 
paragraphs were the most relevant. The first demanded strict control over agitation in the press. 
The beginning of the second paragraph read, “political societies, organized for the purpose of 
direct or indirect support of the uprising, will not be tolerated...”83 These orders from Vienna 
were clearly the reason that four days earlier, on 29 February, Mažuranić had ordered the Zagreb 
Committee to supply receipts and accounts for its activities.84  
As Mažuranić explained to a city council member, the Zagreb Committee’s permission 
extended only to helping refugees, and if there was even the “smallest evidence that the money 
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collected went to support the uprising in Bosnia or in Hercegovina, the unpleasant situation 
would arrive that the [committee’s] permission would be retracted, and the society would be 
disbanded.”85 Šime Mazzura, a lawyer and merchant originally from Dalmatia and the head of 
the Zagreb committee, ultimately did provide some records, although in comparison with the 
thousands of forints the committee had distributed, the small sums he accounted for were 
insignificant. The documentary record of the Zagreb Committee effectively ends at this point, 
and there may well have been more material. What is known is that the Committee was not 
disbanded—it remained an active public institution and was frequently mentioned in newspaper 
articles. 
In this flurry of activity about the Committee, Mažuranić singled out one man in particular: 
Ilija Guteša, who Mažuranić said should be warned “to avoid all contact, either direct or indirect, 
with insurgents in Bosnia,” and who was brought in for an interview with the Zagreb police.86 
Guteša had been a hero of 1848, was elected to the Sabor in 1861, and had been elected three 
times to the Orthodox Serbian Church council, an official organ that was, among other things, 
responsible for Serbian education. Guteša was also the vice-president of the Zagreb Committee 
and by far its most visible member. He embodied most perfectly the various strands of civic 
activity along the border during the uprising. Guteša had long before the start of the uprising 
been among the most active of the elite Zagreb do-gooders. He was a member of Društvo 
čovjećnosti, a founding member and later president of Dobrotvor, and a tireless organizer of aid 
and support for people in need. His understanding of the meaning of charity was broad, 
extending from a sense of local obligation to more distant causes—in 1874 he raised 20,000 
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forints in Zagreb to help farmers in the impoverished Lika district after a particularly bad 
harvest.87 Guteša himself was an Orthodox Christian from Lika, and his charitable deeds in this 
case were clearly motivated by this close connection. His activities during the uprising were 
effectively an extrapolation of his efforts from 1874, encompassing the length of the Habsburg-
Ottoman border zone. At the same time that he extended his range of aid activity, he was also 
among the most important connections between local activities and foreign do-gooders in 
Croatia, throughout the Habsburg Empire and beyond. It was these contacts—in particular with 
two British women, Adelina Paulina Irby and Priscilla Johnston—that helped Guteša to project 
need abroad. Finally, he did not restrict his activity to caritative aid. He was a gun-runner, helped 
to organize insurgent bands and tried to establish a provisional government for Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Indeed, following the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina he was 
considered dangerous enough that he was permanently banned from entry.88 As much as the 
Habsburg Foreign Ministry may have wanted to prevent these latter activities (especially during 
the 1876 repatriation effort), his support for refugees and his support of violence were intimately 
bound up with each other, even interdependent. For people such as Guteša, they both existed in 
the same conceptual space of “humanitarianism.” 
The Zagreb Committee, and Guteša in particular, served as one of several nodes in what 
was, despite the rapid establishment of committees throughout the region, a highly centralized 
refugee aid program. In addition to collecting money in Zagreb proper, clubs and fundraisers 
elsewhere in the region sent their money to the Zagreb committee—even from Sisak, which was 
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much closer to the border than Zagreb, and was itself a temporary home to many refugees.89 The 
Zagreb Committee published appeals for funds in newspapers such as Obzor, and editorial 
offices themselves collected contributions that were subsequently forwarded to the Zagreb 
Committee. The wide catchment basin extended also to recipients of aid, and money from 
Zagreb flowed to refugees along the entire length of the border with Bosnia and Hercegovina.  
Refugees also came to Zagreb to appeal directly for help. By 1877 local support for 
refugees was waning along the border as hunger, disease and “donor fatigue” set in. An Obzor 
correspondent from Sisak described the misery along the border as the worst yet, saying that 
despite earlier generosity from both Croats and Serbs, there were no longer any “true friends” of 
the refugees. Requests for help would be answered with “Go to Guteša in Zagreb, he’s your god 
and savior!”90 The refugees did just that. Encouraged by a misprint in the daily newspaper 
Primorac, which claimed one of Guteša’s contacts had received 412,775 forints in donations—
instead of the actual 4127.75 forints, “old men and women who could barely drag themselves 
there, women with half-starving, naked infants suckling at their empty breasts, children, 
unclothed and naked,” came to Zagreb in groups of 50 to 100, their bodies “shaking from frost 
and disease, starvation staring from their vacant eyes.” 91 On arrival, they joined a growing 
encampment in the old city, in sight of the Sabor and across from Guteša’s store at Number 79, 
St Mark’s Square, where, it was claimed, they received some bread, cloth, a small amount of 
money, and surely most importantly, a glass of strong Balkan fruit brandy—rakija.92 
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The collapse of popular domestic support for refugee aid by 1877 was not unique to Sisak. 
Newspapers continued to print lists of donors throughout the course of the uprising, but 
donations from domestic sources gradually decreased.93 As they did, the relative importance of 
foreign financial and material aid increased. 
In the fall of 1875, a British woman by the name of Adeline Paulina Irby presented herself 
to Guteša with a letter of introduction from the prominent Serbian politician and diplomat, Filip 
Hristić. Irby would likely have been known to Guteša even before they met: she had established 
and run a school for Christian girls in Sarajevo in the 1860s, and when the uprising started, she 
and many of her students evacuated to Croatia. Irby and her partner, Priscilla Johnston, returned 
to England via Croatia and sent five of their pupils, all orphans, to continue their education in 
Prague.94 The decision was not uncontroversial. Even from their days in Sarajevo, Irby and 
Johnston had been suspected—without foundation—of wanting to convert orphaned Orthodox 
girls to Protestantism, and these accusations continued to resurface throughout the period and 
cast a shadow over some of Guteša’s activities as well.95 
In England, Irby and Johnston established what would become the largest individual 
humanitarian undertaking for the refugees. The “Bosnian & Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphan 
Relief Fund” officially distributed £40,912 3s. 4d. in cash donations, goods, and materials. It had 
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influential backers, including Florence Nightingale and the Archbishop of Canterbury.96 Irby’s 
original intention had been strictly to limit the “aid to children, and chiefly to the education of 
the children, but [Irby and Johnston] found it practically impossible to refuse relief in food and 
clothing to the wretched and starving fathers and mothers.”97 Irby and Johnston were at first 
based in the Slavonian town of Pakrac, and then later resettled in Knin, in the harsher 
environment of Dalmatia’s Dinaric mountains.  Friends collected used clothing and goods in 
Britain, which Irby and Johnston imported and distributed to refugees, along with small amounts 
of food and money. At the start of 1876, Irby and Johnston established their first schools for 
orphaned refugee children in the area around Pakrac. By February they had opened two schools; 
by June 1876 they had added another five schools, with over 300 pupils.98 Ultimately, Irby and 
Johnston established some twenty schools, and hoped that once the violence ended and the 
refugees returned, the teachers and the pupils from their schools would form the vanguard of 
Bosnian education.99  
Strictly speaking, Guteša and Irby were not colleagues, although their worlds overlapped 
and they remained in close contact throughout the course of the uprising. They were “always 
exchanging their ideas about the fastest and most effective means to help the poor Bosnians who 
crossed over” to Habsburg soil.100 At times this exchange took a concrete and consequential 
form, for example when Guteša helped to obtain materials for the first school in Pakrac. When 
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Irby and Johnston first arrived in Croatia, It was Guteša who toured the border with them, and it 
was Guteša, already well known among the refugees, who helped to dispel the suspicion among 
many refugees that Irby and Johnston would spirit away the orphans as part of their Protestant 
missionary work.101  
By 1877, Guteša had become the contact man for foreign do-gooders, and was himself 
actively recruiting help from abroad. He was in contact with Edward A. Freeman, the British 
historian, and traveled heavily in the border zone with Adolf Vischer-Sarasin, a humanitarian 
activist from Switzerland.102 Guteša also toured the border zone with Lord Campbell, who 
frequently spoke on the Eastern Crisis and who, Guteša hoped, would present a memorandum to 
the parliament upon his return.103  
At the same time, Guteša expanded his call for aid to the foreign public. From the very start 
of the uprising, he had received money and goods from donors across the Habsburg Empire. 
These came mainly from the Slavic lands, where newspapers and committees raised aid in a 
similar manner to those in Croatia itself. Pan-Slavic groups in Russia and Serbia also sent money 
to the insurgency. This worried the Habsburg authorities, and in the early days of the uprising, 
Guteša had to defend himself against accusations he was secretly receiving Russian money. Yet 
by late 1877, Austria-Hungary was more certain of its diplomatic position vis-a-vis Serbia and 
Russia, and Guteša was openly printing appeals in Russian and Serbian newspapers for help for 
the refugees. Encouraged by a donation from Mathilde Frank in Gernsbach-Baden, Guteša 
published “Aufruf an die deutsche Nation!” in March, 1878, and “Les fugitifs de Bosnie et 
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d’Hercegovine. Appel a la nation française” in May. Support for the refugees came from 
surprising places: a Slavic “patriotic society” in San Francisco sent a donation, asking only that it 
receive the lyrics to some “patriotic songs” in return.104 
The humanitarians’ stars shone bright during the crisis of 1875-1878. Irby and Johnston 
became minor celebrities and by 1876 it was no longer even necessary to refer to them by name; 
they were simply the Beneficent English Ladies. Irby was the “angel of the Serbian wretches,” 
and a “mother to the nation.”105 Indeed, her legacy is mapped on to the physiognomy of Sarajevo 
itself: the street on which the original school for girls stood is now called “Mis Irbina.” The 
situation was similar with Guteša, a man who did more for the refugees than “the strength of his 
will and his body” could make possible, and who was immortalized in traditional epic song for 
supporting the Christian peasants, the raya.106 
He sent help to the raya who had fled 
The hungry raya receive it 
And gratefully thank the man. 
And to the greatest Guteša Ilija 
Who had made a mighty effort for them, 
God pay him for his effort! 
To your health, brother! Live long! 
How many children did you feed 
And how many suffering old people in the mountains 
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And how did you fight for suffering Serbian mothers? 
For the nation you were a glorious visage,  
And your spirit reigns over the raya! 
Now your song has been composed, 
And you will be celebrated until judgment day. 107 
 
 
The Humanitarianism of Violence 
Good deeds were only one side of the humanitarian equation along the Habsburg-Ottoman 
border. As much as Guteša pled for material and cash support for the refugees in the local and 
foreign press, and as much clothing and cash Irby and Johnston received from their supporters in 
Britain, the entire humanitarian project was fundamentally inseparable from the aims and 
activities of the insurgents and the nationalization of the uprising. Foreign support for the 
insurgency and for refugee aid was often indistinguishable, came from many of the same 
organizations out of near-identical emotional or political motivations, and was distributed along 
the border by many of the same people. The internationalization of aid strengthened existing 
local ties to the outside world and helped to create new ones. Pan-Slavism and Serbian 
nationalism—or the fear of them—lent an additional weight to the importance of these ties in the 
eyes of all participants. This included Habsburg authorities, who became even more concerned 
when Serbia and the Ottoman Empire went to war in July 1876. The Habsburg authorities were, 
with good reason, deeply suspicious of the “humanitarians.” And yet to a great extent the health 
and well-being of the refugees—and by extension the local population—on Habsburg soil 
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depended on foreign aid. More than once, officials in Zagreb found it necessary to publish in the 
local newspapers public thank-yous of the following sort: “The General Command finds itself 
obliged [...] to express its warmest thanks to the noble-hearted ladies for this humanitarian action 
on behalf of the suffering refugees.” 108 
Irby herself had alluded to the problem early on: distinguishing rebel from refugee was 
nearly impossible, and often no distinction could be made. Her claim that “every Bosnian child’s 
father, brother, or uncle is an insurgent” was hyperbolic.109 Refugee statistics kept by Habsburg 
officials point to roughly equal numbers of male and female refugees, and whatever the 
deficiencies of Habsburg border control, clearly not all of the men were going back and forth 
across the border to fight in the insurgency. Yet from the very start, she also projected an image 
of herself as what one might call a “pure humanitarian,” insisting that “one of our hardest tasks 
was the absolute necessity we were under to refuse helping [the insurgents] in any way to buy 
arms and ammunition; to have done so would have been to compromise our whole special 
work.” She admitted, however, to caring for —at the request of some of her subscribers—a “few 
sick wounded men.”110  
Habsburg concern over the possible dual purpose of Irby and Johnston’s aid mission along 
the border lasted throughout the period of the uprising. The distrust was deep-seated and mutual. 
Irby was not an unknown quantity when she arrived in Croatia. In the 1860s she had traveled 
extensively in Slavic lands of the Habsburg Empire with Georgina Muir MacKenzie. During this 
journey, encounters with Slovak national activists as well as Czech intellectuals such as 
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František Palacký had earned them police surveillance and, in the town of Smokovec in the 
Slovakian Tatras, a brief arrest.111 The experience imprinted on both women strong Slavic 
sympathies that remained with them throughout.112 In Sarajevo, Irby’s educational activity 
centered on Orthodox Christian pupils, which further buttressed her reputation as a Slavophile, 
while also giving it a specifically Serbian tinge.  
Irby’s sympathies for the Orthodox population of Bosnia and Hercegovina transferred 
directly to her aid for the largely Orthodox refugees. The work sometimes put her in direct 
conflict with authorities in Civil Croatia, which since the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 
had belonged to the strongly anti-Slavic Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire. It was on the 
territory of Civil Croatia that her extensive school-building project aroused fears of Serbian 
nationalism, and her material and financial aid to the refugees raised suspicion that she was 
helping the insurgency. In both cases, Irby’s associates did little to inspire the confidence and 
trust of the authorities, who put a number of obstacles in her way.  
Irby, who later spoke favorably of Robert College, a missionary school in Istanbul, and its 
role in the “preparation for Bulgarian freedom” clearly understood the revolutionary potential of 
education.113 When she started her schools for refugee orphans in Croatia, she threw herself into 
the center of the Croatian national debate, where education had become, according to the 
historian Mirjana Gross, the main reason for the collapse of the political accommodation 
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between the Croatian and Serbian elite.114 Although there is no evidence that she saw the schools 
as tools for direct anti-Habsburg activity, she wanted to provide her pupils with a Serbian 
education. Textbooks were for the most part in Cyrillic, and “the only ‘reading books,’ so called 
[that the pupils] use are the New Testament and the Serb ‘National Songs.’”115 For Irby and 
Johnston, the schools were a cornerstone of a civilizing mission that would entrench and buttress 
Bosnian Serb culture, by returning to Bosnia a cohort of well-trained schoolmasters.  
Concerns over the activities of the schools became acute after the start of the Serbian-
Ottoman war. The problems were heightened because of the man Irby and Johnston had chosen 
to run their schools. Demeter Josić was the headmaster of the preparatory school for Orthodox 
Serb teachers in Pakrac, which Irby and Johnston had established with the support of a wealthy 
Serb merchant.116 Because of his experience and his connection with the community, Josić was a 
good choice. But on 25 July 1876, Josić and an assistant teacher were arrested on suspicion of 
treason.117 The charges were ultimately dropped, but the connection between Irby’s schools and 
men who were very likely involved in pro-Serb activism was established. Authorities quickly put 
Irby’s schools under the supervision of a Catholic priest. Irby found the situation so restrictive 
that in 1877 she chose to shut down all of the schools in Civil Croatia.118  
Josić was not the only suspicious character with whom Irby and Johnston associated. In 
1877, Irby reported that although they had “obtained the aid of native Austrian residents of well-
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known and unimpeachable honesty,” she had never given financial support to committees that 
supported the insurgency.119 They did, however, work closely with people who were active in the 
insurgency. One of their most trusted employees for aid distribution along the border zone was 
Peter Uzelac, who throughout 1875 had been an insurgent leader. Uzelac was among the better-
educated of the insurgents. He stood out for his moderation, and by 1878 was supporting the 
Habsburg occupation of Bosnia.120 Nevertheless, during a February, 1877 tour of Dalmatia in 
which he distributed aid for Irby and Johnston, The Military Border General Command in 
Zagreb ordered district offices to keep their eye on this “middle-man for the English ladies Irby 
and Johnston’s […] plan to distribute food and clothing to the Bosnian refugees…” Local 
officials were not to put any unjustified arbitrary obstacles in Uzelac’s way, but were to “observe 
him and warn him away from any unpermitted agitation [among the refugees].”121 
Habsburg authorities continued to have difficulty distinguishing refugee aid from support 
to the insurgency. One reason for this was refugees and rebels themselves were often 
indistinguishable—Irby’s claim that “every Bosnian child’s father, brother, or uncle is an 
insurgent” was exaggerated, but illustrative.122 Refugee identity was bound up with suffering as 
much as it was with armed insurgency, and the nomenclature reflected the lack of clarity not in 
the nature of activity per se, but in the nature of identity. Indeed, the categories themselves were 
unstable and constantly shifted: depending on any number of factors, people could claim refugee 
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status at one point, join the insurgency at another, abandon the insurgency at a later date to rejoin 
refugee populations, or seek to straddle both identities. The Zagreb committee’s early documents 
consistently referred to those who crossed to Habsburg territory as “Hajduks.” It was a freighted 
term that implied the refugees’ relationship to violence, yet its usage presented no obstacle to the 
operation of the committee, which had to limit its activities to supporting refugees, not the 
insurgency.  
The official target of the Zagreb committee, the so-called suffering Hercegovinians, was 
innocuous enough, but in Dalmatia it was understood that the central committee in Zadar was 
supporting not just Hercegovinians who had crossed over to Dalmatia, but also the uprising 
itself. The daily newspaper Narodni List was a key node of activity for the Zadar committee, 
responsible for publicizing committee activities locally and abroad, co-ordinating the arrival of 
international volunteers, and collecting the “charity that fell like hail from all corners of 
Dalmatia” and abroad. The Committee, Biankini wrote, was “like a ministry” that divided up 
activities into various spheres of responsibility.123 
Habsburg policy assumed a binary—insurgent or refugee—inconsistent with reality. The 
prohibition of aid to the former and approval of help for the latter seemed reasonable at either 
end of the spectrum, but the definitional area in between was not only a functional and 
conceptual link between the two extremes, it also created opportunities within the system. The 
Dalmatian committees illustrated this well. Narodni List’s appeal for the establishment of aid 
committees to help “our suffering brothers from Hercegovina” was intended to help refugees, but 
even more so to help the insurgency. Habsburg policy towards the insurgency as well as the 
ability to enforce associational laws meant Narodni List cautiously elided differences and in an 
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apparent effort to whitewash the committees’ activities, pointed out that “the authorities will not 
be able to ban this philanthropic activity.”124 The historian Julije Grabovac argues the subsequent 
establishment of a committee to help the uprising by a number of locals not known for 
“patriotic” political activity was likely a ploy to “cast off any risk of suspicion” by Habsburg 
authorities about the “actual aims” of the committee.125  
It makes sense, however to take the claims of humanitarianism and philanthropy seriously. 
Of course, they served as a necessary legal cover that fooled nobody. But in the context of an 
anti-Ottoman uprising of “brother Hercegovinians,” humanitarianism and paramilitary support 
were not mutually exclusive, and the former cannot simply be dismissed as what Grabovac 
described as “only a screen for the real activities of the aid committees.”126 The Dubrovnik 
committee was mostly involved in supporting the insurgency with money, clothes and war 
supplies, while the “Ladies’ Committee” took responsibility for helping the refugees.127 The 
division of labor was not entirely clear, however, and Ladies’ Committees not only depended on 
the committees to help the insurgency, but often provided aid to the uprising directly.128 
Humanitarianism and paramilitary support were complementary, and the humanitarian sensibility 
extended to, and even included, anti-Ottoman violence.  
Guteša was also an active supporter of the insurgency. His support was central to the 
establishment and supplying of an insurgent band on Croatian soil, he organized and was one of 
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the few literate members of a short-lived Bosnian provisional government, received money from 
Russia and at the behest of the Belgrade committee bought arms for insurgents in Slavonia. The 
centrality of his character in both the insurgency and humanitarianism points to the structural 
intersection between the two activities. Across Croatia, aid to both refugees and insurgents relied 
on the same supply lines. This can be seen in Irby and Johnston’s reliance on Uzelac for the 
distribution of aid. It can also be seen in Guteša’s connections with committees across Croatia. 
He worked closely with the committee to support the insurgency in the Croatian town of Nova 
Gradiška (across the Sava river from Bosanska Gradiška). The Nova Gradiška committee was 
the most important support committee for the insurgency in northern Bosnia, and was led by 
Vaso Vidović, who had been one of the refugees from 1873.129 The committee received money, 
food and weapons from Guteša; also on the committee’s well-kept ledgers were shipments of 
clothing and food for refugees—sent by Irby and Johnston.130 
 
Defining Necessity 
Humanitarian sentiment was conceptually and geographically broad throughout the period. In 
early 1877, Irby and Johnston were still making emotional appeals to the British public for 
support, and newspapers in Croatia and abroad were tugging at readers’ emotions with vivid 
descriptions of suffering complimented by impassioned requests for aid. Guteša was still 
publishing an occasional appeal to the public in the Zagreb papers, and had begun the campaign 
for foreign aid discussed above. In April, he wrote a “memorandum to the parliament and nation 
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of England” in the name of the Bosnian refugees, which he most likely hoped his friend Lord 
Campbell would introduce.131  
In some respects, the appeal harks back to 1873: Guteša’s refugees were asking firstly for 
the “English nation’s” help in the establishment of an effective and beneficent administration in 
Bosnia and Hercegovina that could end the “Turkish barbarities” and introduce the rule of law. 
Secondly, they were asking for financial support upon their return home so they might at least 
avoid starvation while re-establishing their farms and rebuilding their houses.  
Yet the tenor and tactics of the request also show sharp differences from 1873. Certainly 
Guteša’s refugees were appealing—though not explicitly—for an international intervention that 
went beyond the restoration of fairness of Ottoman rule. But the appeal from 1877 is at a level of 
abstraction that would not have served the specific, legalized framework of the demands from 
1873. Where the earlier document outlined specific events and the actors involved, individuals 
and specific events are all but absent from the 1877 plea. Instead, the broad forces of “animal 
barbarianism” are at work on an entire people. To be sure, there are detailed descriptions in 
which, for example, “innocent children are roasted, and their parents are forced to eat from their 
meat.” But these grisly details lack any context other than the “inhumanity” of the “Turk.” 
Guteša’s refugees were bound in that classic humanitarian cause, “slavery.” 132 With the situation 
framed in these terms, there was no hope the Sultan was capable of anything in the 1873 “spirit 
of humanity and civilization.”133 
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The memorandum also abstracted the intended audience and the self-image of the refugees. 
This was no longer a petition that assumed a vertical dependence, but an appeal that implied a 
horizontal equality. The refugees were targeting not the heads of state of the guaranteeing 
powers of the Treaty of Paris, but the human sympathies of the “English Nation.” In doing so, 
they claimed a national identity for the people of Bosnia and Hercegovina—as “the only nation 
on God’s earth whose slavery and suffering was so long and terrible.” From the outset the 
refugees lay claim to the nation—that most modern embodiment of humanity and, following the 
model of Germany and Italy, progress.  
Purged of specificity, the appeal became universal. Space still remained for the individual, 
however, and the plea mentioned two by name. Irby and Johnston were the corporal realization 
of the English Nation and those who supported them in their “Christian and philanthropic tasks.” 
Irby and Johnston were testimony to the “humanity and Christian love” of the sons and daughters 
of the English nation, and it is through this that the two humanitarians were the agents of 
fundamental change, not just for Christians, but for European modernity—the Christian Nation.  
Guteša’s memorandum argued for humanitarianism as a force for change in international 
politics, and it used a sentimental public appeal to try to effect concrete changes to Britain’s 
eastern policy. The claims of humanity were of course malleable, and along the border, insurgent 
leaders were demanding Austria-Hungary return the weapons they took from refugees so the 
refugees might return home. These valences were in fact dependent on each other, both to give 
meaning to humanitarianism itself, and also to add a humanitarian narrative layer to the violence.  





and the Failure of the Spring Repatriation Effort, 1876 
 
 
Ragusa, March 15, 1876. AFFAIRS are worse than ever. Austria apparently is 
making efforts for pacification, but without visible success. Russian Agents more 
and more active in preventing submission, but [Russian] Consul Jonin himself 
less openly. Return of refugees almost impossible, from want of money and 
provisions. No money at Mostar. Insurrection as vigorous as ever. Turks defeated 
again near Piva. Army terribly reduced by famine and sickness. Soldiers forced 




The early months of 1876 marked a turning point for Habsburg-Ottoman relations and the 
question of refugees. Since the start of the uprising in the summer of 1875, Austria-
Hungary had taken two largely discreet approaches to the refugees, and to the uprising 
more broadly. The first of these approaches was the management of refugee movement 
and the distribution of aid. The presence of refugees on Habsburg soil also strained 
domestic politics and was another area that revealed conflicting agendas within the 
Empire, both between the center and periphery, but also between the Austrian and the 
Hungarian sides of the dual monarchy. The centralization of aid and management policies 
was necessary given the size of the problem and the large sums of money involved. 
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Refugee policy and support came from the joint Austrian and Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry, and execution of policy most immediately involved the Ministry of War—
another joint institution. Beyond the joint imperial structures, other official efforts to 
support the refugees did not get far, as shown by the Croatian diet’s failed attempt to 
budget for refugee aid (see Chapter Two). The centralization also depoliticized the 
refugee question as much as possible domestically by identifying refugees as a largely 
bureaucratic and logistical problem. The nature of this bureaucratic response emerged 
from the encounter between the long institutional history of managing and responding to 
Ottoman subjects fleeing to Habsburg territory on the one hand, and the new international 
context on the other (see Chapter One). 
The second approach was diplomacy. The refugees had, after all, turned an Ottoman 
domestic affair into an international question. The subjects of neighboring states and 
polities such as the Habsburg Empire, Montenegro, and Serbia became directly involved 
not just in refugee affairs, but also participated in the organized violence of the 
insurgency against the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Muslim elite, and against the Ottoman 
state itself. Pan-Slavists, revolutionaries and activists from farther afield became 
involved, too. All this served to internationalize the uprising further and to blur the lines 
between innocent victims of violence who had fled the insurgent provinces, and active 
members of the insurgency who were temporarily exploiting the relative safety to be 
found in neighboring states.  
The internationalization of the uprising was from the very start correctly seen by the 
insurgents as something that could only help the lot of Bosnia and Hercegovina’s 
Christian population. Internationalization of the uprising enabled the official involvement 
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of the other Great Powers in Ottoman affairs, and by opening up questions agreed to in 
the Treaty of Paris, it threatened to destabilize the international system—and therefore de 
facto required Great Power involvement. Refugees, insurgents, and the strained integrity 
of the Habsburg-Ottoman border directly endangered European peace. 
This chapter focuses on a brief period in the late winter of 1875 and the spring and 
early summer of 1876 when the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires began a bi-lateral 
process that merged and sought to solve simultaneously two concerns. The first of these 
concerns was the expanding diplomatic crisis resulting from the failure to end the 
insurgency and to stanch the flow of refugees across the Ottoman border. Equally 
troublesome for the two neighbors was the threat of domestic instability caused by a 
mounting refugee problem on the Habsburg side of the border, coupled with the crisis of 
legitimacy that a long-term absence of the Christian population would cause on the 
Ottoman side of the border. The chapter argues that as it was envisioned in Vienna and 
Istanbul, the official pacification and repatriation process designed to solve these 
problems was undermined by European diplomacy, especially that of Austria-Hungary 
itself, and was inefficient from the start. The corruption and weakness of Ottoman 
government institutions in the insurgent provinces, the government’s concomitant 
inability to make good on any of its reform promises led to consistently worsening terms 
of repatriation at the local level. The troubles were exacerbated by the Ottoman 
government’s bankruptcy, which among other things left Ottoman soldiers selling their 
weapons and scavenging for clothes and food, and left Ottoman repatriation officials 
unable to fulfill any of the material promises to returning refugees. On the Habsburg side 
of the border, the repatriation project was crippled by an increasingly Slavic public 
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mobilization in support of the uprising, enabled by the inability or unwillingness of 
public officials to enforce domestic restrictions. Border officials failed to establish and 
enforce the strict border controls envisioned in Vienna, which would have partially de-
internationalized the crisis and also ensured Austro-Hungarian neutrality with regard to 
the uprising. All of this fed into a process where the failure of the repatriation project led 
to Austria-Hungary turning away from the effort altogether, and by the second half of 
1876 entering into negotiations with Russia over how to end Ottoman sovereignty over 
Bosnia and Hercegovina without causing the outbreak of a general European war.  
This is not a novel argument. What this chapter will do, however, is to use a case 
study of these months to re-position the refugee question at the very center of the 
diplomatic and domestic concerns of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. The first half 
of 1876 turned mass refugee movements, perhaps for the first time, into a question of 
international policy. In January 1876, in the midst of a winter of strained budgets and 
high refugee mortality, Andrássy said that his main concern was not Ottoman reform per 
se, but refugee return.2 Even if the reforms lasted only temporarily, a permanent return 
would be sufficient proof of Ottoman integrity; if the refugees returned again it would 
warrant direct Habsburg intervention in the form of an occupation. Andrássy functionally 
and conceptually merged refugee return with the success of Ottoman reforms; 
repatriation became a proxy for, and the primary indicator of, the success of pacification 
and the re-establishment of Ottoman control over the provinces. Successful and 
permanent return and resettlement—not durable and effective institutional and legal 
reforms—defined successful pacification and reforms.  
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This case study points to a number of consequences of the repatriation effort, 
including that for the first time, a generalized definition of a modern, mass-movement 
refugee emerged, if only tentatively. While surely tacitly understood at the time, it was 
the detailed fourteen article repatriation instructions the Sublime Porte sent to its border 
officials and repatriation commissioners that explicitly parsed the Ottoman subjects who 
had fled to neighboring states into different groups. In doing so the instructions created 
an exclusive typology of “the refugee” as a victim of violence.  
Of more immediate and basic consequence to the refugees was that the formal 
repatriation effort intensified the violence of the insurgents against refugees who were 
preparing to return or already had returned; it also intensified insurgent violence against 
Orthodox Christian peasants who had remained in their villages, in and effort to force 
their exile. It is difficult to reckon the extent to which peasants fled in the face of Muslim 
or Christian violence against them. And while the uprising started with Christian 
violence, it is also difficult to determine the extent to which attacks on the peasantry were 
primary violence, or retaliatory. Yet what does become clear is the real and persistent 
threat of violence by Christian insurgents against Christian villagers and peasants. This 
alone is not surprising, but the fact of this violence smudges the clean lines of a 
nationalist narrative with additional, and more particularistic categories of identity. That 
the peasantry should fall victim to both Muslim and Christian attacks and efforts to 
prevent their return only underlines the extent to which this linkage between repatriation 
and reform success held true for all the parties involved. With this in mind, the hallmark 
of the repatriation process was not the process itself, nor was it the failure of the process. 
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Instead, it was the intensified tactical instrumentalization of the refugee to achieve 
strategic goals. 
 
The Berlin Memorandum implicitly framed the refugee question in terms of the integrity 
of the Treaty of Paris, and explicitly moved refugees to the center of multilateral 
international politics. Yet solving the problem of refugees had been the subject of intense 
Ottoman-Habsburg diplomatic relations almost from the very start of the crisis. In fact, 
by the time the contents of the Berlin Memorandum were made public, a bilateral 
agreement on a formal joint Ottoman-Habsburg effort to repatriate the refugees and 
resettle them in their homes was months old. As this chapter demonstrates, the refugee 
question was an area in which both the Habsburg and the Ottoman side were able to 
negotiate policies, in part because their interests were mutual. It was also an area where 
the Ottomans had significant although often ham-fisted influence over policy-making. 
Both sides saw refugee repatriation as the key marker of the end of the insurgency, and 
the fundamental proof of the efficacy of Ottoman reforms. At the same time, they both 
suffered—albeit to a different extent—from an inability to coerce refugees or insurgents, 
and even an inability to control the actions of their own representatives on the ground.  
It was the Ottomans themselves who first linked pacification and repatriation into a 
single policy goal. Facing the insult of the consular mission, the Ottoman government 
unilaterally initiated a program of pacification and repatriation in a last-ditch attempt to 
prevent the foreign powers from sending their consuls on a formal inspection tour of the 
insurgency. The failure of this attempt to negotiate the insurgents into submission and 
repatriate the refugees, not to mention the near certainty of the consular investigation, 
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made expedient a stronger militarized effort at pacification. For Ottoman officials, 
repatriation was an essential policy goal. It reflected their conviction that refugee flows to 
neighboring territories would not only further internationalize a domestic conflict, but 
also were a palpable indication not just of Ottoman rule in the provinces, but the way 
Ottoman rule was seen abroad. 
Pacification and refugee return as a unified goal quickly became orthodoxy, and the 
twin projects of re-establishing peace and returning the refugees to their homes came to 
be seen as interdependent. A successful end to the violence in Bosnia and Hercegovina 
was a necessary condition for the return of refugees, and a successful return of the 
refugees would serve as proof that the violence in the provinces had, in fact, been brought 
to an end. Disregarding the emphasis the Andrássy Note placed on Ottoman reform, 
Andrássy told the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna, Arifi Paşa, that care should be taken 
“above all for the repatriation of the refugees,” and that the question of reforms could be 
postponed until afterwards.3 The Austrian historian Horst Haselsteiner has written that it 
was with the failure to repatriate the refugees, “one could say above all [this failure]—
that all of the pacification efforts of Austria-Hungary collapsed.”4 
The bilateral plan was made formal at the end of February with the Ottoman 
publication of the terms of repatriation that had been agreed with the Habsburg Empire. 
This detailed set of instructions was to be distributed to Ottoman provincial officials and 
to special commissioners the central government appointed. It required cross-border 
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cooperation and contained provisions for security, public health and the reconstruction of 
villages. To a great degree these instructions prefigured the broader demands of the 
Berlin Memorandum. As with the Memorandum, the repatriation effort these instructions 
inaugurated was viewed skeptically by statesmen, diplomats and consular officials alike. 
They doubted refugees would find the terms attractive or find the Habsburg threat to end 
the distribution of aid sufficiently compelling to return. The repatriation effort was 
undermined by foreign influences, opposed by insurgents, and in many cases rejected by 
the refugees themselves. It was also a cornerstone of bilateral Ottoman-Habsburg 
diplomatic relations and efforts to re-establish Ottoman authority in the provinces, 
prevent further weakening of the Ottoman Empire, and maintain European peace. 
Although well known in the European capitals, the effort was an intimate and exclusive 
affair between neighbors. 
The effort very concretely linked high diplomacy with domestic conditions and 
local administration, from regional capitals down to the most remote village. The 
infrastructure of Habsburg state administration became the executor of Habsburg foreign 
policy and a major actor in Ottoman domestic affairs. This exposed European diplomacy 
and international stability not just to truculent insurgents and circumspect refugees, but 
also to the capacities and whims of official and unofficial representatives of the state at 
the smallest level of villages to the more powerful biases and executive influence of 
regional officials. There were many valences to the joint Habsburg-Ottoman pacification 
and repatriation effort, but the nucleus was not simply a concern for the well-being of the 
refugees. Instead, it was a concern for the well-being of the international system of 
empire itself.  
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The Preconditions of Return 
At the start of the uprisings, the Ottoman government was ill-prepared for the strain on its 
own central structures and competing interests or on its marginal ability to govern in the 
provinces in the first place. The execution of tanzimat reforms and centralization had 
been particularly difficult in the provinces. Other than during the halcyon days 
immediately following Omar Paşa Latas’ seemingly decisive blow against the power of 
the entrenched and restive Bosnian kapetans, the interests of Muslim land-owners held 
the local Ottoman administration captive. Military deployment in the years prior to the 
uprising was low, and the Porte largely failed to push through serious reforms.  
The lesson of the merchant refugees from 1874 was not just that Istanbul appointed 
corrupt or incompetent governors, but that the office itself was weak. Two decades after 
the provincial capital was moved to Sarajevo from the ineffective isolation of its fortified 
redoubt in Travnik, it was still the local notables who held sway in provincial politics. 
The Porte was unable, or unwilling, to take the steps necessary to reassert central 
government control. Instead of addressing structural problems it reverted to largely 
symbolic changes of administration: Bosnia and Hercegovina had ten different governors 
from 1869-1875, including one who never even made the trip to Sarajevo.5  
The Porte did make one major administrative change prior to the repatriation 
process: in December 1875, it divided Bosnia and Hercegovina into two separate 
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provinces.6 It was not an unprecedented decision. Hercegovina had only recently been 
incorporated into the provincial administration of Bosnia—possibly as a district of 
Bosnia by 1846, although it may have existed independently as late as 1865.7 The 
consular corps in Bosnia voiced its opinion on the change largely in its silence. Ibrahim 
Tepić makes no note of any Russian response and there is scant indication of a serious 
Habsburg response.8 The British ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Elliot, entertained “much 
doubt of the expediency of this division,” although he saw that “arguments of weight may 
be urged in its favour. In the Vilayet of the Herzegovina the Christians will be in so large 
a majority that in Provincial Councils, if at all fairly elected, they should have a 
preponderating voice, whilst in Bosnia it is Mussulmans who will be strengthened by the 
separation.”9  
Gerrymandering was in fact the Porte’s intention. It worried more about the 
Hercegovinian uprising than the Bosnian; Hercegovina had a long restive past, and the 
government in Istanbul hoped that a pacification in the southern province would quickly 
end the uprising to the north. The administrative division created a new set of 
opportunities. Server Paşa, about whom the British consul in Mostar wrote that “no man 
has done so much to deprive the Christians of all confidence in reform  [... ]” was recalled 
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to Istanbul.10 Mehmed Rauf Paşa, who had served as governor and military commander 
of the unified provinces for about two months, was replaced in Sarajevo by İbrahim Bey, 
and appointed interim governor of Hercegovina; İbrahim was then replaced on 24 
January 1876 by Ali Paşa, who had been serving as ambassador in France.11 The districts 
of Gacko, Bilece and Trebinje, where the uprising had been centered, were 
administratively separated from Mostar and placed under the authority of Konstan 
Efendi, a Christian.12  
All of these changes, however, were overshadowed by a military appointment: 
Muşir Ahmed Muhtar Paşa, who had earned his reputation and title in Yemen, was to 
replace Rauf as military commander of the two provinces. The appointment marked a 
change in the military’s tactics against the insurgency. Rauf had simultaneously pursued 
a military and a negotiated settlement; in late December 1875 he sent Konstan to Istanbul 
in the hopes of convincing the Porte to negotiate with Montenegro for its support to end 
the uprising. At the same time, Rauf had hoped to build his forces at Banjani (in present-
day Montenegro) for the winter, where “he could have succoured the indigent and 
rendered the task of those who remained in arms much more difficult, as they would 
have been deprived of the shelter they now obtain there.”13 The arrival of Muhtar Paşa 
heralded a new course for the Porte, however. Authorities in Sarajevo were seemingly 
incapable of reining in the influence of powerful landowners over local officials or 
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curbing their abuses of power (and the local population’s violence towards 
Christians), and the gendermerie and the military had so far failed to suppress the 
uprising or limit insurgent violence towards Muslims, Christians, and their property. 
By appointing Muhtar Paşa, the Porte was invoking the succesful tactics of Omer 
Paşa Latas. The appointment meant “no more and no less than the Sublime Porte was 
determined to defeat the uprising [exclusively] with military force [...]”14  
By the start of the return and resettlement process, there was little evidence of a 
reversal of military fortune under Muhtar Paşa’s leadership. Large-scale insurgent 
violence had in fact subsided, although attacks on Ottoman military and civil targets in 
Hercegovina continued. In the Bosnian borderlands even though low-level violence and 
incursions persisted, the region was relatively peaceful up through March. For the most 
part however, these moments of relative calm were the result of winter cold.15 Moreover, 
a set of reports submitted to Anton Mollinary, the commander of the military border, 
illustrate the extent to which this low-level violence and the failure of reforms, not 
clashes between the Ottoman military and organized bands of insurgents, were the major 
obstacles to refugee return. 
In late February, as the empires were preparing for the official repatriation, 
Mollinary had sent Alfred Boić, the First Lieutenant Commissioner for Turkish Refugees, 
to tour the border zone and report back on the conditions for return.16 Boić spent most of 
the month of March traveling and reporting, and while his reports offer snapshots of 
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current conditions, many of his observations reflected long-standing issues. For the most 
part, his reports concerned the Habsburg side, but he closely followed the situation across 
the border in Bosnia. On several occasions he crossed over to the Ottoman province, 
where he met with Habsburg and local Ottoman officials. In Bosnian Kostajnica he 
watched eight militia divisions conduct exercises, and judged them to be in good shape, 
reasonably well disciplined and similarly clothed but differently shoed. These last points, 
it seems, were intended as military intelligence: the existence of a uniform was a key 
marker of the regular (and hence internationally protected) soldier. Despite the clothing, 
Boić reported that the Redifs, compared to “our troops, are francstireur, but not 
military.”17  
The Boić reports neatly illustrate many of the problems that the repatriation 
program would have to overcome for it to succeed. At the most basic level, even if there 
was little in the way of organized insurgent activity, violence on the Ottoman side of the 
border continued to drive refugees across to Habsburg territory. Habsburg district heads 
in Petrinja reported that refugees crossed the “dry border” daily and were pursued right 
up to the border.18 The situation in Croatian Kostajnica was similar. There is no doubt 
that the situation on the Ottoman side of the border was in many places grim, and in 
Petrinja local officials with whom Boić met unanimously assured him the refugees would 
rather die of starvation on Habsburg soil than return.19 The refugees correctly blamed the 
begs for many of the ills in the insurgent provinces; they also saw the begs as the 
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instigators of Muslim violence against them. At the same time, however, they trusted the 
local Ottoman officials as little as they did the begs. As had been the case with the 
renegade kapetans a half century before, centrally-appointed Ottoman officials were 
largely incapable of controlling the activities of the begs. For many officials it wasn’t 
even a question of controlling the begs. Boić reported the reason that as late as March the 
Ottoman reform ferman still hadn’t been published in northwest Bosnia was that local 
Ottoman officials were afraid to do so.20  
As the contents of the reform ferman became known in the northwestern heartland 
of the Bosnian uprising, violence by the local Muslim population increased. Ekmečić has 
interpreted the violence in terms of class struggle that ultimately broke down along 
religious lines. He has argued the anti-reform violence broke out only with the formal 
announcement of the reforms in provincial centers such as Bihač and Banja Luka, and 
that even the rising of the lower classes of Muslims were led by sipahis and begs.21 In 
Bihač, violence erupted during the announcement of the reforms, despite the earlier 
deployment of regular army soldiers.22 Indeed, the anti-reform protest was marked by 
opposition to the central reform elements of the ferman, in particular the core idea of 
“equality” among the religions, as well as any intrusion by the state into the question of 
agricultural relations between landowner and tenant farmer.23  
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Class struggle certainly explained some of the violent response to the 
announcement of the reforms, and it keeps in context the big picture of the fundamentally 
conservative goals of Bosnia’s Muslim landowners. But it also underemphasizes the 
legacy of and ongoing tense relations between the center and the periphery. As much as 
the begs supposedly wanted to “restore the feudal system that existed formerly in these 
provinces,” the larger point was that it was the central government that prevented them 
from doing so—that local administrators indirectly caused “the present insurrection by 
maladministration, and by stirring up the mutual hatred and jealousy of Christians and 
and Turks.”24 And while Boić was not able to confirm the rumors, Bosnian Christians 
from several different towns claimed that the begs from the area around Kostajnica sent a 
telegram to the Sultan, swearing their fealty but protesting the reforms, and promising 
that were the Sultan to repeal the reforms, they would “hold on to Bosnia for him.”25 
Throughout the winter the violence in Kostajnica had been constant, but at a low 
level. On 25 January 1876, the magistrate and the Deputy sub-governor of Kostajnica 
reported to officials in Bihač that twenty insurgents had crossed over the border from the 
Habsburg side and stolen nine head of draft animals from “loyal Christians” in the village 
of Demirovac, where they burned eighteen carts of hay and one house as well as its 
barn.26 On 8 February, the county governor in Bihač forwarded to the governor in 
Sarajevo another report from Kostajnica. After the insurgents had destroyed the 
watchtower in Johova the previous autumn, the Ottoman border guards began 
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construction on a fortified shelter in the town of Dubica. They abandoned construction 
with the onset of winter, intending to return in the spring. But on 28 January 1876 
insurgents crossed over from the Habsburg side, burned down the fortifications, tore 
down the chimney, and then destroyed a nearby bridge. Days later, insurgents crossed 
over again and stole seven head of oxen from villagers in Gornje Grad; on their way 
back, the insurgents burned several stacks of hay that had been collected for the desetina 
(tithe). The villagers of Gornje Grad demanded that an official letter on the matter be sent 
to Habsburg authorities.27  
Yet the geographic distribution of the violence was uneven. Even as the Christian 
peasants were being attacked in the county of Bihač, elsewhere along the border refugees 
were returning voluntarily—or were being attacked by insurgents to prevent them from 
doing so.28 Events in Bihač also demonstrated how contingent on local circumstances the 
violence actually was. Boić’s reports also include protocols of interviews he conducted 
with several refugees, including an interview with Mile Zec, a refugee from the villlage 
of Rujiška, in the Kostajnica district of Bihač. Zec had fled with his family to Habsburg 
territory during the night of 2 March 1876.29 The fifty other residents of Rujiška had fled 
the previous autumn. Only Zec and his family stayed on. In his statement to Boić, Zec 
said, “my Sipahi Mustajbeg emboldened me and asked that I stay.”30 Exactly why Zec 
was willing to remain when the others fled is unclear, although one reason may have been 
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his apparent passivity: “I remained peaceful and did my work as a farmer.”31 By the 
spring, Zec’s situation was no longer tenable. Tensions had mounted throughout the 
winter, and then, on 28 February, while Zec and his brother were plowing his field, a 
“band of Turks” appeared and started shooting at them.32 The two farmers fled and hid in 
the bushes, and when they returned home their families told them that the bands had 
stolen almost everything. The final push towards flight came from Zec’s Muslim 
landowner, a member of the very class said to be provoking the excesses: “My beg 
Alibeg told me himself to flee after I complained to him that the Turks had shot at me, 
saying ‘it is not be possible for me to help you because it would mean I might be 
killed’”33 Even Zec’s Muslim protectors now needed protection. 
The Boić reports also offer a nuanced picture of the state of affairs on the Habsburg 
side of the border in the period prior to the repatriation effort. Most broadly, the 
Habsburg Empire faced a limited ability to control its borders—insurgents used its 
territory to stage attacks, and aid groups of the sort discussed in Chapter Two actively 
helped the rebels. The Habsburg’s porous southern border attracted the full range of what 
the historian Dragutin Pavličević has described as “revolutionaries, soldiers, adventurists, 
desperadoes, vagabonds, agents, spies and thieves of all nationalities.”34  
Along the military border, Mollinary was an effective and disciplined officer who 
dealt with both military and civilian administrators along the border. And while his 
officers were for the most part reliable, members of the civil service played a decisive 
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role but were—whether out of pro-uprising sympathies, nationalism, conflicting interests 
or because they were simply schlampig—less trustworthy. In Zemun, the border-town 
across the Sava River from Belgrade, the mayor was considered loyal largely because his 
private businesses had collapsed and he lived solely off his salary as a civic official. 
Nevertheless, the state police “could not offer, for many reasons, their approval of him; 
he is by birth a so-called Serb, has property in the Principality [of Serbia] and cannot 
always mask his sympathy for the Serbian cause.”35 Moreover, the mayor’s good 
intentions could easily be undermined by other local officials. The recently-appointed 
police commissioner also offered “no guarantee that our state interests would be 
appraised in accordance with the circumstances.”36  
The situation in Croatian Kostajnica appeared to be completely different. Boić 
praised the district chief Paić, who was following Mollinary’s instructions to an extent 
well beyond the requirements of his office. Boić thought these efforts were instrumental 
in the retreat of armed insurgents from the “sites of their activities without the application 
of any kind of forceful measures, and also [that] for the future the [integrity] of our 
territory is secured.”37  
Even the efforts of a man such as Paić only went so far. In Kostajnica alone—in 
addition to insurgents and their leaders—Boić reported there were two Russians with 
valid papers. Beyond that, however, were Serbian and Russian agents, who pretend to be 
newspaper correspondents although they were actually the former; “an intelligent Pole, I 
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think his name is Soroczinsky, a former Austrian officer, these people, who are either 
agitators, spies or revolutionaries, will be dealt with according to the high orders [...] and 
placed under surveillence, warned, expelled, and even deported.”38 
Dalmatian authorities exercised much less control over the border-zone than did 
those along the military border. Local administrators and even high-ranking officials 
generally sympathized with the insurgents, to the point that even in Dubrovnik, General 
Jovanovich allowed armed insurgents to “openly move about the neighbourhood of this 
town without any interference on the part of the military.”39 Baron Rodich, the Dalmatian 
governor, set the tone. Although he followed his orders, Rodich was well-known for his 
strong support of the insurgents’ cause. Josef Koetschet a Swiss private physician turned 
dragoman and part-time negotiator for the Hercegovinian governor, told a British consul 
that Rodich’s “manner and demeanour in executing Count Andrássy’s instructions were 
amply sufficient to destroy all the effects of the language which had been put into his 
[Rodich’s] mouth at Vienna.”40 As the repatriation effort failed to get underway towards 
the end of March 1876, Hercegovinia’s new governor, Ali Paşa, became justifiably 
convinced that if Rodich so desired he could end the insurrection by directly confronting 
the chiefs and also effect a successful repatriation.41 
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In the early spring of 1876, neither the Ottoman nor the Habsburg Imperial 
authorities were able to exercise a great deal of control over their borderlands. To be sure, 
the situation on the Ottoman side of the border was more chaotic, with an armed 
insurgency, a weak provincial government in hock to independent and powerful local 
landowners, an ill-equipped and small military deployment under a new general with no 
knowledge of the region, and a persistent outflow of refugees. The situation was far better 
for the Habsburgs even if there were long-term concerns about domestic stability should 
the refugees not return home. Vienna nevertheless had command and control problems: 
local officials were often less than responsive to orders from Vienna, and in some cases 
simply defiant, while the borderland population was often sympathetic to the insurgency; 
smuggling of weapons and supplies to the insurgency was endemic and armed bands 
raided Ottoman territory in direct violation of the expectations of Habsburg neutrality. 
The Habsburg army, too, was woefully under-deployed to guard its long border on rough 
terrain, or to prevent smuggling and the landing of supplies on the craggy Dalmatian 
coast. These were the local circumstances that the clumsy tools of Great Power 
diplomacy and Habsburg-Ottoman negotiations had to overcome. 
 
Preparing the Return 
On 26 January 1876, five days before Zichy presented the Andrássy Note to the Porte, 
Andrássy sent his ambassador an outline proposal for Habsburg-Ottoman co-operation 
over refugee repatriation. Austria sought two guarantees for the refugees. The first of 
these was a general amnesty, which by the 1870s was a now-familiar tool of the Ottoman 
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state to encourage people to end insurrectionary activity and to return home.42 The second 
was a guarantee that the Ottoman authorities protect Christian inhabitants “against all of 
the violence and barbarity that Muslim resentment could drive.” Additionally, Andrássy 
asked the Porte to consider what he called temporary measures: providing the necessary 
materials to rebuild homes and churches, providing peasants with the necessary means to 
restart agriculture, and granting a discount on taxes for one or two years. 43 These ideas 
were not new, and had been circulating at least since Fall 1875. For example, in 
Andrássy’s rejection of Mollinary’s proposal to establish colonies for refugees in Croatia 
(see the discussion in Chapter One), the foreign minister had briefly outlined what he saw 
as the necessary terms of an effective repatriation: “Offhand, I mention the general main 
points that I foresee, for example the introduction of an entirely unmolested return, the 
provision of materials for the reconstruction of the destroyed buildings, the distribution of 
seed for the next planting, and the introduction of tax freedom. These are, roughly, the 
concessions that I plan to win for the refugees.”44 
The 1876 outline Andrássy sent to Zichy actually came as the result of Ottoman 
prodding. The Ottoman government had for some time recognized the urgency of 
repatriation, even asking Austria-Hungary to use its “influence to begin the return of the 
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refugees.”45 Andrássy had shunned active involvement in repatriating refugees so far, out 
of a “feeling of humanity” and the fear that an organized and coercive return would 
deliver the refugees into the hands of “carnage and misery.”46 The terms of the Andrássy 
Note appear to have been a guarantee sufficient to alleviate Andrássy’s concerns and, he 
hoped, those of the refugees. This was part of the point of the Note: Andrássy hoped that 
by positioning the Great Powers as guarantors of Ottoman reform, the Note would 
overcome insurgent and refugee objections that Ottoman government reform promises 
were worthless because the state was too weak to implement reforms.47 
Andrássy asked Zichy to present the repatriation proposal to the Porte after the 
Ottomans accepted the Andrássy Note itself.48 It is unclear exactly what sort of help with 
refugee return the Porte had asked for prior to this proposal, but the context and the terms 
of the proposal are illustrative. Neither the Habsburg nor the Ottoman side clearly 
distinguished between insurgent and refugee. That such a distinction existed is implicit, 
but the granting of a blanket amnesty—for crimes committed rather than the simple act of 
flight—recognized the overlap between the two extremes of victim and victimizer. The 
specific worry over retribution by Muslim subjects underlined this, even though 
Orthodox insurgent violence against refugees posed an increasing danger. The proposal 
points to bilateral discussions between Andrássy and Raşid Paşa, the Ottoman foreign 
minister, which ran parallel to but separate from Andrássy’s great-power negotiations 
over his Note.  
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The Andrássy Note was presented to the Porte accompanied by promises from the 
foreign minister that Austria-Hungary would maintain a strict neutrality with regard to 
the uprising. This included preventing Habsburg subjects from supporting the uprising, 
ending the smuggling of weapons and war materiel across Habsburg territory, and 
cracking down on suspected foreign agitators—such as the Russians Boić had found in  
Kostajnica. Most importantly, neutrality meant maintaining a sort of “turnstile” policy on 
the border: allowing Ottoman subjects to seek refuge by crossing to Habsburg territory, 
but preventing them from returning.  
Vienna issued explicit orders to strengthen border control in late February 1876. 
They were included in the same set of instructions reiterating restrictions on associational 
life and the press that were discussed in Chapter Two.49 Andrássy’s orders did not in fact 
contain special instructions on how to deal with specific categories of people; instead he 
singled out foreigners: “Because the insurgents [include foreign supporters] your 
excellency is to discourage with energetic measures the stay of individuals or the 
gathering together of such foreigners, who certainly have revolutionary tendencies, and to 
banish them from our territory without reservation.”50  
Mollinary interpreted these orders strictly in his instructions to officials in the 
military border. He reiterated the policy towards foreigners—by which was meant, it 
seems, individuals who were neither Habsburg subjects nor from the insurgent Ottoman 
territories—and added further that if there was any doubt about an individual, they were 
                                                
49 Andrássy’s terse orders to Mollinary are dated 21 II 1876; see Haselsteiner, “Andrássys 
Pazifizierungsversuch im Februar/März 1876,” 197-99. The following discussion is based on Mollinary’s 
much-elaborated instructions sent to all high officials in his purview: district leaders, mayors, offices of the 
senior public prosecutor, district attorneys and the Serezaner Corps (Gendermerie) Command. HDA Spisi o 
Bos. Ustanka box 12 #253. 28 II 1876. 
 
50 Ibid., 198. 
 
  180 
to be taken into provisional custody. These were the instructions that district leader Paić 
executed so effectively.51 Mollinary’s other instructions largely conformed with 
international expectations to maintain neutrality in the case of conflict in a neighboring 
state. The ban on the export of weapons to the insurgent provinces continued, and any 
weapons bound for the insurgency were to be confiscated.52 To prevent the assemblage of 
armed bands, regional officials were to disarm individuals who might join together, 
whether or not they were Habsburg subjects. Those individuals arrested while crossing 
over to join the insurrection or having been repelled back onto Habsburg territory, and 
who had committed no punishable crime on either side of the border, were to be sent 
towards the interior and their leaders placed under special observation.53 This procedure, 
called Internierung, or internment, kept any of the arrested individuals within the 
established system of refugee management. It placed insurgents and refugees into the 
same functional category of aid-recipients; similarly, insurgents and refugees had the 
same limitations on movement as existed for refugees by allowing for a temporary 
documentation of the refugees and their legal travel towards designated locations at a 
distance from the border.54   
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From the very start of the uprising, internment was part of the Habsburg response to 
individuals crossing over from the Ottoman side of the border. Officials removed 
refugees from the immediate border zone to a “safe distance,” although the meaning of 
“safe distance” was unclear. International custom held one mile to be sufficient, a 
distance that perhaps made sense with regard to soldiers of a disciplined regular army, 
but was irrelevant in the context of the Habsburg-Ottoman border: the individuals were 
not regular soldiers but peasant subjects who did not stand under the authority of a 
commanding officer and who could easily move back and forth across the border. 
Moreover, many of the refugees never even made it one mile into the interior, instead 
finding space to stay in villages right along the border. 
Mollinary’s instructions on internment made the informality of these expectations 
concrete. They called for the refugees to be interned to at least one mile from the border, 
although under certain and specific circumstances the instructions allowed for local 
discretion: in the case of refugees who had demonstrated good behavior, the 
Bezirksvorsteher or the mayor could grant an exception and allow refugees to remain up 
to a half mile from the border. The exception would only be granted “because of sickness 
or wounds or for other humanitarian reasons and [only] for the period during which these 
reasons [remain valid], and the affected refugees must nevertheless be given a certificate 
and kept, in the appropriate manner, under watch.”55 
At first, Ottoman officials on the ground and the British ambassador in Istanbul 
were confident that Austria-Hungary would be able to deliver on its commitment to 
police the border effectively. Server Paşa, the minister of public works and one of the 
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Ottoman officials sent to accompany foreign consuls during their original “mission” in 
August, 1875, was satisfied with Andrássy’s promises that the border would be sealed 
and Habsburg officials would prevent armed insurgent bands from returning to Ottoman 
territory and threatening peaceful refugee repatriation. In Istanbul, the Ottoman’s own 
experience encouraged such optimism. Six years earlier the Ottoman military had 
prevented violence in Hercegovina from spilling over into Habsburg Dalmatia.56 Danış 
Efendi, the Ottoman consul in Dubrovnik, had inspired additional confidence with a 
favorable report that said local authorities were increasingly willing to maintain the 
neutrality Andrássy had promised to the Porte at the start of February.57 Danış was an 
astute observer of the local situation, and although he complained about problems at the 
border, he argued that if Vienna’s orders were followed correctly, the insurgency would 
soon end, making way for repatriation.58  
It quickly became clear the Habsburg authorities were unable or unwilling to end 
border violations. Austria-Hungary’s failure to do so throughout the uprising was a 
failure to meet the expectations and responsibilities of neutrality and a major, arguably 
decisive, factor in the ultimate failure of the mass repatriation process. Anticipating the 
obstacles that lay ahead, the liberal Vienna newspaper Neue Freie Presse demanded that 
Dalmatian authorities maintain an effective, “no longer make-believe neutrality” by 
introducing an effective border control and finally targeting “the agitation committees in 
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Ragusa and other places” and their “outrageous activities [that are] counter to 
international law.”59 
Reporting directly to London, Monson wrote General Jovanovich had repeatedly 
admitted the Habsburg military presence in Dalmatia was “utterly insufficient to maintain 
a strict observance of neutrality along the frontier,” and had the government threatened to 
dismiss officials who failed to carry out their orders, “the contraband trade in arms and 
munitions of war carried on through Montenegro by Russian agents and Russian money 
would have been prevented,” and the insurgency quickly ended. Instead, even those high-
level civil and military officials who “obey the base letter of the orders received from 
Vienna, take care to show, by the manner in which they execute them, that they do so 
against their own inclinations.” 60  
For its part, the Porte had already taken two important administrative steps to 
prepare for the repatriation process. These were intended to enable co-operation between 
Ottoman and Habsburg officials and to overcome the inertia of the existing local 
administration in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The first step was an apparent effort to give 
local officials the power to negotiate directly with Habsburg officials without having to 
resort to higher-level diplomatic channels.61 Bosnia and Hercegovina already had 
governors with the power to conduct limited foreign affairs concerning their province. 
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The task at hand however specifically required the cross-border co-operation of lower-
level bureaucrats, among other things in order to “win more time.”62 Andrássy had 
cleared away personnel and protocol questions in his notes to Mollinary and Rodich, 
where he informed them that he had appointed Konrad Wassitch as a consul without 
portfolio, and that Habsburg officials would be dealing directly with their Ottoman 
counterparts.63 Analagous instructions regarding bilateral co-operation of local officials 
are not available in the archival record for the Ottoman side. Nevertheless, it seems the 
Porte did not take lightly the decision to devolve power to local administrators. Instead, it 
relied on historical precedent, referring back—as had Mollinary when he first began the 
state-backed refugee aid project in 1875 (see Chapter One)—to precedents set in 1854. At 
some point in 1876 an official at the Ottoman foreign ministry resent a set of March 1854 
instructions giving local officials in Bosnia the power to work directly with their 
Habsburg counterparts, based on the Habsburg ambassador’s agreement to a Sultanic 
proposal for conflicts that could break out along the Bosnian and Hercegovinian borders 
“being arranged and solved at the location by direct agreement between [Ottoman and 
Habsburg] state officials.”64 
The invocation of historical precedent reflected both conceptual and administrative 
continuities that speak to Ottoman foreign politics and the ongoing domestic challenges 
of reform and rule of Bosnia. The devolution of international relations to local 
administrators in 1876 placed the co-operative repatriation process within the longer-
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range history of the province as a borderland—in constant contact with the neighboring 
empire on the one hand, and fiercely protective of any autonomies it could win from the 
central government on the other hand.  
In 1854 two sides agreed to localized cross-border co-operation in response not to 
an internal crisis within Bosnia and Hercegovina, but to the Crimean War, which drained 
resources out of the Ottoman local administration. With the outbreak of the war, all but 
one military commander in Bosnia was sent east; only Ferik Avni Paşa, who 
subsequently suffered a stroke, remained in Sarajevo.65 Austria, too, was busy 
reconfiguring its military deployment. Its principal worry was domestic nationalist 
revolution on its southern borders, where a potentially restive mix of Hungarian and 
Slavic populations, were of particular concern.66 It had been building up troops along its 
southern border in Slavonia, particularly in the east towards Belgrade, since Russia 
occupied the Ottoman Danubian Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia in May 1853. By 
the time Britain and France officially joined the fighting in 1854, Austria was planning to 
mobilize 150,000 troops in Slavonia up to its borders with Serbia.67 
Given the circumstances, devolution of cross-border affairs to local officials was 
welcome. It seems likely, then, that the proximate cause of the agreement to manage 
conflicts locally was the contingencies of international relations. But the agreement was 
not simply the result of the latest crisis in the Near East, and should be read as something 
more than the two empires simply making the best of a bad situation by minimizing the 
                                                
65 Hadžihuseinović, Povijest Bosne, 2: 1065. 
 
66 Winfried Baumgart, Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung: internationale Beziehungen, 1830-
1878, Handbuch der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999). 343-44. 
 
67  Baumgart, The Crimean War, 1853-1856, Modern Wars (London, New York: Arnold; Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 102-06. 
 
  186 
administrative strain of cross-border violence. The document reveals an Ottoman 
government sufficiently confident in the sovereignty of the central government over the 
province’s local elite, and in the abilities of local officials on both banks of the Sava 
River to defuse conflicts to the extent that they would not blow up into larger problems.  
This had not always been the case; similar efforts to devolve power had failed in the 
1830s because of the strength of local elites over central government representatives, and 
because of their financial interests in supporting cross-border brigandage.68 The 1854 
agreement came at the pinnacle of tanzimat-era central government power over Bosnia, 
thanks to the Ottoman general Omar Paşa Latas’ decisive 1851 defeat of rebelling 
Muslim elites and their subsequent exile to Anatolia. In 1854, at least, the success of 
Ottoman reforms—imposed with violence, to be sure—could be measured not just by the 
ability of the central government and strong governors to implement change, but by their 
willingness to delegate cross-border relations to minor local officials along the Ottoman-
Habsburg frontier.  
The situation in 1876 was more reminiscent of the 1830s than of 1854, however. In 
fact, some of the characters harkened back to that earlier era, because many of the 
Muslim elites had subsequently returned from their Anatolian exile and reintegrated 
themselves into Ottoman state structures. 69 With the subsequent failure of reforms and 
the inefficacy of central government power in Bosnia and the Hercegovina (see 
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introduction), there was little hope the government could enforce the changes necessary 
to induce return by using the existing structures. Therefore the second big administrative 
step the Porte took in preparation for the joint repatriation process was to appoint the two 
commissioners who would lead the Implementation Commissions in Bosnia and in 
Hercegovina.70 These appointments met the final term of the Andrássy Note, and the 
Porte sincerely hoped the commissioners could manage the same lazy, venal, and 
sometimes malicious local officials whose inefficacy had exacerbated the crisis. These 
were the officials who would now be entrusted with the additional responsibility of 
implementing the repatriation process.  
The Porte appointed high-level and reliable officials to the Commission. İbrahim 
Haydar Efendi, who had served as Ottoman ambassador to Vienna in 1865-1870, was 
sent to Bosnia. Pasco Vasa Efendi, an Albanian Christian who had previous experience in 
Hercegovina and had been serving at the court of appeals, was sent to Mostar. Upon 
arrival, they two men were immediately to set up an administrative council made up of 
Muslim and non-Muslim members who would receive 1,500 kuruş.71 The commissioners 
would serve as quasi governors. This was not a problem in Hercegovina, which had been 
separated from Bosnia in part to manage the crisis, and therefore had no entrenched 
gubernatorial regime. Vasa and Ali, the new governor, seemed to be of like minds and 
abilities. In Bosnia, however, Haydar found himself in less favorable circumstances and 
would struggle against local authorities who, according to the Habsburg general consul 
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lamented, “do not carry out even precise orders received from Constantinople.” 72 
Haydar’s position was at odds with the existing provincial leadership, and even İbrahim 
Paşa, the governor, stymied his reform plans.  
Raşid Paşa drew up the final instructions for the repatriation of the refugees 
himself. The Sultan, who had already rejected the last of the Andrássy Note’s five points, 
was reluctant to move any faster or far forward than necessary, and vacillated for several 
days. He finally approved the instructions, in their entirety, on 29 February 1876.73 Zichy 
was very impressed, and noted approvingly that they conformed to all of the 
recommendations that came from Vienna.74 He wrote to Andrássy that the instructions 
were of the type “that would be sought for in the annals of Turkish history and 
administration only in vain.” With misplaced confidence, he noted “nothing else remains 
to be wished for other than the selfsame be faithfully carried out.” 75 
The repatriation instructions Haydar and Vasa brought with them contained 
fourteen articles and the Sultan had ordered “the thing that will be considered most on the 
arrival of these refugees is their being protected from the treatment considered to be the 
reason for their complaints.”76 From the outset, the instructions did what Habsburg 
officials had failed to do: explicitly define the meaning of “refugee.” Only two types of 
individuals would be afforded protection during the repatriation and resettlement process 
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laid out in the instructions—those who either on the promises or under the threat from the 
insurgents joined their bands, and those families who were forcibly removed from their 
homes by insurgents. Those individuals who had left their homes due to the insurrection 
would be granted a general amnesty if they returned within the space of four weeks from 
the time it was officially declared.77  
Members of the commission would meet returnees at the border. Their identities 
would be checked based on name and place of birth, and any foreign agitators would be 
turned away. After katibs (secretaries) recorded the return, the head of each family would 
be issued traveling papers, and the refugees would be escorted under protection to their 
villages. For those individuals who were too sick or weak to travel, the implementation 
commission would set up temporary hospitals and other facilities; once healthy enough to 
travel they would be processed in the appropriate manner. The government was to supply 
all returning refugees with sufficient provisions for their return, and they would continue 
to receive them until they had rebuilt their homes and finished their first harvest. The 
government would provide lumber from state forests to rebuild their houses, and 
additional supplies for the reconstruction of any churches that had been destroyed; it 
would furthermore provide the necessary tools for reconstruction and seed corn for the 
coming agricultural season. Refugees would be exempt from paying tithes for one year, 
and taxes for two. 78 
The instructions were a comprehensive plan not merely to repatriate refugees safely 
and to filter out any insurgents. They were a reconstruction plan for the entire province 
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and the same benefits accorded to the refugees would be offered to the “Muslims and 
Christians who had been tractable and obedient during this affair and who have suffered 
devastation and ruin because of this war,” even if they never fled the provinces.79 The 
Ottoman government understood the refugee question not simply in terms of the military 
necessity of creating peaceful conditions for return. It also saw the question in social 
terms that addressed the entire population, both Muslim and Christian.  
 
Repatriation and its Discontents 
The repatriation plan marked a high-point of cross-border co-operation. Within weeks of 
its announcement in February 1876, provincial officials began establishing the required 
checkpoints on the Ottoman side of the border in Bosnia and in Hercegovina. At both the 
imperial and the provincial levels, there were numerous obstacles that thwarted the 
official, co-operative repatriation effort. Both the Habsburg and the Ottoman sides were, 
from the very start, blinded by their conviction that the negotiated agreements and Great 
Power guarantees were sufficient to overcome refugees’ distrust of the Ottoman 
government and their reluctance to return home. Beyond this, the Ottoman government 
especially failed at implementation. Having defaulted on its foreign debt interest 
payments in October 1875, the Ottoman state was near bankruptcy and incapable of 
providing the money it promised for reconstruction. The lack of money also directly 
affected security: the army had no animals for transportation, soldiers were poorly 
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clothed, lacked supplies, and were frequently reduced to selling their weapons (often to 
insurgents) to buy food.80  
As the rest of this chapter will show, other problems were specific to each of the 
provinces. Eforcement varied on the Habsburg side of the border. The mountainous 
Dalmatian/Hercegovinian border was exceptionally porous, and the lenient attitude of 
Rodich, the Dalmatian governor, meant the supply of weapons and war material never 
stopped. Insurgents harried the Ottoman army, Ottoman repatriation officials, and 
returning refugees. Mollinary, by contrast, seems to have been more willing than Rodich 
to enforce border controls—or at least was not as invested in the insurgents’ success as 
Rodich. While people and weapons moved easily across the Croatian/Slavonian border 
with Bosnia, the insurgents were less brazen and found less support on the Habsburg side 
than they did in Dalmatia. The obstacles to repatriation in Hercegovina strongly reflected 
the local circumstances, especially the strength of the insurgency in Hercegovina and the 
long-standing cultural ties to Dalmatia and Montenegro that helped to support the 
uprising. The Hercegovinian case is particularly good for demonstrating some of the 
obstacles to repatriation at the start of the process on both sides of the border. It clearly 
demonstrates, furthermore, the effect of central government problems on the repatriation 
process: the lack of security and money along with infighting in Istanbul left the governor 
and the repatriation commissioner hard-pressed to carry out the plans and doubtful of 
support from the central government. After looking at the situation in Hercegovina, the 
chapter will turn to the process in Bosnia, where the problems in the central government 
were compounded and amplified by Haydar’s prolonged power struggle with the 
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governor. When İbrahim was finally sacked, Haydar pursued the repatriation agenda with 
renewed vigor and continued his efforts, however futile, until late autumn.   
 
By the middle of March, the Habsburg military authorities in Dalmatia had dispatched an 
official to villages on the Austro-Hungarian side of the border to explain to refugees the 
terms of the return process. As an added inducement to return, they were informed that 
their subventions would be withdrawn. Danış Efendi, the Ottoman General Consul in 
Ragusa, went so far as to pay for the return to Venice of some thirty Italian 
revolutionaries who were expected to cause problems during the repatriation process.81 
Despite the encouragement, many refugees remained unwilling to return. On both 
sides of the border the imperial governments had trouble executing central policies. 
Andrássy struggled against high-level officials in Dalmatia—many of whom strongly 
supported the insurgency, while the Ottomans faced obstructionism and bureaucratic 
incompetence on their side of the borders. In Hercegovina, for example, the 
announcement of amnesty, tax reductions and guaranties of security to those refugees 
who returned within a four-week period was printed late and circulated only after a full 
week of the amnesty period had already passed.82 Competent local officials were 
arbitrarily replaced. The key Ottoman figures in the repatriation process, while generally 
regarded as efficient, were also recent arrivals unfamiliar with the local conditions. Ali 
Paşa, the new provincial governor, had just arrived from his embassy position in Paris, 
while Vasa Efendi, the new reform commissioner for Hercegovina, arrived at the start of 
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the repatriation process. Neither of the men could be certain where their mission stood 
with regard either to the ability of the government in Istanbul to support the process 
politically and materially, or to the willingness of Habsburg authorities to cooperate. 
Ali and Vasa would be disappointed on both counts. In early May, Konrad 
Wassitch, the Austro-Hungarian General Consul in Mostar and leader of the Habsburg 
repatriation efforts reported that of the promised construction supplies, farm equipment, 
food and seed, Ali had so far only been able to deliver the seed.83 The delays continued. 
By the end of May, Vasa had managed to assure the delivery of building supplies to a 
distribution center, but was also under increasing strain, and told Wassitch that despite 
promises, they were receiving little support from Istanbul.84  
The Ottoman provincial officials were not alone in their inability to live up to the 
agreed terms of the repatriation process. Although the Habsburg Empire was not wracked 
with troubles in the central government the way the Ottomans were, the apparent efficacy 
of its civil and military bureaucracies had been captured by local interests and 
sympathies. In the hands of the insurgents and local officials, controlling refugee 
repatriation was an important tool in undermining the success of unwelcome diplomatic 
agreements.  
Habsburg administrative problems started at the highest levels of the local 
authorities in Dalmatia. Andrássy justifiably worried that any violence on either side of 
the border could halt the repatriation process, and ordered that the border be well-
patrolled and insurgent groups prevented from using Habsburg soil as a launching ground 
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for attacks into Ottoman territory or against returning refugees. Gabriel Rodich, the 
Governor-General of Dalmatia, was an ambivalent executor of Vienna’s wishes, 
however. On the one hand, he had proved to be a strong and effective advocate for 
refugee (and by proxy, also insurgent) interests, and had conducted earnest negotiations 
with the refugees to convince them to return home.85  On the other hand, Rodich was 
reluctant to enforce border controls, and was willing to tolerate open violence by 
insurgent bands on Habsburg territory against refugees who wanted to return. Dalmatia 
itself remained a headquarters and staging ground for the uprising; Dubrovnik cafes were 
favored meeting places for leaders of the insurgency, and the city “had the appearance of 
a city lying in open war against Turkey.”86 
In these circumstances, few refugees were returning via official means. The 
discrepancy between the thousands of refugees on Habsburg soil and the number who 
took part in the formal repatriation is telling: in the first days after the process started in 
Dalmatia, Ottoman officials processed 11 families—a total of 70 individuals—at 
repatriation stations. It was for this reason that Ali, “who will hardly be able to produce 
for the Porte a list of 500 voluntary and officially returning refugees, speaks so poorly 
about Dalmatia.”87 
Instead of official repatriation, however, some refugees were returning, village-by-
village, without registering with the authorities. The residents of the Hercegovinian 
village of Popovopolje were a case in point, illustrating the diversity of local situations. 
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Popovopolje had been the site of a Muslim attack the previous fall that left seven 
villagers dead; the remainder fled to Dalmatia. By the spring of 1876, the villages were 
largely under the control of a small band of insurgents. When the pacification and 
repatriation process began in early April, Habsburg and Ottoman authorities viewed 
Popovopolje as high-priority. Despite the events of the previous fall, the conditions for 
return were not inauspicious. Unlike many other villages nearby, the insurgents had not 
burned down Popovopolje. The insurgent bands that claimed control of it seemed to be 
operating independently from the larger movement. Reports indicated that many residents 
of the village were anxious to go home.88 
In early May, a Habsburg official in Dubrovnik reported that some 600 refugees 
from Popovopolje were preparing to return, while in the border town of Metković another 
400 were ready to return.89 Their return however, also stood as a pointed reminder of the 
limited ability of policies developed between Vienna and Istanbul to effect the situation 
on the ground, because their return took place against the will of Ottoman repatriation 
authorities, and under the worried eye of Wassitch, who was convinced “the pacification 
was an illusion, and the repatriation an absurdity”90  
The situation was the result of the Ottoman’s weak military presence and the simple 
fact that the military and the civilian authorities—especially the repatriation 
commission—had competing priorities and worked at cross-purposes. The Porte had 
indeed promised the military would provide security for returning refugees, but this did 
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not happen. Muhtar Paşa had marked the start of the repatriation process by violating a 
provisional armistice within days of its being agreed.91 In early May, Ali had requested 
that the Ottoman army clear the insurgents out of the border area. This help was not 
forthcoming: the Ottoman forces in the region were already stretched to near the breaking 
point; they had run out of food over the winter, lacked basic supplies, and were involved 
in active fighting along the border with Montenegro. Muhtar had more urgent concerns 
and no troops to spare.92 This undermined Habsburg support for the repatriation process, 
which was conditional on the Ottoman ability to guarantee security for the refugees. 
Consul Wassitch reported to Vienna that this had not been achieved. “Nothing is more 
likely than the insurgents applying all sorts of pressure following the formal handover of 
returning refugees, and the latter, when possible, postponing the formal return.”93  
The inability to coordinate operations with the military put Ali in the unwelcome 
situation of having to oppose repatriation out of concerns over security, and therefore 
accountability. From the Ottoman standpoint it was a sound argument: the entire 
repatriation process was vulnerable, and any attack on refugees who had returned—either 
from Muslim residents bent on revenge, or from Christian insurgents who had started the 
violence—would be clear proof of Ottoman failure, and would elicit a strong rebuke from 
the other Great Powers.  
At the same time Ali needed to process as many refugees as possible through the 
repatriation centers to prove the success of the Ottoman reform effort. For the residents of 
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Popovopolje this meant their return would be circuitous, inconvenient, and mediated by 
low-level Ottoman bureaucrats of questionable competence and doubtful conviction. 
Their predicament worsened when Ottoman authorities announced that they had moved 
the planned repatriation center from a nearby town to the more distant Trebinje, and 
demanded that the residents of Popovopolje who had already come home, settled in, and 
started farming, head to Trebinje and announce themselves for official repatriation. 
Although the peasants had the necessary farm equipment and even sufficient seed to start 
the season, they would have to depend on the Ottoman state for grain until their crops 
were ready for harvest. And the only way to get that was to leave their houses, fields, and 
livestock unattended and endangered while they went to Trebinje to register for a 
repatriation they had already completed. The actual implementation of the rules and 
mechanisms for managing refugee return threatened to define them out of the category of 
refugee. 
The situation drew a sharp rebuke from Wassitch, who told Ali it appeared “the 
Turkish authorities view the repatriation not so much as a measure necessary in the 
interest of humanity and the re-establishment of an orderly situation, as they saw it as a 
coup diplomatique that would allow them to assert that there no longer was an 
insurrection [...].”94 In the face of such criticism, Ali relented somewhat, and replied to 
Wassitch he could promise the refugees safe asylum in Trebinje, and would be able to 
send a commission to Popovopolje to distribute food. He did not, however, have the 
resources to defend the residents of Popovopolje against attack. Aid would only come if 
the residents were willing to accept responsibility for their own security. 
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The successes of this type of unofficial return were small when compared to the 
refugee problem as a whole. It is unclear to what extent they were permanent, or whether 
the residents of Popovopolje, as a municipal official in Metković had predicted, did in 
fact return to Dalmatia at the first sign of trouble.95 Whether they remained or not, the 
simple fact of unofficial return was a strong indictment of the official repatriation process 
itself. The failure of the Habsburg-supported Ottoman effort to pacify was without doubt 
the single most important obstacle to a successful refugee return. Fear of violence was a 
strong disincentive, and as one refugee leader put it to Rodich, the refugees would rather 
be thrown “directly into the [sea] than if you were to hunt us across your border.”96 Yet a 
lack of security was not the sole obstacle. Even during the fighting and in the face of 
violence aimed directly at them, refugees did take advantage of the leaky borders to 
return on their own—a fact attested to in the archives as much by the occasional report of 
voluntary return as by the increasingly frequent reports of attacks against returning 
refugees.97  
In the event, Andrássy’s concern that providing anything but minimal aid would 
encourage peasants to leave the insurgent provinces and to remain on Austro-Hungarian 
territory did not hold true.98 The inverse, however, did. Even after the government 
withdrew the refugees’ subvention as part of its agreement with the Ottomans to 
encourage return, the vast majority of refugees still refused to go home. In this respect, 
the residents of Popovopolje were surprising outliers. Some refugees had been able to 
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build stable lives on the Austro-Hungarian side of the border, settling in as Mollinary had 
originally suggested: they found jobs, places to live, and places to pasture their livestock. 
More than that, repatriation was contested among the refugees themselves, and the 
opportunity to return home revealed divisions among them. In Metković, the preparations 
by some refugee families formally to repatriate themselves led to streetfighting with 
refugee groups trying to prevent returns.99  
By May, the reform commissioners had renewed hopes the central government 
might overcome the failures in supplies, preparation, efficacy and political will that had 
paralyzed the Ottoman side of the project. As Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany met 
in Berlin and drafted the Memorandum, the British consul in Mostar reported “a general 
pause in affairs in expectation of what may result from the meeting [...].”100 Yet just at 
this moment, stuttering leadership in Istanbul only undermined the efficacy of the 
repatriation commissions. In early May, Nedim Paşa, the Grand Vizier, relieved Ali as 
governor of Hercegovina and thereby prompted Vasa to announce his resignation as 
repatriation commissioner.101 The hiatus was brief—the Sultan removed Nedim from the 
Vizierate on 15 May, and Ali was immediately reinstated as governor of Hercegovina. 
Vasa then withdrew his resignation as well. As much as the incident demonstrated the 
allegiance and unity of purpose between Ali and Vasa, it was further damaging evidence 
that the leadership in Istanbul struggled to maintain its course.  
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Nedim’s ouster had less of a direct effect on Haydar Efendi in Bosnia. Unlike Ali, 
Haydar’s job had not been at risk, but the change was a welcome sign for a potentially 
renewed repatriation effort. Like Ali and Vasa, Haydar had been struggling to effect 
repatriation since the start of spring. He had arrived in Sarajevo on 13 March, and been 
quickly dismayed at the situation on the ground. In February, the Porte had responded to 
rumors that most of the refugees were returning by requesting detailed accounts of the 
number of refugees who had fled, and the number who had returned. Muhtar, whose 
military command included both Hercegovina and Bosnia, lived up to his reputation as 
someone who embellished his own achievements, and reported that refugee return was in 
fact already taking place and the outlook was good.102  More reliable reports from the 
provinces suggested otherwise. Two days after Haydar embarked for Sarajevo, a report 
from Bosnia arrived at the Porte, saying that of the 26,140 people who had fled, fewer 
than one in ten had returned.103 The evident lack of progress surprised Haydar when he 
arrived in the region. He had travelled to Sarajevo by way of the Habsburg/Ottoman 
border town of Brod, where leaders of several refugee groups overwhelmed him with the 
extent of their needs—of the necessary outlay in supplies and feed and manpower in 
protecting them during their return.104 Moreover, none of the obligations the repatriation 
instructions outlined had been met. The officials that Server Paşa had said would provide 
the local knowledge and language expertise necessary to carry through the repatriation 
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had not been appointed, and none of the promised food, tools or reconstruction materials 
existed.105  
From the moment of Haydar’s arrival, İbrahim Paşa, the governor of Bosnia, 
passively and actively undermined the new commissioner’s efforts to implement 
repatriation and reform. İbrahim’s elevation to governor in January had been celebrated 
by the more conservative members of Bosnia’s Muslim elite, who quickly gained 
influence over him.106 By the time of Haydar’s arrival, İbrahim had done nothing to 
prepare the terrain for reform, preferring instead to while away time in his harem and 
curry favor with the same begs Haydar would have to win over to implement reform, and 
who by mid-March had petitioned Istanbul for Haydar’s removal.107 Predictions that the 
two men would end up openly antagonistic proved true. As a commissioner Haydar 
lacked executive authority, and İbrahim refused to wield it. The governor only reluctantly 
promised to execute the reforms, but was ultimately unwilling to provide the necessary 
support to protect or supply the returning refugees.108 Haydar had been mounted “on a 
horse whose reins were held by the vali.”109  
Despite this serious hindrance, Haydar quickly set to work establishing the local 
administrative infrastructure as per his instructions. In mid-March he asked Habsburg 
General Consul Theodorovich for suggestions about whom he should appoint as the 
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Christian member of the commission. Theodorovich recommended the Vienna-educated 
Banja Luka merchant Jovo Bilbija, who had been one of the 1873 refugees (see Chapter 
Two).110 Theodorovich thought him to be both respected among his compatriots as well 
as of a moderate disposition. Theodorovich erred on the second point; Bilbija was 
ideologically aligned with the Serbian government and Boić, in his report from 1 March, 
referred to the necessity of making both of the Bilbija brothers “harmless.” Not 
surprisingly, Bilbija turned down the job.111 
Haydar did not begin serious efforts at repatriation until May. A tour of the border 
region planned for late March or early April never took place despite Theodorovich’s 
offer to supply Haydar with the consulate’s official Dragoman.112 The renewal of 
insurgent activity along the border was certainly one obstacle. Along the Sava river, 
which marks Bosnia’s northern border with Croatia, “revolutionary committees operated 
in public,” stopping and frequently confiscating or destroying goods transported along the 
river, and forcibly preventing the “return of emigrant families who manifest the desire to 
return to their country.”113 
Haydar spent his first month in Sarajevo establishing the commission, which began 
holding its first regular meetings in early May. The commission made a little progress on 
refugee repatriation, securing the care of refugees returning to the Bihač Sancak. Mainly, 
however, it devoted its time to questions regarding taxation, in particular to the 
implementation and collection of taxes. This was a thorny issue. The provincial coffers 
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were almost empty, while abuses and corruption assured a large tax burden on the 
population but little government revenue. Moreover, policies themselves were unclear 
and subject to change. Particularly with regard to tax policy, the central government 
issued orders that conflicted with earlier promises, subsequently revoked them, and again 
reinstated them.  
İbrahim was truculent, and only executed the commission’s decisions to the extent 
necessary to meet his minimum responsibility. 114 Haydar was pleased with even this 
level of progress, but the Habsburg general consul deflated him by pointing to the lack of 
money to implement the decisions, the lack of competent officials, and the need for strict 
monitoring of the return process. This was especially true in Bihač where the county 
governor was known for his unreliability. İbrahim’s reiteration to regional officials of the 
need to follow the letter of the law, noted Theodorovich, would do little to curb the 
arbitrary enforcement of law which henceforth “will certainly happen all the more 
because the Vali himself [as numerous examples demonstrate] leaves the legal decrees 
unenforced, even avoiding direct Vizierial orders.”115 By late May, İbrahim’s 
obstructionism had prevented reform and repatriation to such an extent that Haydar 
formally complained to the Porte, accusing İbrahim of failing to deliver the amnesty 
proclamation fast enough and directly contradicting the terms of the December reform 
ferman.116 To the Habsburg consul in Sarajevo, Haydar confided that if he continued in 
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such a powerless position, even if the governor was replaced he would resign his post as 
commissioner.117 
The deposing of Abdülaziz on 30 May 1876 and his replacement by Murad V killed 
any official presentation of the Berlin Memorandum to the Porte. That said, the 
Memorandum clearly had unofficial repercussions and prompted a renewed Ottoman 
vigor over the repatriation process. This manifested itself most concretely when Sultan 
Murad V, wishing to “inaugurate his reign with fair and spectacular measure of healing 
that demonstrated his feelings of leniency and great concern for his people” turned his 
compassionate gaze towards his “subjects who strayed from Bosnia and Hercegovina.” 118 
On 5 June, the Porte sent instructions to Haydar and Vasa to announce a six-week halt to 
all military operations in the provinces and a blanket amnesty to all those who returned 
during the period and presented themselves to the local authorities.119 
The announcement was not whole-heartedly welcomed among the Great Powers. 
Andrássy had indeed hoped the change of leadership in Istanbul would lead to positive 
developments in the provinces, and suggesting he would be willing to abandon other 
points from the Berlin Conference, had already recommended a brief eight-day cease fire 
to come to terms with the insurgents.120 Despite the similarities, the Ottoman 
announcement irked Andrássy because Austria-Hungary had only been informed post-
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facto and because he thought it undermined the legitimacy of the Great Power’s moral 
obligation to the insurgents and refugees as guarantors of reform.121 
There was a rejuvenation of Ottoman repatriation efforts leading up to and 
accompanying the official announcement of the amnesty. On 3 June, an official by the 
name of Derviş Efendi was sent by the sub-governor of Dervent and the civic head of 
Bosanski Brod to the Habsburg side to entreat the refugees to return, while amnesty 
proclamations by the sub-governors of Dervent and Berbir were sent to Brod and Novi 
Gradiška on the Habsburg side. Neither of these efforts had any effect, and with several 
days to go before the official amnesty announcement, the local Habsburg officials 
completely refused to distribute the unsigned and possibly unauthorized proclamations.122 
The following day, Haydar sent a sharp telegram to the foreign ministry requesting 
Istanbul send the sums required to procure “provisions needed by the refugees who will 
return.”123 The message revealed again the military as a fundamental weaknesses to the 
Ottoman repatriation effort. Referring to repatriation instructions sent to the county 
governor along the border, Haydar complained that the supplies of food and seed corn 
intended for distribution to the returning refugees had instead been “entirely exhausted 
and consumed by the army sent to Bihač and Banja Luka.” 124 
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Theodorovich, the Habsburg consul in Sarajevo, doubted the process would 
succeed. He sent Haydar a list of questions that help to clarify the exact nature of the 
return process and the Habsburg concerns about potential pitfalls.125 First, the Habsburg 
consul wanted to understand the specific terms of the general amnesty, and in particular 
whether it would forgive all acts “between the insurgents and the refugees on one hand, 
and the Muslims and Christians who remained [in Bosnia and Hercegovina] on the other 
hand,” and that had taken place since 8 August 1875, the day the first Redifs were called 
up—and that nothing would be forwarded to a civil or penal court. Second, Theodorovich 
wanted to know how the authorities would guarantee security for refugees returning to 
the counties of Bihač and Banja Luka, where public safety had still not been re-
established, and whether a sufficient number of zaptiyes would be deployed for the this 
purpose. Third, whether the border locations for the receipt and care of the refugees had 
already been determined.  
The fourth and fifth questions focused on what was—other than the provision of 
security—considered to be the main Ottoman weakness and obstacle to return: the 
provision of the material goods and opportunities necessary for the returned refugees to 
restart cultivation and survive the remainder of the season until harvest. Theodorovich 
pointed out domestic supplies were so low, the military had to import food and animal 
fodder from abroad. Given that, he wanted to know, what and how much food and seed 
could be supplied to returning refugees? Would construction and farming tools be 
supplied? What about draft animals for those refugees who no longer had any? Land was 
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the other big concern. The state owned none that it could lease to refugees, so all 
arrangements had to be made with local landlords. Land and property ownership had 
already caused problems in Hercegovina, where the Ottoman state had expected 
landowners to contribute materially to the reconstruction of returnees’ houses, only to 
have them refuse. Theodorovich wanted to know whether the begs and agas had now 
made concrete commitments to lease tillable soil, and whether the refugees would be sent 
to land as far away from their previous location as possible in order to prevent “acts of 
revenge and other unavoidable” incidents. Sixth and finally, the Habsburg consul wanted 
to know if Haydar would be traveling to the border zones himself, or whether he planned 
to send representatives who knew Bosnian. 
Haydar responded to these questions at length, but with little detail.126 He remained 
vague with regard to the nature of the amnesty itself, saying simply that the “emigrants” 
have a six-week period from the date of publication of the edict, to submit their obeisance 
and to a settlement of their complaints before the authorities. Without going into 
specifics, he said the government would take responsibility for the security of life and 
property, but asked the Austro-Hungarian authorities to prevent the return of certain 
individuals who could endanger the process. On the third point, Haydar relinquished the 
initiative and expected the Habsburgs authorities to determine repatriation points. With 
regard to the provision of supplies, Haydar requested that the Habsburg authorities 
provide him with detailed lists of returning refugees. The distribution of seed and 
building supplies would, it seems, take place on location after the refugees returned, and 
an exact knowledge of the numbers returning would make the process more efficient. The 
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Ottoman authorities could not give provide the numbers for how many individuals had 
lived on the properties of individual begs and agas, as “before the uprising not enough 
consideration was taken with regard to a sufficiently regulated relationship between 
landowner and tenant.” Nevertheless, Haydar promised that no returnees would be 
homeless or without provisions. As evidence for the government’s abilities, he pointed 
out that those refugees who had already returned had been provided wood from state 
forests, nails, and for children up to the age of fifteen, 100 dirhem of corn and for those 
over fifteen, one-half okka of corn as well as seed corn for the next harvest. Haydar had 
already answered Theodorovich’s sixth question, and was preparing for a trip to the 
border-zone that might bring him as far Zagreb. Nevertheless, he did emphasize the need 
for local Ottoman officials’ effective and honest performance of their duties. The tension 
between the concreteness of Theodorovich’s questions and Haydar’s vague answers is 
telling, and reflected a general source of frustration for foreign consuls—the Ottoman 
inability not just to execute plans, but to establish a clear course of action.  
Haydar also forwarded to Theodorovich the specific instructions, which were 
remarkable largely for their similarity with February’s more extensive instructions. The 
instructions again divided the population into two categories. The rebels and others who, 
after being threatened, joined the uprising out of fear; and those who “led off their 
families in order to relieve themselves of the insurgents’ oppression.”127 The document 
resembles the February instructions almost perfectly, with plans to write down the names 
and villages of the returnees, reject those who were foreigners, offer medical care and 
security for returnees as well as supplies to re-establish their lives and farms. Indeed, the 
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only major change is that the new plan explicitly states the reception committee itself—
not just the implementation commission in Sarajevo—was to include both Muslims and 
Christians.128 
Theodorovich had in fact already requested the lists Haydar wanted. It is likely that 
prior informal discussions between Theodorovich and Haydar had taken place with 
regard to these lists, as Theodorovich’s request both precedes that of Haydar and 
conforms exactly to Haydar’s request.129   On 5 June, Theodorovich had asked Mollinary 
to forward complete descriptions of the families who were returning with a detailed list of 
their posessions; an exact description of their last place of residence in Bosnia including 
the village, the district, and the county as well as the name of the abandoned landholder; 
and finally the border locations where Habsburg authorities were to assemble refugees for 
repatriation.130 Suprisingly, given the otherwise minimal involvement of Theodorovich 
with affairs in Hercegovina, he sent an identical request to Rodich, in Dalmatia.131 
Neither Mollinary nor Rodich supplied such lists. District heads had basic problems in 
finding refugees, who for reasons that will be discussed below often hid when officials 
tried assembling them for headcounts. Yet the main reason that lists were not 
forthcoming was the refugees’ simple unwillingness to return home, especially at a time 
when families continued to flee from the Ottoman provinces to Austria-Hungary. 
Precipitous changes in Istanbul had little direct effect, either positive or negative, on 
the repatriation process along the Ottoman-Habsburg border. On 13 June the Porte finally 
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acknowledged the repeated complaints from Haydar and the consular corps in Bosnia and 
removed İbrahim as governor of Bosnia, sharply criticizing him for his failure to “meet 
the extraordinary degree of importance of the Bosnian question.” 132 İbrahim’s 
replacement was Manastırlı Mehmed Nazif Paşa. In the event, the new governor did not 
arrive in Sarajevo until 7 July 1876, and the immediate effect of the replacement seems to 
have been negligible.133 Also negligible to local repatriation efforts was the effect of the 
murders, on 15 June, of War Minister Hussein Avni Paşa and Foreign Minister Mehmet 
Raşid Paşa by a Circassian officer.  
As much as events in Istanbul further destabilized the Ottoman Empire and its 
diplomatic position, local factors and the efficacy of administrators on both sides of the 
Ottoman-Habsburg border were the predominant influence on the repatriation process. 
With Haydar’s dispatch of 1000 copies of the amnesty proclamation to Mollinary for 
distribution to refugees on the Habsburg side of the border, Theodorovich reported to 
Vienna that he had advised Haydar to send emissaries to the border who “so far have not 
given a reason to cause mistrust” among the refugee populations.134 Haydar wanted to go 
personally, but sickness prevented him from doing so. In his place, he sent two emissaries 
to the border town of Brod, where more refugees had recently crossed to the Habsburg 
side.135  
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Abdullah Efendi and Mehmed-Beg Kapetanović, a well-respected Muslim 
landowner and a member of the commission, arrived at Bosanski Brod at the end of 
June.136 After spending several days in Bosanski Brod, Mehmed, along with the sub-
governor of Derventa and the civic head of Bosanski Brod, asked Adolf Müller, the 
mayor of Slavonski Brod on the Habsburg side of the border to arrange an audience with 
41 heads of refugee families who Mehmed had asked to meet.137 The meeting took place 
on 3 July. Mehmed announced the amnesty and reforms, and guaranteed the safety of 
returning refugees. None of the assembled refugees agreed to return. There was little new 
in the reasons the refugees gave for refusing to return: they did not believe Ottoman 
authorities would this time be able to live up to their guarantees of equality and justice 
and security; they still feared that the “the best Turk” could plunder, abuse, and even kill 
them without fear of punishment, while from the “worst Turk” a simple denunciation 
would be sufficient to have them thrown into the most horrible of prisons.  
Underlying all these concerns was the broader basic fear of violence. Some of this 
fear was based on rumors, which appear to have been endemic in the refugee 
population—the refugees told Mehmed, for example, that Muslims had recently been 
parading around Bosanski Brod and entertaining themselves with the severed heads of 
Ottoman Christian subjects, although even in the anti-Ottoman press there is no evidence 
to support the claim.138 There were of course very good reasons to be afraid, particularly 
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from retributive violence by landowners and their Muslim tenants, from attacks by 
Başibozuks, and even from attacks by the regular army. 
What is clear, however, is that refugees’ individual or collective decision to return 
was not just an existential question, but an intensely political decision. In a diplomatic 
environment where the Great Powers—Austria-Hungary and the Three Emperor’s 
League especially—equated refugee return with domestic stability and saw it as proof of 
a successful pacification, large-scale return would clearly represent for the Ottoman 
central government a diplomatic victory as well as one over centrifugal movements in the 
insurgent provinces. Conversely, the failure of refugees to return vouched for the strength 
of local interests over the central government. This seems to have been the case with 
Muslim violence especially when viewed within Bosnia and Hercegovina’s history of 
repeated efforts by its Muslim elite to seize greater autonomy from the central 
government. Much of the evidence for this is indirect and filtered through the experience 
of refugees. The testimonies recorded by Boić reveal a complex picture of the violence 
that shows a specificity and variety at the local level and even among different 
landowners. Although Boić was uncertain about the veracity of refugees’ claims that 
members of the Muslim elite had telegrammed the Sultan for permission to deal with the 
insurgency in their own manner, such claims must be taken seriously. 
At the same time, however, insurgents used violence and the threat of violence to 
prevent refugees from returning. Fears of Muslim violence against returning refugees are 
insufficient to explain the general lack of return. While the number of refugees who 
informally returned was tiny in comparison to the total size of the refugee population, the 
fact that such return was not geographically isolated indicates that refugees from many 
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parts of Bosnia had minimal worries about retributive violence from Muslims. Voluntary 
returns were even happening in Hercegovina, where the violence was most intense. The 
return of refugees from Popovopolje, where Muslims killed villagers in the fall of 1875, 
is the most compelling example of this. The very fact that insurgents resorted to violence 
to prevent refugee repatriation indicates there was an even more widespread assumption 
among refugees that return was sufficiently safe.  
This major role that insurgent threats and violence played in preventing refugee 
return is manifested in the architecture and wording of the imperial repatriation project 
itself, and documented in reports coming from consuls and Ottoman officials on the 
ground. At the level of imperial policy, insurgents were held culpable by both the 
Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. On the Ottoman side, this can be seen in the two-tier 
typology of the refugee in the first lines of the repatriation instructions from late February 
as well as those issued at the start of the six-week amnesty. Similarly, the Habsburg 
government’s proposal that repatriation begin with Catholic refugees returning to 
predominantly Catholic areas because they were less likely to be harmed and their houses 
had suffered less damage points to the problem of insurgent violence against refugees. 139 
By late June and early July, the agricultural window for refugees to plant seed when 
they returned had effectively closed. In a 25 June note to the governor in Sarajevo, the 
administrative council pointed out that stores of maize that had been set aside for 
returning refugees (and apparently saved from army confiscation) were beginning to rot, 
but that the refugees could be supplied with seed from the new harvest, which would be 
brought in within 20-30 days. Even with the new harvest there would not be sufficient 
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supplies for the winter, however, and the government would be forced to buy seed 
abroad.140 Had repatriation worked at the start of the growing season, the state would 
theoretically have only needed to support the returnees until the harvest came in. A return 
in the late summer however would require support for an entire year: through the winter, 
the spring and the following summer until harvest time. The financial burden of return 
would be extreme, and the inflationary pressure of limited domestic supplies of food 
would further increase costs.  
Political windows were closing, too. The looming threat and then outbreak of war 
between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire forced a fundamental shift in Habsburg foreign 
policy, which began to countenance territorial aggrandizement in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. War and policy shifts had limited direct effects on the refugee repatriation 
process. But the reorientation of Ottoman military and political energy towards Serbia 
and the gradual shift in Habsburg diplomatic priorities and calculations helped to 
strengthen a parallel shift in Austria-Hungary’s approach to the refugees—from refugee 
repatriation to refugee management.  
Austro-Hungarian authorities had always tried to control refugees and their 
movements after the arrival on Habsburg soil. Border officials were to maintain 
Habsburg neutrality by removing refugees from within one mile of the border, and they 
were also responsible for settling refugees in villages, caring for and monitoring them, 
and maintaining public security. By early summer, however, the system as it existed was 
becoming untenable and any hopes for an immediate and efficient repatriation were 
quickly fading. The refugees were becoming an increasingly heavy financial burden, 
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there was overcrowding in many border districts, and this contributed to outbreaks of 
contagious diseases such as cholera, small pox, and rinderpest. In response, the central 
government ordered a new round of internment on an unprecedented scale, envisioning 
the transportation of tens of thousands of refugees from the border zones to new locations 
deeper in Habsburg territory—the so-called Provinzial. The process of mass internment 
was logistically complex, administratively disruptive, locally resisted, and broadly 
criticised. For many of the refugees, it was also deadly. 
The first report of the large-scale transport of refugees away from the border was 
published in Obzor 23 June 1876, in a report filed from Sisak.141 It seems, however, that 
internment started several weeks before the report first appeared. From the foreign 
ministry, Leopold von Hofmann responded to an 18 June note from Zagreb, saying he 
had asked the Hungarian Minister President to make available 100,000 gulden in order to 
cover either the expenses of more refugees crossing over from Bosnia, or the costs of an 
eventual repatriation. Hofmann emphasized, however, that the money was not intended to 
cover the alimentation costs in July. Indeed, he envisioned a marked reduction in the 
overall costs of taking care of the refugees. The foreign ministry expected every able-
bodied man to seek out work “in the same manner as our own subjects,” and should there 
be no work available where the refugee was staying—as was largely the case in the 
immediate border zone—he was to be relocated to a district in which work was available. 
It was not lost on Habsburg officials that men who were “able-bodied” were able not just 
for work, but also for joining the insurrection. “The closer the refugees are together, the 
closer they live to the border, the more possible is disorder and the more difficult it is to 
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redress the problem on the spot. A radical step against this is the relocation of those 
refugees who are able-bodied into the Provinzial, farther from the border, where not only 
their surveillance but also their earning [enough to support themselves] will be easier.”142  
This “radical step” would prove to be difficult and costly. The transport of refugees 
to Sisak, the subject of the original reports in the media, illustrates the many obstacles to 
the successful internment of large numbers of refugees from the border. Over the course 
of several days thousands of refugees, traveling in columns on foot and in transport 
wagons, many with their livestock in tow, arrived in Sisak and awaited further transport 
to further internment locations. Even with boats continuously transporting refugees 
across the Sava from Sisak towards Galdova, the refugees filled the streets and every 
public space. Local bakers could not keep up with demand, there were reports of looting, 
and “three thousand women, children and old people overnighted in the open on city 
meadows,” in the rain.143 The rapid arrival of such large numbers of people overwhelmed 
city district officials, who immediately complained to Ivan Mažuranić, the governor of 
Croatia, in Zagreb.144 With that, officials in Sisak refused to receive more refugees until 
Mažuranić decided what to do.  
The decision in Sisak to block all further arrival of refugees had immediate 
consequences in towns such as Dubica and Dvor, where many of the early transports had 
originated. It had taken local officials four days and all of the available manpower to 
assemble the refugees for the first of the planned transports at the collection point, in the 
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village of Rujevac. Even then, the district council complained they had only been able to 
bring together several hundred refugees. And just when the transport was finally ready, a 
telegram arrived from Sisak saying officials there were no longer accepting refugee 
transports. The district council, complaining about the difficulties posed by the civil 
authorities in Sisak, informed Zagreb that after spending four days assembling refugees 
in the cold and in terrible conditions in Rujevac, he would now send them back to the 
villages and towns where they had originally been settled and registered as refugees.145  
The refugee transports themselves were intended to be dispatched from collection 
points every third day, and were large-scale operations. In late July, the seventh transport 
of refugees organized by Dvor left the collection point at Rujevac with 1004 individuals 
and 491 head of livestock on 75 wagons including those for children and baggage, as well 
as ten additional support wagons and an escort.146 The sheer size of these transports was, 
however, only partly to blame for the problems in Sisak and other points further removed 
from the border. Administrative and communication problems made the difficult situation 
far worse. In the Dvor-Sisak transports, for example, refugees from the district of Dvor 
were gathered at Rujevac, a distance of several kilometers from the border, at the 
intersection of two main roads. From Rujevac, they were transported due north towards 
Petrinja. In the town of Jabukovac, in the Petrinja district, the transport was restocked 
with new support wagons and would then continue on to Sisak—the first gathering point 
outside of the military border, in Civil Croatia. Sisak served as a sort of distribution 
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center, from which refugees would be sent to various final destinations further towards 
the interior, such as Bjelovar.  
Delays in assembling refugees at the collection point in Rujevac, combined with 
bad communications with Dvor made the transfer of responsibility from the district office 
in Dvor to Petrinja difficult to co-ordinate. Karl Frank, the district head in Dvor, 
complained about mixed signals from Petrinja and Sisak. In a sharply-worded note to the 
General Command in Zagreb, Frank requested of the General Command, the district 
office in Petrinja and the county office in Sisak that his office receive full support and be 
seen as the single official body  “which in a half-way humane manner can move this mass 
of people, can take care of it, and with the best possible protection and consideration of 
unexpected events can set them in motion.”147 Frank complained that he spent the whole 
time in constant exchange of telegrams with Sisak, and if he didn’t keep the transports up 
exactly on the schedule of every three days, the offices there would complain. The pace 
was too fast for officials at the mid-point in Petrinja, however, who would complain that 
they did not have enough time to send support wagons to Jabukovac. As a result, the 
transport would not arrive on time in Sisak and because of that, the whole undertaking 
would be cancelled out of administrative considerations.148 Mollinary agreed to delegate 
broad powers to Frank, but it seems to have helped little. On 18 July the district office in 
Petrinja informed Zagreb that for the second time officials in Dvor failed to inform them 
a transport had departed, making it impossible for Petrinja to ready their wagons for the 
transfer. The Petrinja offices notified Zagreb that they had sent an official south to 
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Jabukovac—a town along the route from Dvor—who would announce the impending 
arrivals of future transports. 149 Such problems, exacerbated by the continuing influx of 
new refugees from Bosnia, continued throughout August, with Sisak periodically 
stopping all transports because of strained capacity.150 
The greatest difficulty, however, lay with the unwillingness or inability of the 
refugees themselves to relocate further towards the interior. Many refugees had leased 
farmland along the border and were unwilling to abandon their fields. Local merchants 
and peddlers had made good profits from the refugees, and in an effort to prevent the 
refugees from leaving spread rumors that they were to be transferred to swampy unarable 
land in the Hungarian puszta—and not allowed to return home to Bosnia.151 Ironically, 
many of the able-bodied refugees feared the forced relocation so much they fled into the 
woods and mountains when military and civil officials came to collect them, at times 
even fleeing back into Bosnia.152 
Illness was the worst of the problems. Among the tensions between Dvor and Sisak 
was the condition of the refugees on the transports. In early July, officials in Sisak 
complained that in the transport that arrived on 4 July 1876 there were 17 children sick 
with smallpox, a pregnant woman who gave birth on the night of her arrival, a mother 
and child who died en route and a number of other sick, seven of whom were so ill they 
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could not be moved.153 Disease and sickness not only made it difficult to move 
individuals, but with many families having at least one sick member, it was difficult to 
separate the healthy from the unhealthy.154 Even after Habsburg authorities had moved 
thousands of refugees towards the interior, there were many thousand more who avoided 
moving, whether for legitimate reasons or for illegal purposes.  
 
Conclusion 
Hopes for a successful repatriation effectively died at about the same time the Ottoman 
government announced its six-week amnesty. By the time Mehmed-Beg Kapetanović 
was announcing the amnesty to refugees gathered in Brod, Habsburg border officials had 
already begun the elaborate, time-consuming process of internment. Even if 
circumstances had changed and repatriation was suddenly possible, the internment 
process would have been difficult to reverse. The case never presented itself. Serbia’s 
declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire on 30 June 1876 only reinforced the 
Habsburg’s desire to maintain neutrality and keep refugees away from the border. The 
Ottoman amnesty was not even four weeks old.  
The repatriation project failed for a host of reasons. Mollinary’s dismissive 
comment that Andrássy didn’t understand what was going on along the border 
underestimated the Foreign Minister’s awareness of the conditions along the border. 
Andrássy’s error was in trusting his own border officials and overestimating the coercive 
strength of Great Power commitments over insurgents and refugees. Diplomacy and 
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bilateral agreements failed because as one of the parties involved, the Ottoman Empire 
was incapable of re-establishing public faith in its ability to rule, while neither Christians 
nor many Muslims were particularly interested in the re-establishment of strong central 
government control over the two provinces.  
Finally, the strength of embedded interests and the specificity of local contingency 
was insuperable. It is important to note that neither the Muslim population nor the 
Orthodox and Catholic Christians wanted to permanently prevent the refugees from 
returning. Far more important were the immediate interests of the interested parties and 
their ability to exercise force. Neither the Christian insurgents nor the Muslim population 
saw profit in allowing the refugees to return, even when the absence of the peasant 
refugees guaranteed another year of failed crops. The violence between the two groups 
sprung from the same sources and had similar motives—minimizing, though not 
abolishing, the real and the nominal power of the Ottoman Central government over 
affairs in the two provinces.  
By the end of summer, a formal repatriation effort became a sort of mannerism 
entirely disconnected from the reality on the ground. Refugee diplomacy had failed, yet 
communication and instructions continued. In October 1876, Haydar wrote to 
Theodorovich to ask if it would be possible for both sides to restart the repatriation 
process. The Habsburg consul forwarded the request to Andrássy, and also to Mollinary, 
who by this time had done extensive political and infrastructural preparation for the 
winter months. It was Mollinary, not Andrássy, who responded to the request. With the 
conviction that the refugees would not return, Mollinary refused to initiate another cross-
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border return effort, resigning himself instead to the “difficulties that another over-
wintering of the refugees” would cause.155 
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Refugee Diplomacy and the Creation of a Habsburg  





The thesis that a nationally and confessionally un-homogeneous state such as Turkey has 
no right to existence in today’s Europe should be applied with caution, because the logic 
leads us further to the point that, when Turkey collapses and on its grave is placed not the 
crescent, but the cross, this should also carry the simple inscription like you see by 
burials in the countryside: Hodie mihi, cras tibi1 
 
 
Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 24 April 1877, and having secured 
passage through Romania, the first Russian soldiers crossed the Danube onto Ottoman 
territory in late June. The Russian army advanced rapidly against the better-armed but 
poorly commanded Ottoman troops through July, until the Ottomans stopped the Russian 
advance at the fortified city of Plevna. It took another four months for Plevna to fall, and 
the Ottoman fortress did so only after Russia called in help from Romania.2 Afterwards, 
the Russian army moved forward rapidly. At the end of January, the Ottoman army 
signed an armistice in Edirne, but the Russian army continued its advance, halting only 
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under direct British threat, when it reached the Marmaran village of San Stefano (now 
Yeşilköy) on the outskirts of Istanbul.3 The preliminary peace treaty signed at San 
Stefano was the pinnacle of Russia’s Balkan politics. It awarded independence to 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Romania, assured an autonomy for Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
and created the “Greater Bulgaria” Russia had envisioned during the Constantinople 
Conference—not an independent state, but an autonomous Ottoman province under a 
Christian prince, in which Russia would help to draft a new organic law and maintain 
commissioners to help implement it, as well as maintain an occupying army of no more 
than 50,000 men.4  
The Berlin Treaty revised San Stefano, and in the process Austria-Hungary gained 
the authority to occupy and administer Bosnia and Hercegovina, with the Ottoman 
Empire retaining formal sovereignty. Historians have often viewed the Habsburg 
acquisition of Bosnia and Hercegovina as the culmination of a long-term expansionist 
policy, starting with an 1856 memo from Josef Radetzky, the Habsburg General, 
demanding the addition of a strategic hinterland, through 1869 plans by Franz Josef and 
Archduke Albrecht for a complete annexation, possibly to make up for lost Italian 
territories, and on to the uprising itself.5 Secret agreements with Russia—first at 
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Reichstadt, then at Budapest—over the division of Balkan territory support this view, as 
does the porosity of the Habsburg-Ottoman border to insurgents and weapons; in this 
account the pro-insurgency activism of officials and military officers on the border 
should be seen as an elemental part of the broader Habsburg Balkan policy.6 Less clear, 
but more likely, is that even with the general idea of an annexation floating about, 
Andrássy fought truly to preserve the Ottoman status quo until rather late in the game. 
From this standpoint, secret agreements with Russia over territorial divisions are best 
seen as contingency plans, and the pro-insurgency activities of military officers or local 
officials on the border reflected either the war ministry’s long-standing bias towards a 
seizure of territory, the limits of central government control over actors at the periphery, 
or both.7 
What is clear, however, is that after San Stefano Andrássy had no other option than 
to force a Habsburg occupation or annexation of the Ottoman provinces if he was to 
maintain Austria-Hungary’s economic and political influence in the region, thwart 
Serbian and Montenegrin expansionism, and meet his Emperor’s expectations. Chief 
among these obstacles to Habsburg expansion were the Ottomans themselves, but also 
the complications of Habsburg domestic politics. In both these cases, refugees were a 
linchpin of Andrássy’s argument for occupation—the need to get them off Habsburg 
territory by returning them was central to his domestic argument; the need for the 
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refugees to be returned home in order to stabilize and bring peace back to the provinces 
was central to his international argument. Once the occupation took place and the 
provinces were under Habsburg control, refugee return became one of the first priorities 
of the new transitional government the Habsburgs established.  
 
The war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires fundamentally changed the volume 
and the tenor of the Balkan refugee question. Where the Serbian-Ottoman war of 1876 
had led to some displacement, largely of Muslims, the Russian-Ottoman war caused the 
largest and most rapid refugee movement in Balkan history. In the fighting of 1877-1878, 
250-300,000 Muslims were killed, and another 1.5 million fled deeper into the Ottoman 
Empire.8 To be sure, the issue of Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees remained 
important to the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Yet the Russian advances—particularly 
after the Ottoman fortress at Plevna finally fell—took clear precedence in government 
circles. This was true diplomatically: the sweep through the Balkans very nearly 
precipitated a much larger European war, and no matter what the negotiated outcome 
would finally be, the war represented a fundamental change in the structure of the 
European system of states. The Bulgarian case was the counterpoint to Bosnia and 
Hercegovina: Bulgaria was where the population politics after the violence were part and 
parcel of nation-state formation rather than, as in the example of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, part of the preservation of an imperial system of rule.  
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A detailed analysis of the refugee question in the Eastern Balkans is beyond the 
scope of this study, but a comparison with the case of Bosnia and Hercegovina helps to 
explain why, in the spring of 1878, Andrássy thought the broader refugee issue could be a 
persuasive component in negotiations with the Ottomans over an eventual Habsburg 
occupation. A comparison also helps to demonstrate the extent to which the political 
meaning and broad repercussions of massive forced migration were not yet altogether 
clear. The risks were apparent—and as we will see, Andrássy exploited in his diplomacy 
the potential dangers of what he argued was a Russian effort to empty Bulgaria of 
Muslims. But the formation of exclusionary nation-states was not yet understood to be 
the almost inevitable corollary to massive forced migration. Indeed, Bulgaria gained 
autonomy, not independence. While it is tempting to equate autonomy with 
independence, the difference mattered.9 It mattered symbolically for the Bulgarians and it 
mattered technically for the Russians who saw autonomy as a determined step towards 
independence.10 It also mattered greatly for the Ottomans, who not only maintained 
nominal title to the land (autonomy as a conservative solution), but were able to use 
questions of territory, sovereignty and demographics to their advantage in diplomatic 
negotiations. 
The refugee crisis that emerged during the Russian-Ottoman War was far more 
acute and shockingly visible than the steady flow of refugees out of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. The war started with the Russian army crossing the Danube on 23 June 
1877, and Muslims who fled the Russians’ first, rapid advances often resettled in the 
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southern Danubian provinces. By September, areas under control of the Russian army 
had been depopulated of Muslims, with crops rotting in the fields.11 The process started 
over again after the Ottoman fortress at Plevna fell. The devastating winter flight took 
place mostly on foot, but railroad and wagon trains helped to speed removal, in the 
process concentrating refugees in urban areas. By spring 1878, Edirne alone housed 
30,000 refugees, with more scattered elsewhere throughout the Balkans.12 Throughout, 
refugees poured into Istanbul as well, where they became the subject of lurid newspaper 
reports and graphic illustrations of the misery, and broad public concern across Europe.13 
“It would require the pen of a de Quincey to picture the horrors of that winter exodus,” 
wrote George Washburn, the president of the American missionary Robert College, 
before attempting the task himself.14 Including Ottoman soldiers, some 300,000 refugees 
arrived in Istanbul.15 The streets were crowded with refugees and even Istanbul’s elite—
including high officials such as Said Paşa (İngiliz), Safvet Paşa, and Aarifi Paşa—opened 
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up their homes to house them.16 Four to five thousand alone were housed in the Hagia 
Sophia mosque; the wife of the British ambassador established a small-pox hospital; and 
the entire foreign diplomatic corps met regularly to discuss the refugee crisis in the city, 
ways to ameliorate it, and the dangers—not least to public safety, but also to trade and 
commerce should an epidemic disease shut down the port—the crisis posed.17 
Historians have most typically viewed this flight of refugees not merely as a 
characteristic of the Russian-Ottoman war, but as an intended consequence. Subsequent 
events in the Balkans, such as the Balkan Wars, surely inform this view, propped up by 
now-familiar documents such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s 
Report of the International Commission on the Balkan Wars.18 The outcome also seemed 
pre-determined. The Russian-Habsburg conflict over the shape of the Balkans pitted the 
Habsburg desire to exercise indirect influence in the region by maintaining a weakened 
Ottoman Empire against the Russian vision of autonomous territories that would, it was 
assumed, turn into nation-states.19 San Stefano’s vision for a Greater Bulgaria appeared to 
be the fulfillment of plans that emerged from the Constantinople Conference at the end of 
1876—which were, in turn, based on the national principle as embodied in the extent of 
the Bulgarian exarchate and the latest ethnographic studies of Heinrich Kiepert, a 
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German cartographer.20 Finally, historians have relied extensively on British archival 
evidence, resulting in a slanted view of events.21  
Counter-narratives have gone relatively unheeded. Recently, however, Peter 
Holquist has argued that as much as the consequence of the war was massive dislocation 
and death, a demographic redistribution was not the intent or even desire of Russian civil 
and military officials. Instead, Russian authorities were heavily invested in the 
prosecution of war based on recently codified—but by no means universally accepted—
laws of war. The maintenance of the Muslim population was an important part of this 
new approach.22 Occupying authorities issued directives guaranteeing the freedoms and 
securities of the non-Orthodox populations, and although Russian soldiers’ anti-Muslim 
violence was not infrequent, the army generally tried to secure conquered territory and 
protect the local population: “Rather than seeking to ethnically cleanse the new Bulgaria, 
Russian forces actively sought to return Muslim inhabitants to these regions.”23 Robert 
College’s Washburn was not an eyewitness, but became convinced of the generally 
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benignant intentions of the Russian army and related stories of Russian soldiers helping 
refugees and saving infants whose starving parents left them behind to die.24  
The level of human misery in Bulgaria had no counterpart in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina. Throughout most of the three-year uprising, the forms and goals of the 
violence distinguished themselves sharply from what happened in Bulgaria. Certainly 
Muslims did flee Bosnia and Hercegovina during the three years of the insurgency—
mainly going south, deeper into the Ottoman Empire—but despite the insurgent violence 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina being driven by Orthodox Christians, it was largely the 
Christians, not the Muslims, who took flight because of the insurgency.25  
The effect of the insurgency on the Muslim population of the provinces should not 
be underestimated, but as with the case of Bulgaria, it was not autochthonous violence 
that led to large-scale displacement but rather military invasion. In the case of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, mass movements, as small and measured as they were in comparison to 
those in Bulgaria, were the result of Montenegrin forces entering southern Hercegovina 
in mid-1877. In a manner similar to the Bulgarian question, the near-forgotten story of 
the fall of the Ottoman fortified town of Nikšić on 8 September 1877 complicates the 
binary images of nation-state formation and “ethnic cleansing.” The fall of Nikšić was 
one of Montenegro’s most important military victories, and resulted in what was 
probably the largest single mass departure of Muslim refugees in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina during the entire uprising. Yet despite the violence that preceded the flight, 
the departure of the refugees appears to have been, for the most part, orderly. Moreover, 
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many Muslim families subsequently returned. Nikšić was the Ottoman fortified town just 
north of the Montenegrin border that Muhtar Paşa had spent much of 1876 fighting to 
replenish and it continued to be a central focus of Ottoman military tactics in 
Hercegovina throughout the uprising.26 When it finally fell after a forty-five day siege, 
Montenegro’s Prince Nikola Petrović-Njegoš offered generous terms of surrender. They 
included a guarantee that those Muslims who remained in Nikšić would be secure in their 
possessions, have freedom to practice their religion, and enjoy the same privileges as 
other Montenegrin subjects. Those who chose to leave, on the other hand, would be 
guaranteed security up to the Montenegrin border, and would be able to take their 
belongings with them.27 
The population of the town itself was around 2,000, most of whom were Muslim 
landowners, with many more Muslims living in the town’s immediate vicinity.28 The vast 
majority of the residents left after the fortress fell to the Montenegrin troops, although the 
circumstances of their departure are not completely clear. Jovan Ivović, who points out 
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that the town was subsequently open for settlement because all of its Muslim population 
departed, only poorly quantifies the exact number who left. Although a memoir of the 
period says thirty houses were abandoned, Montenegrin government documents say only 
nineteen houses stood empty; Ivović says the number could have been up to forty 
houses—although given the size of the subsequent emigration, it is difficult to determine 
what the number of houses actually means.29 
What is clear is Nikola did take steps to prevent the emigration, including 
appointing a Muslim kapetan for the town. These efforts largely failed. Ivović attributes 
the continued departure of Muslims to the destruction of feudal relations that hit the 
town’s landowners hard, as well as to the Montenegrin government’s inability to quell the 
Montenegrins’ religious hatred towards the Nikšić Muslims.30 Ottoman authorities, 
military officers and the refugees themselves did, however, speak highly of the humane 
treatment they received from Nikola and Montenegrin soldiers, and the refugees in fact 
received military protection as they headed either north into Hercegovina, or south 
towards Albania.31 The Montenegrins, for their part, blamed the departures on fear of 
reprisals should the Ottomans return.32 
A more rounded picture of the flight from Nikšić comes from the few Habsburg and 
Ottoman documents available. The Habsburg consul in Mostar reckoned the number of 
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Muslim refugees who fled Nikšić to be about 2,400; an additional 1,200 refugees 
subsequently fled as Montenegrin forces entered the Hercegovinian towns of Bilek and 
Gacko.33 At the start of December, about two thirds of the refugees remained in 
Hercegovina: 1,300 were in Mostar and its environs, 350 in Ljubuski, 500 in Krojnica, 
and 200 in Pocitelj. The remainder had moved on to Bosnia, where some of them 
subsequently joined the anti-occupation insurgency.34 After the Berlin Congress, many 
Muslims from Nikšić ultimately returned, to some extent restoring the Muslim character 
of the town.35 
Reflecting both the absolute and relative size of the flight in comparison with the 
mass movements out of Bulgaria, Ottoman authorities did not incorporate the refugees 
from Nikšić into the centralized refugee aid system run by the Muhacirin Komisyonu 
(Refugee Commission.) Instead, local authorities were independently responsible for 
helping the refugees. Unlike with the Habsburg aid program, the aid consisted largely of 
food—half an oka of cornmeal per person, per day. Those men who had been on a 
military or other official payroll prior to the fall of Nikšić were to continue receiving a 
monthly pay of 15 piasters.36 Housing was a more contentious issue. In Mostar, officials 
ordered a number of houses simply to be cleared of their occupants in order to make 
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space for the refugees.37 The Habsburg Consul in Mostar complained it was Christians 
who were forced to leave their houses, and forced to leave in an entirely arbitrary 
manner. Among these were, supposedly, several Habsburg subjects.38 Although some 
Nikšić residents may have started returning home almost immediately after leaving, many 
remained on the local dole through the first half of 1878, and possibly even later. At least 
in one respect, some of the refugees from Nikšić were similar to some of their Christian 
counterparts in Dalmatia: in May 1878, local authorities found some of the Nikšić 
refugees were cheating local commissioners to get more daily rations. In response, the 
Ottoman interior ministry ordered that the refugees be continuously observed; those 
refugees who repented would, however, be given a monthly allowance of 250 guruş—to 
be distributed directly by the local commission.39  
Both the Bulgarian and the Bosnian and Hercegovinian cases demonstrate the soft 
edges of territorialized nationalism, and more particularly the extent to which even in the 
violence of war the differences between the nation-state (or autonomous province in the 
case of Bulgaria) and the empire that preceded it were ones of gradation, not sharp lines. 
Post-Berlin Bulgaria, for example, maintained a large Muslim population, and developed 
from the Ottoman millet model complicated systems of religious autonomies to maintain 
it.40 To be sure, Bulgaria after the Berlin Congress was marked by anti-Muslim violence 
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at the local level and a pervasive structural exclusion of Muslims—for example, in the 
exclusive use of language in the Bulgarian parliament. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian 
leadership at least was invested in meeting the expectations of the Berlin Treaty, as a 
means to demonstrate and secure the international legitimacy for their newly autonomous 
province.41 
Muslim refugees from Bulgaria—and also from Bosnia and Hercegovina after the 
Habsburg occupation—posed several challenges for the Ottoman Empire. The technical 
side of mass refugee immigration was overwhelming, and sufficient to sap the life out of 
the Ottoman statesmen who faced it. At the same time, refugees also opened deeper 
questions about the nature of the Ottoman Empire and its relationship with its Muslim 
and non-Muslim subjects. After the Congress of Berlin the need to return Bulgarian 
refugees (many of whom were, in fact, Christian) became an international orthodoxy, 
framed not just in the explicit language of opportunity in the Berlin Treaty, but as the 
natural expectations of diplomats and the general public.42  
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What was not a matter of course in either case, however, was whether the Ottomans 
themselves would see the refugee question in this manner. Indeed, the Ottoman 
leadership appeared willing, at least in the beginning, to take a pragmatic and even 
somewhat flexible approach to what should be done with Bulgarian Muslims. Safvet Paşa 
led the Ottoman delegation at the San Stefano negotiations and argued strongly for the 
repatriation of Bulgarian Muslim refugees. As with the Berlin Treaty, San Stefano 
ultimately did include language that would enable return, although Russia was unwilling 
to help the process—suggesting at first that Muslims should not even be allowed to 
remain in Bulgaria. Safvet countered with a much more radical proposal: that Bulgaria 
extend south only as far as the Balkan mountains as per the “Lesser Bulgaria” solution 
first outlined at the Constantinople Conference, but that the Muslims living north of the 
Balkan range would exchange places with the Bulgarians living on Ottoman territory 
south of the Balkans.43 This would not be the last time a Bulgarian-Ottoman population 
exchange was on the table. In context, the exchange is better understood as progeny of 
the mid-nineteenth century strategic resettlement of Tatars and Circassians along 
Ottoman border zones than as the progenitor of later Ottoman ethnic cleansing. 
Nevertheless, Safvet’s suggestion does demonstrate a growing awareness of the ties 
between a specifically Muslim population and state legitimacy. For example, the question 
of Muslim refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina in the wake of the Habsburg 
occupation had similar contours. The Ottoman council of ministers initially supported 
Muslim emigration from the occupied provinces and wanted to help Muslims leave if 
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they wanted. Ottoman officials also recognized preserving a Muslim population was 
essential to maintaining Ottoman claims for sovereignty in the provinces.44  
 
Habsburg Domestic Opposition 
Ottoman uncertainties over what to do about Muslim refugees did not extend to the 
Orthodox Christians of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Perhaps the future of the Muslim 
population of the Bulgarian provinces could be debated, but there was no such possibility 
with the Bosnian and Hercegovinian Christians, whose condition the Sultan was bound to 
improve and protect according to the Treaty of Paris.45 The ability to return the refugees 
was a near-explicit demand of the one document the Ottoman state counted on to ensure 
Ottoman international legitimacy.46 And by spring 1878, the possibility the Ottomans 
might lose Bosnia and Hercegovina—provinces that, after all, had not been conquered by 
Russia and still contained a large majority Muslim population—became increasingly 
clear in Istanbul. From the Habsburg side, the ability to return the refugees, 
simultaneously lifting the burden off the state coffers and off the residents of the 
borderlands, remained a top priority regardless of what policy was pursued. For both 
Empires, then, the expectation of return and resettlement remained a fixed point of 
Ottoman-Habsburg bilateral diplomacy and helped to frame domestic and foreign policy.  
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Despite its unfavorable terms, San Stefano removed some of the uncertainties over 
Habsburg options and approaches. For Andrássy, it brought the palace’s aspirations of 
territorial expansion into Bosnia and Hercegovina in line with diplomatic reality. The 
Ottoman defeat and Russian demands made further discussion of Ottoman reforms to the 
provinces all but pointless. In a note to Zichy that tellingly fails to consider the Ottoman 
diplomatic position, Andrássy pointed out that because the Russian terms were very 
“unfavorable” for France and Britain, “the view that there will remain no other option for 
us than to seize possession of Bosnia and Hercegovina is again coming to the fore.”47 
The preliminary peace of San Stefano awarded to Bosnia and Hercegovina the 
autonomy suggested at the Constantinople Conference—self-government, with a 
governor appointed by the Porte on approval of the guaranteeing powers and overseen by 
an international commission.48 In fact, it left the provinces in a sort of limbo: from the 
standpoint of the Ottomans and the insurgents, San Stefano did not impose peace in the 
provinces; from the standpoint of the provinces’ neighbors the autonomy represented 
only an instability that, depending on how it was viewed, was either a threat or an 
opportunity. 
Habsburg public and political discourse labeled the autonomy proposed in San 
Stefano as a threat. As soon as details of the treaty and the potential autonomy for Bosnia 
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and Hercegovina were leaked to the press in February 1878, anti-occupation liberals in 
the Austrian parliament demanded the government confirm the reports, asking whether 
the government thought the treaty was in alignment with Habsburg interests in the 
Balkans, and if not, how the government would protect those interests.49 The preliminary 
treaty forced the question of what would happen with the two provinces, and by relation 
what would happen to the refugees on Habsburg soil. Throughout the three years of 
insurgency, Andrássy had consistently argued in public that Austria-Hungary had no 
intention of annexing or occupying the two provinces. Few in Vienna or Budapest 
believed him. While a clarity of intent to occupy the provinces is debatable in the period 
leading up to the Russian-Ottoman war, by 1878 Andrássy had decided the only possible 
course of action was to occupy or annex Bosnia and Hercegovina. In public, however, he 
continued to deny any intention to move into Bosnia and Hercegovina.50 
Andrássy faced two major obstacles to occupation. Not only was the Ottoman 
Empire reluctant to forfeit sovereignty over a territory it had ruled for centuries, but 
despite the sharp divisions in Habsburg public opinion over an occupation, the public 
tilted strongly against territorial expansion. Andrássy thought that a Great Power mandate 
to occupy and secure the provinces and then to carry out refugee repatriation would 
encourage public support. On the international front, at least, the outlook was positive—
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the strongest support he received for an occupation came from the other Great Powers. 
While still a general secret, Russia had agreed Austria-Hungary could have full discretion 
in the provinces; by spring 1878 even England was assuring the Ottomans they had little 
hope of retaining ownership of the provinces. Andrássy’s efforts on the other two fronts, 
however, relied heavily on the politicisation of refugees. He used—to moderate effect—
the burden of refugees and the security and social threats they posed to convince the 
general public that an occupation was the only solution to the problem. And as will be 
discussed later in this chapter, employing the question of refugee return was the central 
negotiating tactic when it came to securing the other term Andrássy thought might win 
public support for his policies: an Ottoman invitation for the Habsburg military to occupy 
two provinces.  
Convincing the Habsburg public to support an occupation promised to be a difficult 
job. In Cislethania, the general political lines of support and opposition to an 
interventionist policy of any sort had been apparent from the very start of the uprising in 
1875. While the Eastern Crisis was a major problem unto itself, it also quickly became 
yet another parliamentary tool employed in long-standing arguments over taxation, the 
extent of government centralization, education, social programs, the church, and more. 
To these conflicts was added the further complication that the decennial renewal of the 
economic terms of the Ausgleich—and hence a struggle not only between both halves of 
the empire, but among the parties within each half—came up for debate in 1876-1877. 
From the perspective of the public and the political elite, one of the core issues was 
demographic: what responsibilities, if any, did the Habsburg Empire have towards a 
neighboring population of Slavic Christians, and how might taking action change 
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domestic stability? The contours of the debate were already discernable in a fall 1875 
parliamentary interpellation from Josef Fanderlik, a Moravian member of parliament, 
who, after saying that Habsburg Slavs sympathized with their Balkan brethren, demanded 
to know what the government was doing to create a “satisfactory political situation” in 
the Balkans.51 Parliament’s Slavic members found common cause with its conservatives. 
In a contentious parliamentary debate in November 1876, after Russian intervention 
abruptly ended renewed Ottoman-Serbian hostilities, Karl Sigmund Hohenwart, a 
conservative federalist, joined the Slavs in denouncing any action that allied Austria-
Hungary with the Ottoman Empire or could leave Habsburg troops fighting against Slavs 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Hohenwart lashed out against recalcitrant liberals stymieing 
a “cultural mission which we have to fulfill in the east,” in order to advance “not only the 
material interests of the people, but also those higher spiritual interests for which 
mankind lives and works.”52 Hohenwart was by no means alone with his views; by the 
time of the occupation, the trope of a Habsburg mission civilisatrice had become well 
established.53  
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Austrian conservatives increasingly painted the liberal opponents to an expansionist 
policy as unpatriotic.54 Days after Fanderlik’s October 1875 exhortation to support Slavic 
interests, 112 liberal members of parliament submitted a series of questions, asking 
finally whether the imperial government was using its influence to ensure that, in the 
event of a general war in the Balkans, peace would be preserved for Austria-Hungary and 
the “quest to acquire foreign territory” would be restrained.55 Financial concerns weighed 
heavily for them, especially for a party still stinging from the financial crisis of 1873. For 
a club that was being torn apart by quarrels over domestic policy, opposition to an 
occupation offered rare common ground.56 Indeed, after the occupation was an 
established fact, it was liberals’ long-standing unwillingness to support it—combined 
with demands that parliament be allowed to approve the Berlin Treaty before it release 
additional money for running the new provinces—that helped to precipitate, in late 1878, 
a ministerial crisis that would end liberal rule of the Cisleithanian government.57 
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Embedded within their opposition was the German liberals’ deep concern over the 
addition of more Slavs to the monarchy, a concern based less on the sort of bigotry that 
later emerged from the liberal ranks than on concerns over government, administration 
and the potential fifth column of Russian pan-Slavism.  
Immediate concerns over governmentality were less the case in Hungary, where a 
deeply-rooted anti-Slav sentiment augmented Magyar Turcophilia in the parliament and 
public. The Neue Freie Presse had it right when the newspaper claimed “the weight of 
that incomprehensible force that one calls public opinion falls nowhere more than in 
international questions.”58 Whereas in Austria, public opinion on the Eastern Crisis and 
Bosnia and Hercegovina in particular was expressed in parliament and in the press, in 
Hungary it went well beyond the strong parliamentary opposition: the public had direct 
ties with the Ottoman Empire, and people took to the streets. Ottoman-Magyar sympathy 
ran deep, and during the Eastern Crisis extra-political activities built on these warm 
feelings and strengthened ties. Hungarians served in the Ottoman armies and worked as 
medics in the field; Hungarian students organized meetings in Budapest and Vienna to 
support the Ottoman Empire after war broke out with Russia, while others helped send to 
school the children of Muslims who had fled to Hungary in the course of the Russo-
Ottoman War.59 Other actions were more symbolic, but for an imperial government 
increasingly worried about parliamentary and public pressure on its foreign policy, 
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perhaps more disturbing. Two almost simultaneous events highlighted the worries: the 
return of the so-called Corviviana, and the visit to Budapest of a delegation of fifteen 
softas, or religious students, from Istanbul.  
In April 1877, the Porte sent Mustafa Tahsin Bey (later the ambassador to the 
United States) to Hungary to return the Corviviana—thirty-five codices which the 
Ottomans had removed from the library of the Hungarian King, Hunyadi Mátyás 
(Matthias Corvinus, ruled 1458-1490) while Hungary was under Ottoman rule.60 The 
Hungarians portratyed the event as strictly cultural, but it had clear undertones of cultural 
diplomacy. Tahsin, while not a member of the Vienna diplomatic corps, was an official 
of the Ottoman government, and he carried with him not just the codices, but a letter to 
the rector of the university in Budapest from Safvet Paşa, saying that in returning the 
codices, the Sultan wanted to offer “new proof of the friendship and respect that should 
make an unbreakable tie between the [Ottoman and Hungarian] people”.61 
The codices arrived on 28 April 1877 in Budapest, where the mayor, university 
rector, museum director, and a minister of parliament received them. Tahsin did not 
accompany the books to Budapest. Andrássy viewed Tahsin’s proposed trip to Budapest 
not merely as the inappropriate and meddlesome activity of a foreign power, but also 
worried it was inflammatory, and he forbade Tahsin from going. 
In addition to Tahsin and the Corviviana, Andrássy faced another delicate question. 
Due to arrive in Budapest one day after the codices was a group of fifteen religious 
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students from Istanbul. This was in fact a separate event from the delivery of the codices; 
the students had been invited on an exchange program that had sent Hungarian students 
to Istanbul earlier in the year.62 Practically, however, the arrival of the softas was an 
extension of the codices’ return. When word had reached Budapest that Tahsin would not 
be accompanying the Corviviana to Budapest, a number of organizations that had 
intended to receive him at the train station decided to delay their formal reception until 
the arrival of the softas on the following day. Groups from across Transleithania turned 
out to meet the students, including delegations from Cluj, Győr, Košice, Debreczin, Solt, 
and Kecskemét. Telegrams arrived from Nagy-Koros, Bratislava, Gran, Nagy-Kallo, 
Nyíregyháza, Szegedin, and Nove Zamky.63 The scene at the arrival of the students was 
frenzied. Large sums of money had been raised from financial institutions, landowners, 
and regular citizens, and the students were paraded from the train station to the center of 
the city, followed by wagons, floats, citizens, and even farmers—dressed in Hungarian 
national costume, and wearing fezzes. At a reception, one of the visitors gave a speech in 
which, accompanied by unceasing cheers, he pointed to the “perfidy of Russia’s pan-
Slavic activities, which even in its own country crushed all emotions of conscience and 
personal freedom, but nevertheless behind the mask of humanity carries to its neighbors 
revolution, quarreling, and war.”64 Including the number of people who stood on their 
balconies or watched from the windows, the liberal, anti-occupation daily Neue Freie 
Presse estimated that some 50,000 people came out to celebrate.65 
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Public worry about an  occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina manifested itself 
differently in social and political disturbances in each half of the empire. Against this 
backdrop, Andrássy went to the Delegations in spring, 1878, to ask for money. Less than 
a week after the signing of San Stefano, the Habsburg government requested it be allotted 
the hefty sum of 60 million gulden.66 Andrássy did not give a specific reason for the 
request; indeed, he went out of his way again to assure the public the government was not 
preparing to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina. As proof of the claim, the government 
pointed out the sum was much larger than would be needed for a military occupation—a 
pointless statement to begin with, but even less meaningful given that the sum was far too 
little for an effective occupation. “Too much to die for, and too little to live,” was how 
one member of the Habsburg family described it.67 
The refugee question played directly into the public debate on money. The 
delegations approved the 60 million gulden on 21 March 1878, and two days later 
approved an additional credit of 5.9 million gulden to pay off debts incurred for refugee 
support from 1876, 1877, and for the first four months of 1878.68 Throughout the whole 
procedure, refugees became a way of justifying expenses and what was clearly an 
intended occupation. Domestic critics—especially the liberal daily Neue Freie Presse—
hammered Andrássy for the cynicism in a series of blunt reports. Referring to an article in 
the Pester Lloyd that discussed the ways in which the Habsburg government was 
pressurizing the Ottomans, the Neue Freie Presse commented “the farce of an occupation 
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of Bosnia out of concern for the refugee is being spun with unbelievable perseverance.”69 
The Neue Freie Presse described as an “ingenious pretext” the claim in the pro-
occupation Budapester Correspondenz that “if we do not want to continue suffering from 
this great plague [...] there is no other means than by entering Bosnia with the appropriate 
number of troops and, as soon as the necessary measures are taken, to repatriate the 
refugees with force.”70 The Presse’s criticism culminated in a long piece on the decision 
of the delegations:  
 
Public opinion has spoken so frequently and strongly against an occupation of Bosnia, 
insofar as it is not a necessary part of a military or political operation against Russia, that 
[the government] sought for a pretense with which [it] could justify this occupation to the 
public. One such pretense was luckily found. The refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina 
demand continued care from the resources of our monarchy, and they have generated 
costs that up to now add up to six million gulden. The delegations are not ready to 
appropriate further money for this care; but they have pointlessly approved [...] another 
sixty million. So we mobilize and use the sixty million for the purpose of escorting the 
refugees back to Bosnia and Hercegovina, so that we save the extra one or two million 
we would need for [the refugees]! The long-sought pretext for marching into Bosnia has 
been found, and moreover in a form that is idiosyncractically consistent with the savings 
tendencies of both parliaments. One spends the sixty million that was in any case allotted 
to spare having to allot a million for the refugees! 71 
 
 
Negotiating an occupation 
For all of the above reasons—massive forced migration of Muslims in the eastern 
Balkans, Russia’s intended massive recalibration of the European balance of power, the 
continuing flight of Orthodox refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina as well as new 
movements of Muslims within the provinces, and the fissure in Habsburg public opinion 
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over the question of Bosnia and Hercegovina—refugees and the language of refugee 
return became an effective tool of foreign and domestic politics in post-San Stefano 
negotiations. For a domestic audience, common agreement on the need to return the 
refugees potentially offered the imperial government a way to make occupation look 
more attractive, while by 1878 consent to an occupation from other Great Powers, 
especially Britain, included consideration of the large number of refugees on its territory. 
And when it came to direct negotiations with the Ottomans to win an invitation for an 
occupation, Andrássy found in the refugee question what he perceived to be a powerful 
instrument to achieve Habsburg strategic goals.  
Refugee return was clearly in the interests of both the Habsburg and the Ottoman 
Empires. Andrássy wanted to convince the Ottomans the repatriation process could be 
carried out only under Habsburg direction, and therefore an Austro-Hungarian occupation 
of the provinces was, in fact, in the best interests of the Ottoman Empire. Refugees were 
the crux of the argument for occupation. Refugee return was vital for economic growth, 
political stability and the re-establishment of the status quo ante, and for preventing any 
further actions by Serbia and Montenegro. As such, return should be seen as the most 
important step to be taken in Bosnia and Hercegovina, regardless of how it was carried 
out or by whom. Over three years the Ottomans had been unable to pacify the provinces 
and return the refugees. Andrássy saw demanding refugee return as a safe way to strong-
arm the Ottomans into conceding to an occupation. Repatriation was a cynical tool in the 
foreign minister’s hands, but in the weeks of intensive diplomacy leading up the Berlin 
Congress the Ottomans took it very seriously The question of refugee return was, as 
Andrássy framed it, once again a means to lay claim to sovereign control of a territory.  
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Andrássy hoped to have a deal worked out with the Ottomans prior to the meeting 
in Berlin. In late March 1878, while holding one-on-one meetings with Ignatiev in 
Vienna to discuss revisions to San Stefano, the Habsburg foreign minister laid out a 
diplomatic course in a lengthy set of instructions to Zichy in Istanbul.72 He made clear the 
tactic was to convince the Ottomans their interests were in alignment with those of the 
Habsburg Empire.73 Although Ignatiev had agreed to an occupation, Andrássy instructed 
Zichy to make his case based on the San Stefano terms for Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
particularly the two-year tax break and the introduction of autonomy. Andrássy expressed 
concern the tax-break would extend Russia’s influence even further because it would 
have secured for the insurgents “a reward [for their uprising] in the form of compensation 
for damages.”74 Zichy was to argue to the Porte that the Great Powers would all agree the 
Ottomans would immediately have to realize in Bosnia and Hercegovina the 
“recommendations from the Constantinople Conference; that the entire circa 230,000-
person mass of refugees be returned at the cost of the Porte.”75 Such a repatriation, if the 
Ottoman Empire was in any position to carry it out, could succeed only with great 
sacrifice, Andrássy argued. In an autonomous Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Muslims 
alone would bear the financial burden, but the underlying agrarian questions that had 
sparked the uprising in the first place would remain unsolved. This, Andrássy claimed, 
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would most likely lead to a renewal of the insurgency, a division of the provinces 
between Serbia and Montenegro, the renewal of the “Slavic question” for the Habsburgs, 
and “new convulsions for the Ottomans that would certainly bring about their rapid and 
definitive demise.”76 The only thing that could prevent such calamities from happening 
was the “occupation of the neighboring Turkish lands.”77  
Zichy was to inform the Porte Austria-Hungary had no desire further to weaken the 
Ottoman Empire through such an occupation. This was surely true—there was little profit 
to be had in undermining the Ottoman Empire still more, as it could only strengthen the 
new states and open the Balkans up to greater Russian influence. Yet Andrássy instructed 
Zichy to use both the carrot and the stick. Zichy was to make clear to Ottoman officials in 
Istanbul there existed only two possibilities for the Porte. First, the Ottomans could allow 
Austria-Hungary free hand in taking any measures in Bosnia and Hercegovina necessary 
to preserve Habsburg interests, in which case Austria-Hungary would go to Berlin and 
fight to maintain Ottoman territory in Europe. Second, should the Ottomans choose a 
“wrong politics and instead of protecting the heart of their Empire [Bulgaria], waste the 
rest of their energy on maintaining a vain appearance of authority in a distant 
borderland,” Austria-Hungary would be forced to act alone, without offering any 
protection for Ottoman interests at the Berlin Congress.78 The lessons of Bulgaria were to 
be absolutely clear: while in the past a Habsburg move into Bosnia and Hercegovina 
seemed like it would only bring with it more problems, Andrássy wanted to caution the 
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Porte that “today it is about protecting the Muslim population [of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina] from total extermination.”79  
One week later, in early April 1878, Andrássy instructed Zichy to keep up the 
pressure and to illustrate the dangers of not following Austro-Hungarian advice. San 
Stefano’s promises of territorial expansion had invigorated Montenegro, which now had 
“in sight the definitive removal of the Muslim refugees, of which there are supposed to be 
20,000 in [Shkodër].”80 Andrássy urged the Porte to demand the unmolested return and 
reintegration of the refugees; any change to the facts on the ground might support the 
terms of San Stefano at Berlin. The Habsburg foreign minister suggested that until a final 
resolution to this and other open questions was reached, the Ottomans should not 
withdraw their troops from areas still under Ottoman military control. San Stefano 
demanded a withdrawal but as Andrássy pointed out, the treaty fixed no deadline.81  
This was population diplomacy. Forced migration—its initiation, prevention, and 
solution—became a valuable chip on the bargaining table for the Habsburg and the 
Ottoman Empires leading up to the Berlin Congress. Andrássy’s support for a smaller 
Bulgaria was in the interest of both empires, but as he asked Zichy to explain, no matter 
what shape Bulgaria ultimately took, Austria-Hungary placed great importance on the 
demand that the Muslims who lived there would be “guaranteed the same rights and 
freedoms as those that were demanded, or should be demanded, for Christians in the 
Turkish provinces.”82 Muslim minority protection was the logical outcome of the 
                                                
79 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 28 III 1878. 
 
80 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 08 IV 1878. 
 
81 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 08 IV 1878. 
 
82 HHStA PA XII box 131, Weisungen. Andrássy to Zichy, 07 IV 1878. 
  253 
Habsburg Realpolitik of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the thought launched Andrássy 
into a fantastical rhapsody of a secure multi-confessional future. In contrast to Russia’s 
plans for Bulgaria, an Austro-Hungarian administration of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
would “afford Muslims the most complete protection of their religion and property.”83 
The occupation would demonstrate that a truly peaceful coexistence and equality among 
Christians and Muslims was attainable, and that “the well-being of one element did not 
demand the oppression or eradication of the other.”84 Criticizing a European belief in the 
“doctrine of the incompatibility of the Cross and the Crescent,” Andrássy argued that the 
realization of such coexistence would have an importance that stretched well beyond 
Ottoman borders, and would “achieve a greater guarantee of the secure continued 
existence of the Turkish Empire in Europe than could be attained through European 
controls or intervention.”85 
At the start of May 1878, Andrássy had gathered the diplomatic strength to force 
the moment to its crisis. His instructions to Baron Herbert, the Charge d’affaires in 
Istanbul, clearly laid out the role of refugee return in the argument for occupying Bosnia 
and Hercegovina.86 The parliamentary delegations would not approve any more funds to 
support the refugees on Habsburg soil, and a return under the terms of San Stefano would 
be a Russian triumph that would put the refugees immediately “on top of a movement 
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and would create new difficulties for us and the Porte.”87 No matter what the Ottoman 
response and regardless of whether the Porte could or would make the necessary 
guarantees for a successful repatriation, refugee return was the question that would force 
Austria-Hungary’s hand.88 Three years experience, plus recent correspondence with 
Mažuranić in Croatia and Mollinary and Rodich along the Habsburg-Ottoman border 
made it all but certain the Ottomans would not be able to offer terms that would induce 
the refugees to return. The local population wanted the refugees to leave, while 
smuggling and other crime had become common. Refugees in the district of Gora told 
Mollinary that if the government cut aid to induce return, the “lack of income and 
foodstuffs would force them to create robber-bands,” while others insisted they would go 
home only under Christian rule.89 
Secure in the knowledge the Ottomans would not be able to return the refugees, on 
2 May 1878, Andrássy instructed that the Porte be given an ultimatum. The Ottoman 
Empire must either immediately provide the refugees with all of the typical supplies 
necessary for return and reconstruction, and be prepared to guarantee Austria-Hungary, 
with “complete certainty,” of the Ottoman ability to meet its promises and provide for a 
secure repatriation, or,  
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It must decide to leave the repatriation of the refugees to us, and for which we would, by 
way of a loan, meet all of the costs and carry out whatever is necessary with our own 
resources. The refugees would return under the protection of our troops, who would at the 
same time be tasked, possibly with the co-operation of the Turkish troops already in the 
provinces, with the establishment of peace in these provinces and for the maintenance of 
order until all of the questions are resolved. We would not oppose a declaration by the 
Porte that these provisional measures would not prejudice [Ottoman] sovereignty.90 
 
The cause of refugee return was thus linked to one of the most distinctive legal 
characteristics of the occupation—the maintenance of nominal Ottoman sovereignty.  
Ottoman officials clearly understood that the question of refugee repatriation was 
what Andrássy described to Zichy as a “plausible pretext.”91 But they also took the 
language of return seriously: an occupation could be prevented by the re-establishment of 
the status quo ante bellum. In this manner, the diplomatic focus on refugee return created 
an opportunity, however limited, to sway international public opinion, isolate Austria-
Hungary, and perhaps convince Britain to block a Great Power mandate for a Habsburg 
occupation. 
The Ottomans moved quickly. Members of the council of ministers disagreed over 
how to respond. Although Sadik Paşa, the minister of the interior, seemed willing to 
accept an occupation under the terms offered, the majority of members was opposed. The 
Habsburg argument could also be flipped with the suggestion that the Ottoman Empire 
should undertake a repatriation on its own, but only if Austria-Hungary would commit to 
preventing the refugees from returning to Habsburg territory.92 At the same time the 
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council was debating, officials took two additional steps. First, they asked Ahmed 
Mazhar Paşa, the Ottoman governor in Sarajevo, to investigate the feasibility of an 
Ottoman-led return and resettlement program. Second, they tried to secure the necessary 
funding for a return. Even before the Habsburg ultimatum, the Ottomans had been trying 
to negotiate the early re-payment of 4.3 million Francs they had advanced to the Danube 
Commission in 1856 to pay for improvements to the waterway. Originally, the Ottomans 
said the money would be used to support the Muslim refugees from the Balkans who 
were in Istanbul and Anatolia. After the ultimatum, however, it was decided the money 
should instead be redirected to save Bosnia and Hercegovina from Habsburg hands by 
returning its refugees.  
The Ottomans were disappointed on both accounts. After meeting with local 
officials and notables, Mazhar reported from Sarajevo there were neither the supplies, 
money nor personnel necessary for repatriation. The British member of the Danube 
Commission said it would be impossible to advance any funds to the Ottomans for any 
purposes, no matter how noble.93 Indeed, it was at this point the British ambassador in 
Istanbul was instructed to tell the Porte it should accept the occupation as the price of 
Habsburg support for a smaller Bulgaria.94 Within a week of receiving the ultimatum, 
Safvet sent a letter to Mahmud Es’ad Paşa, the Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, that 
repeated, almost verbatim, the terms outlined in the original Habsburg proposal: a 
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temporary occupation with military protection for returning refugees, a loan to pay for 
their resettlement needs, and the preservation of Ottoman sovereignty.95 
 
The Road to Sarajevo 
When the Habsburg occupation forces entered Bosnia and Hercegovina on 29 July 1878, 
they met with a violent resistance that military and civil leadership had not expected 
based on generally optimistic consular reports. San Stefano had raised the possibility of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina achieving some form of autonomy, and in the months since it 
was signed, Ottoman central government control over the provinces had effectively 
collapsed. The local administration, once incompetent and dismissive, had become 
virtually paralyzed: officials were either trying to relocate elsewhere in the empire, or 
were, like Ahmed Mazhar and his secretary Konstan Paşa, securing support for leadership 
positions in a new local government.96 Into this void stepped first a committee led by 
local notables. By the time the terms of the Berlin Treaty—and specifically of Austria-
Hungary’s permission to occupy the provinces—became known, real power lay in the 
hands of the loosely-organized militia that fought the occupation. For its part, the 
Ottoman army was barely functional—unable to put down the anti-occupation 
insurgency, incapable of maintaining ranks, and barely able to guard the governor’s 
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residence.97 For most of the uprising and during the Russian-Ottoman war, the provincial 
capital of Sarajevo had “offered an image of quiet idyll.”98 Everything changed in the 
first half of 1878, however, and by the end of July, the city had undergone what Robert 
Donia describes as a “revolution.”99 Sarajevans were preparing for a post-Ottoman order. 
At the start of January 1878, Konrad Wassitch, the former Habsburg repatriation 
official in Hercegovina, replaced Theodorovich as the General Consul in Sarajevo. 
Wassitch was an old Sarajevo hand, having worked in the consul from 1859-1861, and 
his reports counted among the most reliable from Sarajevo’s consular corps.100 Within a 
month, he had a very clear assessment of the situation: the provincial administration had 
“no authority, and the population [had] lost its confidence in the government.”101 
Watching a crowd of Sarajevans exiting the Imperial Mosque, Mazhar commented, “If 
our government wants to hold on to Bosnia at all, it has to do what it used to do and exile 
all of those blockheads to Anatolia without mercy or compassion, because with them, all 
progress and all cultural work is impossible.”102 The governor had first arrived in 
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Sarajevo on 18 May 1877 and had little chance to build a support base; his general 
disdain for the population only undermined his situation further.  
The Ottoman military’s position was at least as critical, and by the time the armed 
insurgency broke out in June it seemed unlikely Ottoman soldiers would be able to 
defend their own armories, having barely withstood crowds rushing the governor’s 
residence.103 The soldiers were poorly trained and poorly outfitted; they were also often 
loyal not to their commanders but to the locals. Out of twenty-three Ottoman battalions, 
nineteen comprised exclusively local soldiers who were, for the most part, stationed near 
their homes. Two more battalions were mixed. By the start of July, 1878, Hafiz Paşa, the 
Ottoman military commander, had only two true “Turkish battalions” at his disposal.104 
The military itself was socially destabilizing, too. In the past three years, the Muslim 
population of Bosnia and Hercegovina had supplied the troops for 32 battalions of regular 
soldiers and numerous Başıbozuk and by the start of 1878, there were few able-bodied 
men left to conscript.105 Inflation meant the money that families of conscripted Muslim 
merchants received was sufficient only to buy enough bread for one person for about ten 
days.106 In February 1878, a group of soldiers’ wives assembled in the government 
building and demanded Mazhar sink the bread prices, while others blocked his path on 
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the open street and demanded bread for themselves and the children they brought with 
them. Wives had submitted written petitions in the past; in March 1878, when Mazhar 
told a group of wives he could do nothing for them because the Ottoman Empire was 
under attack from its enemies, a Muslim refugee from Nikšić responded, “It isn’t the 
foreigners, but the Ottomans who have attacked the empire. You are the enemy of the 
empire.”107  
As far as these failures of the imperial institutions went, they do not seem to have 
had a major direct impact on the process of refugee return that took place after the 
occupation. Habsburg plans envisioned working with Ottoman officials in the repatriation 
process, and in most cases this appears either to have been possible or in cases when it 
was not possible, to have had no serious negative impact on repatriation. Instead, it was 
the formation first of an autonomous quasi-government, followed by the armed 
insurgency, that really set the terms under which the Habsburg occupation took place. 
Public pressure on the civil and military administration had been growing, even if public 
interests were divided, though less by confession than by class.108  
As early as February, 1878, local Muslim notables were meeting in private and 
discussing the situation. Although some saw an end to Ottoman rule as an opportunity to 
regain independence and return to a feudal order, most supported an occupation as a 
means to preserve the social, political, and economic stability that was the root of their 
interests.109 Moderate local notables such as Mehmed Beg Kapetanović, who in 1876 had 
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unsuccessfully tried to secure the repatriation of refugees from Croatia, were measured 
voices in the ears of both Ottoman administrators and the foreign consular corps, and the 
inspiration for Wassitch’s sunny consular reports back to Vienna.110 In May 1878, the 
notables still had enough influence to co-opt a popular movement that was pushing for 
the establishment of an assembly that would run the provincial government, banish 
Christian officials and rule in accord with şeriat.111 In the event, the assembly was 
established, but it lacked any executive power, comprised largely the elite, and was 
empowered solely to investigate the complaints that had led to its establishment in the 
first place. The assembly was also broadly representative: when it met on 8 June, it had 
twenty nine seats. For Sarajevo, there were twelve seats for Muslims, two each for 
Orthodox and Catholics, and one for Jews. The remaining twelve seats were for one 
Muslim and one Christian member from each of six sancaks: Banja Luka, Bihač, Mostar, 
Travnik, Zenica and Zvornik. Because of the cost of travel and board, these seats were 
never filled.112 
By the end of June, the assembly could boast two main achievements. First, the 
simple presence of a deliberative body, especially one that demonstrated flexibility by 
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admitting new Orthodox members, preserved at least some social cohesion. Second—and 
this certainly helped to maintain stability—the assembly was a forum that reduced 
political intrigue elsewhere in the provincial government.113 Despite that, the assembly 
was not able to withstand the news, which arrived in Sarajevo on 3 July 1878, that 
Austria-Hungary, “at the request of England and Russia,” had been unanimously given a 
“mandate immediately to occupy Bosnia and Hercegovina militarily and to assume the 
administration of these provinces.”114 
Wassitch’s initial investigations left him optimistic. While not unanimous, 
Sarajevo’s elite, and especially its Muslim elite, supported a Habsburg occupation for 
pragmatic and deeply conservative reasons. Serbia had for decades been gradually 
pushing out its Muslim population, and large groups of Muslims in eastern Bosnia were 
recently displaced from Serbia.115 Bosnia’s incorporation into Serbia was unthinkable. 
And as attractive as a sweeping autonomy was, the continuation of a form of imperial 
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rule was not just the preservation of the familiar, but the only hope for the preservation of 
the prerogatives of the elite.116  
Yet Sarajevo’s elite were quickly isolated. Despite repeated requests, Mazhar did 
not receive instructions from Istanbul. In the uncertain environment, the assembly voted 
to enlarge itself; in the process it took as a member Salih Vilajatović, better known as 
Hadži Lojo, who would become the charismatic leader of the organized insurgency 
against the occupation and against the maintenance or restoration of Ottoman imperial 
rule. The assembly took on a broader governing role and more populist aspect. It moved 
its location from the governor’s residence to a building directly across from the Gazi 
Husrev mosque, and began its “transition from a nascent representative body under elite 
Muslim leadership to a group of activists under the influence of the conservative religious 
establishment and lower-class Muslims.”117 The assembly’s focus turned to mobilizing 
militarily against the occupation, and within days most of the local notables and 
landowners had walked out. This left Vilajatović in control of the assembly, effectively 
the only functioning governing body in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and one pitted against 
not just a Habsburg occupation, but also against the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The occupation and transitional government 
Major General Stefan Jovanovich led the XVIII Infantry into Hercegovina on 29 July 
1878 and quickly reached and secured Mostar. The XIII Army, commanded by General 
of the Artillery Josef Phillipovich, entered Bosnia at three different points along the Sava 
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River and headed south. Leading the middle column from Slavonski Brod, Phillipovich 
finally entered Sarajevo on 19 August. It took another two months for the army to subdue 
the last pocket of resistance to the occupation, and when the fortress in Kladuša, in the far 
northwestern corner of Bosnia, finally fell on 20 October 1878, the occupation of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina had cost the Habsburg army 5,000 wounded, missing, or dead soldiers, 
with an additional 2,000 soldiers who subsequently died from wounds or disease.118 This 
was far from the “single company of Husars” and a “marching band” Andrássy claimed 
would be sufficient for the occupation.119  
The most immediate effect of the occupation on the refugee situation was that it 
created more refugees—in this case, largely Muslims fleeing the occupying army. Many 
of them were lower-level Ottoman administrators and bureaucrats who fled either deeper 
into Ottoman territory, or even to Serbia, where around 3,000 were waiting for some 
form of transportation to elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Many were peasants or others 
who had been involved in the insurgency; others had simply fled. 
Habsburg authorities pursued the same strategy as the Ottomans had in the three 
years leading up to the occupation. As the occupation operations ground on and refugee 
movement out of the two provinces continued unabated, the Habsburg foreign ministry 
reached an agreement with Serbia, which was already struggling under the burden of the 
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Orthodox refugees it had been sheltering, to control the flight.120 Any armed bands would 
be disarmed and then interned; any armed regular army units who failed to put down their 
weapons would be treated as enemy; unarmed refugees, women and children would be 
offered protection but would be required to provide their own support, and Serb civilians 
would not help refugees cross over.121 The refugees were to be offered an amnesty to 
induce their return, and the Habsburg consul in Belgrade was to prepare for returns.122 
Also for the first time during the uprising, the occupation led to a significant 
number of Muslim refugees crossing onto Habsburg territory. The reasons for this 
movement are difficult to determine, and the actual number of refugees involved is not 
clear, although it was large enough for the Habsburg government to issue policy 
directives. These were based on instructions issued to border officials in 1876 in 
preparation for large numbers of Ottoman soldiers, irregulars, and Muslim civilians from 
Serbia or Montenegro crossing to the Habsburg side during the Serbian war with the 
Ottoman Empire. Framed as policies regarding treatment of prisoners of war, the orders 
established a clear and explicit equality of treatment and management for all individuals, 
regardless of religion. Equal treatment of Muslim non-combatants was implicit in these 
instructions, although best articulated with regard to combatants.123  
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By the time of the occupation, the identical treatment of Muslim refugees was, as 
Mollinary put it, a Grundsatz—a basic principle.124 Once the occupation was underway, 
the new refugees were subject to surveillance and moved more systematically to pre-
established internment locations than had been the case earlier. Nevertheless, the 
treatment of Muslims did not substantively differ from that of Christians. On 24 August 
1878, the General Command in Zagreb requested from the War Ministry instructions for 
managing Muslim refugees from “the interior of Bosnia near Berbir [Bosanska 
Gradiška]” who had requested permission to cross the border onto Croatian territory.125 
From Zadar, Rodich submitted a similar request with regard to anti-occupation Christian 
insurgents in Dalmatia.126 Artur Bylandt-Rheidt, the Minister of War, reiterated the 1876 
instructions and specifically that—as long as the number of refugees remained low—they 
were to be interned in Civil Croatia proper.127 Should the number of Muslim refugees 
increase, Mollinary was to send them to the same Hungarian districts that had been 
prepared to receive refugees during the Serbian-Ottoman War. Officials in these 
locations, the minister thought, were already well prepared to receive Muslim refugees.128 
In Dalmatia, the Christian insurgents and “as the case may be, Muslim or other refugees” 
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were to be interned in Dalmatia.129 Like two years earlier, should many people cross over 
from Hercegovina, plans were in place to transport them for internment in Krajn, 
Carinthia, or southern Styria.130  
Regardless of creed or the date on which they crossed over, these refugees were 
viewed as belonging to the same larger group of refugees. This was true not just in 
management but also finance. After the joint minister of finance questioned how Muslim 
refugees in particular should be accounted for, Andrássy explained “[the fact that] 
Muslims are also to be found among these refugees should not prevent the payments for 
them as well as for the Christian refugees being taken from the allocations” made for 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian refugees in general.131 
Immediate responsibility for running the newly-occupied provinces fell to the 
military, but on 16 and 25 September 1878—six weeks after Phillipovich had entered 
Sarajevo, but well before the Habsburg Army had finished military operations against the 
armed resistance—Franz Josef signed two orders establishing in Vienna a joint 
Commission for Affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Commission started out as a 
provisional solution to establish civil government under political and judicial organs of 
the empire, with the first task being establishing the security of “life and property of the 
residents, and for this special attention was paid to the organization of a gendermerie.”132 
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The commission quickly became first a transitional government and then, finally, the 
legitimate provincial government for the new provinces.133 
The commission worked for five months under the immediate auspices of the 
Foreign Ministry before its activities were subsumed into the Imperial Finance Ministry 
at the end of February, 1879 and ultimately eliminated in June, 1880. The commission 
was an Austro-Hungarian institution to its core, with representatives from each of the 
three common ministries and both halves of the Empire, and meetings held in both 
Vienna and Budapest. The commission was tasked in the first instance with defining the 
Sarajevo Army commander’s role as head of the Bosnian and Hercegovinian civil 
bureaucracy; it was the main advisory body to the foreign ministry on affairs in the new 
provinces and it mediated between the provincial leadership in Sarajevo and all levels of 
imperial and royal government.134 The repatriation of refugees was a central task of the 
commission from the very start.  
Peter Sugar has characterized the commission as “ineffective.”135 It suffered from 
numerous structural problems: other parts of the bureaucracy seconded officials to the 
commission, but at least in the case of the Austrian and Hungarian governments did not 
provide or pay for staff. Moreover, commission members maintained other 
responsibilities in their respective governments. The imperial finance ministry then lent 
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members of its own staff to the commission.136 It was not a long jump from this set-up to 
the removal of the commission into the imperial finance ministry itself with the purpose 
of the “achievement of an active and energetic Executive of all the administrative affairs 
of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the hands of the joint ministry.”137 
The supposed inefficacy of the commission, however, had far less to do with the 
body per se than it did with the awkward structure of the Habsburg Empire itself and the 
persistent opposition to the occupation among the populace. The incorporation of the 
commission into the finance ministry overcame some of the structural problems created 
when the commission was first established. This was the beginning of the process that 
would turn Bosnia and Hercegovina into Austria-Hungary’s only true “Imperial” 
territories. It was also the process by which the civil administration of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina became administratively and physically ensconced in the imperial finance 
ministry, where it remained—an extra-territorial government. Most importantly, 
however, it isolated the provincial administration from representative bodies of the 
Habsburg Empire. The head of the provincial government was the Imperial finance 
minister, and as one of the three common ministers was not responsible to the 
parliaments in either half of the Empire, but to the delegations—which met once 
yearly.138 As Sugar points out, the principles outlined in the imperial order that created 
this administrative structure emphasized the administration was to handle all questions in 
“agreement with the governments of the two territories of the Austro-Hungarian 
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Monarchy.”139 The structure effectively gave the finance minister/governor free hand to 
rule Bosnia and Hercegovina as he saw fit, without any checks on administrative abuse. 
Prior to its incorporation into the finance ministry, the commission had been 
established as an organ of the foreign ministry, which set the early tone of the 
commission’s work by appointing as the chairman Josef Schwegel—the Sectionschef 
(section chief; the highest bureaucratic appointment) in the foreign ministry, a trusted 
colleague of Andrássy, and a former General Consul in Alexandria and in Istanbul.140 
The other members of the commission were Rudolf Borowiczka von Themen, 
representing the War Ministry, Alexander Mérey von Kaposmérő, representing the 
imperial finance ministry, Emil von Gödel-Lannoy representing the Austrian 
government, and Ludwig von Jekelfalussy, representing the Hungarian government. 
Occasional participants included familiar Balkan hands such as Karl Krauss, who was 
chief of the Bureau for Bosnia and Hercegovina in the foreign ministry, and Konrad 
Wassitch.141 
Refugee repatriation came up for discussion at the second sitting of the commission, 
and remained constantly near the top of the agenda. The urgency of repatriation was 
impressed on the commission from the very start. Coming from the foreign ministry, 
Schwegel was of course well-acquainted with the political and financial pressure to 
repatriate; moreover, the primacy of repatriation to the occupation authorities had been 
clear from the very start. Regardless of whether refugee repatriation was a legitimate 
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reason for the occupation or a cynical argument veneering territorial aggrandizement with 
humanitarian necessity, the priority of repatriation remained clear. In late April 1878, 
while Andrássy was using the refugee question to force the Ottoman hand in negotiations 
over an occupation, the foreign ministry circulated a “Memorandum about the most 
urgent precautions in case of an occupation of the Bosnian territory with regard to the 
first administrative and judicial and subsequently policing arrangements.”142 The memo 
first laid out the two possible forms an occupation might take—either with the agreement 
of the Ottoman empire “under the title of a positive guarantee for the secure repatriation 
of [the refugees] and then for the re-establishment” of peace and order, or—either with or 
without the agreement of the Ottoman Empire—an occupation that tended more towards 
a “formal seizure.”143 In the first case, the Habsburg’s “main task” would be providing 
security for the repatriation; in the second instance, in addition to the security 
preparations, an “Austro-Hungarian administrative and judicial apparatus” would be 
substituted for the Ottoman administration and, it is clear, create the circumstances for a 
successful and stable refugee return.144 
The Commission often restricted its administrative agenda to high-level imperial 
concerns, leaving the more practical questions to General Phillipovich. This was 
particularly the case with the refugee question, where the Commission dealt most directly 
with the international and financial aspects. Officials at the border—both on the old 
Croatian-Slavonian and Dalmatian side as well as the Bosnian and Hercegovinian side—
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took responsibility not simply for repatriating the refugees, but also for planning and 
orchestrating the process. The general guidelines for repatriation were hardly new, and 
included providing returnees with the tools and materials to rebuild their houses, seed 
corn for the coming year, and sufficient food to last until harvest. The planning and 
operations were new, however. Previous experiences with trying to move large numbers 
of people informed the procedures that officials developed for the 1878 repatriation, and 
Habsburg control over administration on both sides of the border allowed for much 
greater cross-border cooperation and decentralization than had previously been possible.  
While repatriation of refugees from Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia was urgent, the 
first topic that came up in Commission discussions about refugees was Hercegovinian 
refugees not in Dalmatia, but in Montenegro.145 True to form, the awkward structure of 
Habsburg domestic politics posed an early hurdle for the commission when the Austrian 
and the Hungarian commissioners were unwilling to address the question of refugees in 
Montenegro because it was properly answered by the joint foreign ministry.146 Schwegel 
overcame Gödel-Lannoy and Jekelfalussy’s objections by convincing them they were in 
no way expected to make binding statements, but the issue was the first manifestation in 
the commission’s work of the vitriolic public debates about how to incorporate Bosnia 
and Hercegovina into the Habsburg Empire’s brittle dualism.147 
Relying on a report from the Dubrovnik mayor, Buddisavljević, the Commission 
suggested the repatriation of these refugees should happen through the month of October, 
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along with the return of refugees currently in Dubrovnik, Kotor and Metković.148 The 
numbers were large; in the three Dalmatian districts there were approximately 17,000 
refugees, while an estimated 21,000 refugees were in Montenegro.149 The refugees in 
Montenegro, however, posed additional questions. First, according to a telegram to 
Andrássy from the Habsburg consul in Cetinje, a disproportionately large number of the 
Hercegovinian refugees had been involved in the insurgency. Moreover, many had joined 
in Montenegro’s fight against the Ottoman Empire. Eight battalions of 500-800 
Hercegovinians, “the majority in connection with the actual Montenegrin army, had 
fought under Montenegrin sign and flag and stood not far behind the Montenegrin 
battalions as far as competency.”150 The question for the repatriation program, thought 
Thoemel, was how to return these refugees—”the most striking personification of the 
Hercegovinian insurrection”—and at the same time to break the feelings of solidarity 
they had developed towards Montenegro.151 
The refugees in Montenegro also posed a broader international question. Russia had 
been paying to support them, and had been involved with Montenegro’s refugee affairs 
from early on in the uprising. Like the refugees themselves, Russian aid for refugees and 
aid for the insurgency was often indistinguishable. It was well known that Jonin, the 
Russian consul in Dubrovnik, was funneling money to the insurgents, but he was also 
helping to support refugees in Montenegro—as well as, it was rumored, to support 
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refugees on Habsburg soil. And, as noted in Chapter One, the Habsburgs themselves used 
aid they provided to Montenegro as a form of propaganda. Throughout the uprising, 
refugees had been not just the subject of humanitarian aid, but also the site of imperial 
competition for influence and sympathy. By October, 1878, however, Russian and 
Habsburg involvement in refugee aid in Montenegro had taken on an entirely different 
tone, and become a narrow question of financial responsibility. Aid turned out to be a 
singularly expensive and unreliable way of currying favor among refugees, and the 
Habsburg Empire had long since been cutting spending to all but the minimum, including 
eliminating most of its aid to refugees in Montenegro. 
The Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, however, reframed the 
question into one of financial responsibility for refugee aid and repatriation. Interestingly, 
international norms appear effectively to have been suspended. The expectation would 
have been that the refugees’ home country would reimburse the costs of aid incurred to 
the host. This was, as mentioned above, one element of Andrássy’s argument against the 
Ottoman Empire retaining full control over Bosnia and Hercegovina. Yet in the case of 
the refugees in Montenegro, the Ottomans appear not to have been held responsible, and 
Montenegro seems not to have made any claims against Austria-Hungary after the 
occupation. Not even Russia, which had been carrying the burden of the refugees in 
Montenegro, demanded payment for its outlays—despite having supported the refugees 
well after the decision over Bosnia and Hercegovina at Berlin. The only disagreement 
arose over a two-week period at the start of November 1878: Russia’s representative in 
Montenegro had paid refugee subventions through 12 November 1878, but learned after 
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the fact he only had permission to pay them through 27 October 1878. Austria-Hungary 
had to make up the difference, amounting to 15,000fl.152  
This sum was relatively minor, but the fact the topic was under discussion for 
weeks points to the increasing urgency and complexity of financing repatriation. In 
March 1878, the delegations had approved the government’s past expenditures on refugee 
aid and agreed to the government’s request for an additional 780,000fl for the first 
quarter of 1878; with the commission up and running in October and the army command 
prepared to start the repatriation process, its initial request to the joint ministry was for 
330,000fl exclusively for food.153 Officials along the border began estimating repatriation 
costs. In Zagreb, the border command estimated that food, together with the transport of 
individuals, animals, and baggage from across Croatia-Slavonia to designated repatriation 
stations along the border with Bosnia would cost 415,000fl—a sum that included neither 
refugees from Dalmatia and Montenegro, nor additional costs of settling them in 
Bosnia.154 By mid-November, Phillipovich in Sarajevo requested an additional 188,000fl 
for food for the returning refugees; two weeks later the Finance Ministry released a 
further 100,000fl to authorities in Brod to pay for repatriation.155  
An uneasy tension had been established between Bosnia and Hercegovina’s new 
quasi-government and the officials on the ground arranging repatriation and—in the case 
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of Phillipovich—actually administering the provinces. The government had officially 
ordered repatriation to start on 15 October 1878, with the expectation that it would be 
finished by the end of November.156 The Habsburg administrators worked with those 
Ottoman administrators who remained, but for the most part the repatriation effort 
involved Habsburg officials on both sides of the border who had developed a detailed 
schedule to orchestrate the fastest, most effective movement of large numbers of people. 
Repatriation commissioners were to be sent to the locations in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
where they would work together with landowners and local officials to resettle the 
refugees and, importantly, to return them to their previous land tenures.157 The agrarian 
question remained a troublesome one, as the refugees were busy trying to confuse the 
existing ownership and tenancy relationships—not hard to do as contracts were 
unavailable for many of them.158 On paper at least, the plans were thorough and clearly 
designed to address the many technical obstacles that had arisen during previous 
repatriation efforts.159 The army was to assign officials to meet the refugees at the cross-
over points on the border and to escort them towards the interior; transportation would be 
arranged “stepwise” so that as soon as one group departed, another would be preparing 
for departure so that “individual groups [could] be passed on to the Bosnian authorities 
without interruption.”160 By the first week of November, these locations and the schedule 
had been fixed.161 
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It had been clear from the start that the repatriation was going to be costly; what 
was unexpected, however, was that the process of repatriation would begin at the same 
time the Sava and Una Rivers burst their banks in “[the type of] floods that had not 
happened in over a century.”162 By the middle of December, 79 villages on the Croatian 
side were under water, officials were trying to save their own people, too, and sheets of 
ice were forming across the flooded area.163 While 102,000 refugees—38,000 to 
Hercegovina and 64,000 to Bosnia—had already been returned by the middle of 
December, finishing the job in Bosnia would take much longer than expected.164  
The delays caused by flooding put local administrators who were sensitive to the 
needs of the refugees and the opinion of the local communities at loggerheads with the 
imperial government and the Commission for Affairs in Bosnia and Hercegovina. In 
Bosnia, the repatriation process had really only begun on 9 November, but by 13 
November, the first reports were arriving from Sarajevo and Zagreb that flooding was 
slowing down repatriation: communication between Novi and Gradiška was no longer 
possible; transport was dangerous; refugees and their bags were left sitting out in the 
elements. Three refugees had already died; three women suffered miscarriages, and the 
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conditions at the reception point in Gradiška were inhumane.165 The Commission 
responded to Phillipovich in a firm, accusatory, passive-voice:  
 
We regret the unanticipated hold-ups caused by current weather conditions, but hope that 
henceforth all difficulties will allow themselves to be quickly removed and that with the 
mobilization of all [our] forces, the task of repatriation will be carried out according to plan. 
We appreciate all humanitarian considerations and individual cases, the same can, in special 
circumstances that are worth taking note of, be taken into consideration; but the more 
important and compelling momentum, which the return of the refuges imperiously 
demands, cannot be subordinated to these [humanitarian] considerations.166 
 
For the Commission, the question was political, but also economic. By mid-
December, the costs had reached well beyond what had been offered from the 
delegations, originally anticipated at the time of the occupation, or forecast in subsequent 
revisions. The only money available would be to draw a credit retroactively from the 
money set aside for the military administration in Bosnia and Hercegovina for 1879. The 
potential delays only made matters worse. Because the repatriation had started so late, 
even winter planting was no longer a possibility; because of this refugee families would 
spend much of the next year on the dole, waiting for harvest. The new Habsburg 
government, while more effective than the Ottoman administration before it, was still not 
in a position to accept and process all of the returning refugees.167 The additional costs 
for the two provinces were estimated to be 1,359,247fl.168 For the Commission, the 
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solution was to saddle the new provinces with the costs by charging them as provincial 
debt to the Habsburg imperial government. It was a bookkeeping trick, and the cost of 
three years of refugee aid and repatriation was roughly equivalent to the entire expected 
provincial revenues for the coming year.169 It was also part of the penny-wise, pound-
foolish thinking that Phillipovich was convinced would undermine the Habsburg political 
position in the new provinces. Responding to the Commission’s demand that 
humanitarian considerations be subordinated to the necessity of repatriation, he argued 
that the Habsburg government had spent three years caring for the refugees for political 
and humanitarian reasons, and that if the refugees were to be repatriated in 
“circumstances which [would] lead to their certain demise,” it would mean “abandoning 
in the last decisive moment the final political success and humanitarian reputation that 
[would have been] achieved at the expense of Guldens, only in the name of saving 
Kreuzers.”170 
 
In the last year of the uprising, refugees were a central feature of the diplomatic 
wrangling over how to revise the map of Ottoman Europe. The Russian-Ottoman war had 
unleashed a wave of refugee movements unparalleled in their size, thereby unveiling a 
new model of forced migration and national-territorial change. The events in the eastern 
Balkans were an example that Austria-Hungary employed to argue for the necessity of a 
Habsburg occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and they also formed an essential part 
of the argument the Habsburg government made to the domestic population. Refugees 
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were a central consideration in the occupation, and with the establishment of the 
transitional government, returning and resettling refugees was a key element of the 
Habsburg efforts to legitimize their rule in the occupied territories.  





The Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary did not completely settle diplomatic matters 
over Bosnia and Hercegovina until April 1879, as the final repatriation process was 
drawing to a close. Last-minute negotiations in Berlin to obtain Ottoman permission for 
an occupation had resulted in a secret agreement that guaranteed the occupation would 
not diminish the sovereign rights of the Sultan, that the occupation would not be 
permanent, and that the details of the occupation were to be agreed in a separate treaty.1 
Furthermore it was agreed the Ottomans would not make these terms public.2 For the 
most part, subsequent negotiations for the separate agreement on the occupation revolved 
around a Habsburg military presence in the strategically-located Sancak of Novi Pazar, 
and whether Austria-Hungary would be willing to include an explicit statement on the 
provisional nature of its presence in Bosnia and Hercegovina.3 
As freighted as these questions were with Great Power strategizing and Ottoman 
concerns over sovereignty, solutions were found—even if only on paper. The remarkable 
thing about the Ottoman-Habsburg convention of 21 April 1878, however, was that it 
once again kicked the resolution of a population question further down the road. Article 
VI read simply “The question of the treatment of the inhabitants of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina sojourning or travelling outside these provinces, shall be regulated 
subsequently by a special arrangement.”4  
The convention explicitly assured that “the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in no way [affects] the rights of Sovereignty of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan over these 
provinces [...].”5 Yet the heart of the disagreement actually was about sovereignty, as 
framed with regard to population. Austria-Hungary insisted that Bosnians and 
Hercegovinians be considered in light of the capitulations—that is, when traveling 
elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, the principle of extra-territoriality would hold, and 
they would be subject to Habsburg, not Ottoman law. One reason for this was that 
Austria-Hungary wanted individuals who had taken up arms against the Habsburg 
occupation regime to stand trial before a Habsburg court, and to guard against the 
possibility Ottoman authorities might not hold them accountable.6 From the Ottoman 
standpoint, the claim contradicted the Habsburg’s recognition of Sultanic sovereignty, 
and the capitulations did not apply to a population still technically Ottoman. The potential 
repercussions of accepting the capitulations were serious. The Sultan was unwilling to 
countenance the possibility that a Muslim Ottoman subject might be found guilty in a 
Habsburg court and sit in an Austro-Hungarian prison. He worried that the many 
Bosnians in the bureaucracy and in the harem might be held to Habsburg law. And he 
wondered, since the Habsburgs recognized the kadi courts in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 
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why should Muslim residents have access to that system when at home, but not when 
they leave Bosnia and Hercegovina?7 
In the margins of a later, undated Habsburg document that discusses a resolution to 
the status of Bosnians and Hercegovinians, an official scrawled “did it happen?”8 The 
answer appears to be no, a supplemental agreement never was signed; indeed, it seems 
the subject was dropped entirely. Certainly there were reasons to come to terms over the 
legal status of Bosnians and Hercegovinians elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Bosnians 
and Hercegovinians—not all of them Muslims—began to leave for other parts of the 
Ottoman Empire as soon as the Habsburg occupation began, and the emigration 
continued throughout the period of the occupation. Justin McCarthy suggests the Muslim 
population of Bosnia and Hercegovina dropped by over 200,000 from 1870 to 1879—
about one third of the Muslim population—and estimates that about 20% of the Muslim 
population died over the same period.9 Kemal Karpat argues that 80-100,000 Muslims 
left Bosnia and Hercegovina for the Ottoman Empire during 1878-1912.10 A reckless and 
brutal Habsburg army crackdown on Muslims only encouraged further emigration.  
Emigration was not a desired effect of the occupation, however; in fact, Habsburg 
planning as well as discourse clearly counted on a Muslim population. In part, retaining a 
Muslim population was an administrative question: preserving the provincial elite was a 
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necessary and important tactic for re-establishing provincial affairs. Waking the Muslim 
peasantry from their dark slumber was an attractive and righteous goal for the new 
Habsburg civilizing mission. But the issue went further than that, and the Habsburg 
Empire’s ability to maintain a Muslim population in the new provinces was the litmus 
test for its ability to rule. The bureaucratic expression of the need to maintain a Muslim 
population went well beyond the Habsburg Empire’s investment in cultural, religious, 
and educational institutions in the provinces: through to the early years of the twentieth 
century, Habsburg consular officials in Anatolia repeatedly tried to organize returns of 
Bosnians and Hercegovinians, and were frequently asked to help those who wanted to 
return.11  
The Ottoman response to this emigration was mixed, but confirms the general shape 
of imperial population politics, even while drawing off the long Ottoman tradition of 
settling Muslims in border provinces. Although the council of ministers wanted to help 
Muslims escape Habsburg rule, it also recognized that preserving a Muslim population 
was essential to maintaining Ottoman claims for sovereignty in the provinces; 
furthermore, it would limit Habsburg possibilities for colonization.12 By 1904, the 
Ottoman government had suspended the issuance of residency permits for Bosnian and 
Hercegovinians looking to move elsewhere in the empire.13 Ultimately, despite the large-
scale flight of Muslims, a large number of them returned as well. Proportionate to the size 
of the Muslim population, emigration from Bosnia and Hercegovina was the smallest 
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among the Balkan states, and return migration was the largest.14 Moreover, the process 
continued even after Austria-Hungary formally annexed the provinces in 1908: With the 
outbreak of the Balkan Wars, thousands of Bosnian and Hercegovinian emigrants living 
elsewhere in the Ottoman Balkans sought safety in returning to Austro-Hungarian Bosnia 
and Hercegovina.15 
The Habsburg occupation did not bring neat closure to the refugee question in 
Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, either. Orphans and possible orphans continued to be a 
big problem. Many stayed in Croatia immediately after the occupation, but were 
ultimately returned to the new provinces regardless of whether they had family there or 
not. Foreign do-gooders were involved to some extent, especially with the help of the 
local philanthropist Ilija Guteša.16 Both Paulina Irby and Guteša found themselves in 
awkward positions after the occupation, too. While Irby remained in Bosnia, she stood 
under constant surveillance as someone who had “intimate relationships with Belgrade 
and St. Petersburg” and was an “active agent of that English politics that under the 
leadership of Gladstone has promoted Russian interests.”17  Guteša’s situation was 
equally awkward. When the last commander of the Military Border left Zagreb in 1881, 
he sent a note of thanks to Guteša for all of his good work, especially in helping the 
refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina. At the same time, however, after the occupation 
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took place Guteša was never given permission to enter or travel in the two new 
provinces.18 
 
This dissertation has focused narrowly on a group of Christian refugees who fled the 
Ottoman Empire for the Habsburg Empire during 1875-1878. Their flight was a prelude 
to and testimony of the violence that would spread across the Balkans during those years, 
and force a fundamental redrawing of the peninsula’s political geography in 1878. Their 
flight also came at a time of rising—yet far from coherent—nationalist sentiment. To be 
sure, this was a Europe-wide phenomenon, but in the Balkans, where a relatively narrow 
elite class was actively and aggressively trying to nationalize Christian populations living 
under Ottoman rule, the “national struggle” had the potential for violence, and the 
violence drew the interests and influences of outside groups—other states for certain, but 
also non-state actors, be they volunteer soldiers, agitators, or foreign “humanitarians.” 
The period is often spoken of with reference to the “national aspirations” of various 
groups or principalities such as Serbia. In fact, what is most remarkable in the case of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina is both the population’s resistance to external nationalist 
agitation, and also the stubborn persistence of the imperial imaginary. There were of 
course calls for independence, or for the merging of the provinces in whole or in part 
with their neighbors. Yet until very late in the period, leaders of the uprising and their 
spokesmen demanded reforms and some form of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, 
not independence from it. Among the refugees the sentiment is less clear. Certainly 
reports to Vienna included testimonies from refugees who said they would not return 
until the provinces were Habsburg; how representative this was of broader sentiment is 
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impossible to determine, although there is plenty of evidence of voluntary refugee return, 
even if it was only temporary.  
We are accustomed to thinking of nation-states drawing their legitimacy from their 
citizenry. Especially in the Balkans, where the process involved chipping away at empire 
rather than Italo-Germanic agglutination, we are also accustomed to thinking of nation-
state formation as involving processes for which there are numerous felicitous phrases: 
“death and exile,” the “unmixing of peoples,” “ethnic cleansing.” I would suggest that in 
the face of these murderous processes, it was maintaining the mixed and the dirty, the 
entangled populations, that served as a marker of legitimate imperial rule. For the 
Ottomans this was certainly the case with specific regard to Bosnia and Hercegovina. 
Troubles for Ottoman Christians meant international trouble for the Ottoman Empire, 
Treaty of Paris agreement on non-intervention notwithstanding. At the same time, the 
steady loss of the Ottoman Christian population and the concentration of its Muslim 
population challenged the empire’s self-conception and helped to provoke, under 
Abdülhamid, domestic crises of legitimacy. Population was a marker for “multi-ethnic” 
Austria-Hungary, as well, and in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Habsburg Empire found 
refugee populations to be domestically destabilizing, but internationally almost 
opportune—in the eyes of Andrássy and others, the Habsburg ability to return the 
refugees could be claimed as reason enough for an occupation. From this standpoint, the 
subsequent departure of Bosnian Muslims was disastrous. There were of course daunting 
questions of Great Power politics at play, and these surely did much to define the course 
of events during the Eastern Crisis. The refugees from Bosnia and Hercegovina were not 
an Ottoman problem, they were a systemic problem. At issue was not just the question of 
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the legitimacy of Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Hercegovina, but the legitimacy of the 
imperial system more broadly. 
Given the size of the refugee movements in question, and the technologies that 
could be brought to bear on the refugee problem, it is not surprising that this period also 
saw the creation of new, bureaucratized systems of refugee aid and control. The 
management of refugee populations was as much about controlling movement as it was 
about meeting refugees’ existential needs. To chart the development and extent of these 
systems is to chart how decisions are made about people and who is included or 
excluded. Habsburg refugee management techniques included forced sedentarization and 
mandatory disarmament as part of a broader approach designed to neutralize any threat 
the refugees might pose. These patterns were then recapitulated in the repatriation 
agreements between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Relations between local and 
foreign humanitarians furthered this process of classifying and categorizing in a similar 
manner, but the repercussions could be felt in other directions: the meeting of foreign and 
local philanthropists also resulted in a struggle over what the meaning of 
humanitarianism actually was and, again, to what extent victimhood would be the 
exclusive category for definition. The struggles over definitions and meaning were of 
course very contingent and the definitions were unstable at the time. That, at least, 
remains true: the dilemmas of humanitarian aid and the meaning of refugeedom are still 
open topics.  
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